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Thesis Title:
Russian Public Opinion and the Two Chechen Wars, 1994-96 and 1999-2002:  Formation 
and Evolution 
Thesis Introduction
This thesis is to contribute to academic knowledge concerning Russian public opinion and the 
two wars in Chechnya, focusing on differences in perception of each war within the coinciding 
Russian political climate.
This thesis adds on to relevant academic literature pertaining to this subject in several ways, and 
represents a necessary approach on a topic in which the state of Russia’s democracy can be 
tested, particularly as to what the status is of the Russian state as a democratic state or 
alternatively an authoritarian state.  Frequently, as will be detailed, the subject of Russian public 
opinion on the Chechen wars will have been mentioned, and even explored in the context of 
academic writings.  However, the author finds it necessary to put exactly this issue on a pedestal 
and observe how the very nature and status of Russian public opinion concerning the Chechen 
war issue reflects on the Russian regime, if indeed at all.
There are a great many facets to a study of this topic.  Firstly (chapter one), in the context of a 
detailed literature review, finding and elaborating on an understanding of Russian public opinion 
is necessary in the earliest instance.  Secondly (chapter two), a comparative examination of 
Russian public opinion and its contending views on each of the two wars must be scrutinized.
6Thirdly (chapter three), the question of the cleavages in Russian public opinion on the Chechen 
wars must be explored.  Based on available data, this section will attempt to establish sectional, 
gender, age and other separations in which there could exist differences within “general” Russian 
public opinion on the national level.  Coinciding with this third chapter will be a review of other 
data found during research for this thesis that may have a debated application to increasing 
understanding of Russian public opinion.
Fourthly (chapter four), there will be an examination of the status of Russian public opinion and 
the Chechen wars in regard to efforts by the Russian government to manipulate the media.  Next, 
in a fifth chapter based on data and research in this thesis, Russia’s status as a ‘democratic’ state 
must be assessed.  Accompanying this chapter (five) will be a short literature review covering 
democratic theory, which is of relevance to the discussion in that chapter but that has less 
bearing on the preceding research chapters.  Finally, a conclusion must summarize the findings 
of this thesis, and include some relevant closing arguments in relation to this research.
Looking at the two wars in domestic Russian and international public opinion, the first Chechen 
war is widely considered to be less ‘popular’ than the second.  This is due to the relative lack of 
open protest against the second war internally, as well as a continuing general international 
(  acceptance (outside of humanitarian groups) that the war, to an extent, is Russia’s own internal 
I affairs.  In some ways, this is the case even disregarding the accompanying international war on 
0V-W T  (  terrorism in which President Vladimir Putin has sought to add the Chechen war onto its roll call. 
Such attempts, if successful, would place the Chechen war in a comfortable niche beside 
America’s expanded global security policies and the military interventions in Afghanistan and
'7
Iraq where any misdeeds on Russia’s part more easily could be swept away in public opinion,
r ''  "
both domestically and internationally.
7What is meant by being less ‘popular?’  It is true that the second war seems to have more 
‘popular’ support than the first war, for there have surely been fewer public expressions against 
Putin on this specific issue than for Yeltsin in his day, and this is the case for a number of 
reasons, as to be examined over the course of this thesis.  The second war seems to have a 
heightened level of  justification in the Russian public’s mindset, and so the main research 
question of this thesis is to ask why this difference exists.  Specifically, this thesis is meant also 
to explore the avenues of contextualisation in which the two separate Chechen wars are held, 
how Russian governmental policies have contributed to this changing context, and further to this, 
what can any differences tell us about the state of Russia’s democracy, which is at the time of 
this writing (2007) in its sixteenth year.
Indeed, many academics and analysts take the subject matter of this thesis even as a commonly 
accepted ‘given.’  For example, in a UNISCI discussion paper, Javier Morales writes (in a 
footnote) as part of a larger discussion of President Vladimir Putin’s ‘political project’ in 
reference to public opinion and the Chechen wars:
‘The change in Russian public opinion towards the Chechen conflict was mainly due to 
this campaign of terrorist attacks. If the first Chechnya war had lacked public support, the 
second one started when the Russians rallied around Putin and his promises of an end to 
terrorism.’1
This is not to say that elements of this statement are not true, indeed some are.  Instead this thesis 
seeks a detailed examination of such statements beyond the simplifications apparent in many 
such published articles and other texts.
1  Morales, Javier, ‘Who Rules Russia Today? An Analysis of Vladimir Putin and His Political Project,’ UNISCI 
Discussion Papers, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, January 2004, p. 3, footnote 12, 
http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/Javier4.pdf.Further, this thesis seeks to examine, as expressed by Stephen White, ‘What do the Russians 
think?’2  However, whereas White sought to ask this question in the broad scope of looking at 
various topics such as trust and ideological bases vis-a-vis Communist times versus ten years 
later, this paper intends to focus on Russian public opinion specifically in relation to the 
occurrence, for a great extent initiated by the Russian government, of Russia’s first post-Soviet 
major internal military engagements.  This thesis also will seek to answer the question posed by 
the analyst Timothy Thomas:
‘How important is public opinion to the overall success of a military operation? In the 
information age, as Russians and Chechens clearly demonstrate, it is more important than 
ever [Thomas’s italics].’3
At this point, a review of contemporary and parallel research must be held in which to establish 
the basis of this thesis.
2 White, Stephen, ‘Ten Years On, What Do The Russians Think?,’ Russia After Communism, (eds.) Rick Fawn and 
Stephen White, Frank Cass, London, 2002, p. 35.
3 Thomas, Timothy L., ‘Manipulating the Mass Consciousness: Russian and Chechen ‘Information War’ Tactics in 
the Second Chechen-Russian Conflict,’ The Second Chechen War, (ed.) Anne Aldis, Conflict Studies Research 
Centre, No. 40, September 2000, p.  110 (pp.  110-125)
9Jason Vaughn 
Chapter One
Literature Review 
Introduction
This literature review is written to explain to the reader where this thesis fits in with available 
academic and non-academic source material.
Therefore, primarily this chapter will seek to examine as accurately as possible:
•  What is known about Russian public opinion, and what is not.
•  How Russian public opinion in the post-Communist era previously has been explained.
•  What studies have been conducted on the issue of the Chechen war and on the role of 
Russian society in political discourse on the war.
Although some studies on determining the level of democracy in Russia based on this research 
will be mentioned in this chapter, most study and debate on this subject will be saved for 
discussion in a fifth chapter written solely on the topic of learning what is the Russian regime 
(regarded as a question of democracy versus authoritarianism).  This analysis will be conducted 
using prevailing democratic theory and will be supported by the findings of this thesis on public 
opinion and the Chechen wars.
Firstly, literature on the theory of public opinion must be reviewed.  Second, literature already 
detailing Russian public opinion’s regard for the military, both on the Chechen war and on
10particular issues such as the draft, must be examined.  Third, previous literature on Chechnya 
and the Chechen war must of course be covered.  Finally, in preparation for a larger discussion in 
chapter four, secondary sources considering the Russian mass media as well as other influences 
internally and externally (internationally) must be reviewed.  A short conclusion will summarize 
this chapter and lead into the next where a comparative study of overall Russian public opinion 
on the Chechen war will take place.
Public Opinion Theory and Political Society
This paper will allege that Russian public opinion only has relevance in society to the extent of 
the immediacy of the problem.  Without political actor accountability and the rule of law, even 
this impact is abated substantially.  Each of these issues will be studied in time.
The study of public opinion has a long history; some of which must be reviewed here.
Bernard Hennessy, in his 1985 book Public Opinion, gives one of the best dialogues on what 
exactly is public opinion in the recent era.  One of his first points of discussion is of importance 
for this thesis; this is the difference between beliefs, values, an attitude, and an opinion.
Opinions at Hennessy’s endpoint are ‘judgments about objects.’4  That is: what people ‘think’ 
based on their values, beliefs, and more generalized attitudes in consideration of any particular 
issue, or ‘object.’  Part of assessing public opinion in this thesis will be an attempt at a greater 
understanding of what are the values, beliefs, and attitudes of the Russian people on the Chechen 
war, and what this means in consideration of Russian democracy.  Most studies of democracy 
agree that the premise depends on more than just voting for representatives every so often, but to 
what degree does the Russian public accept a wider scope in having ‘democracy?’  Extending
4 Hennessy, Bernard, Public Opinion. 5th edition, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Monterey CA,  1985, p. 5.from this, what can an analysis of Russian public opinion based primarily on the Chechen wars 
inform us about Russian democracy?
Further, a debate of what is public opinion as extended from individual opinion is in order.  This 
is an issue of some long discussion; there are many definitions in academia for this.  Hennessy, 
through his study of Walter Lippman5  and others, comes to the conclusion that in general:
‘[...Jpublic opinion is the complex of preferences expressed by a significant number of 
persons on an issue of general importance.’6
In an examination of Russian public opinion on the Chechen wars, it is also a necessity to 
consider Hennessy’s ‘five factors’7 in understanding public opinion.  They are:
1) ‘the presence of an issue’
2) ‘the nature of publics’
3) ‘the complex of preferences in the publics’
4) ‘the expression of opinion’
5) the size of the interested public
Russia in the post-Communist era has a unique presence and understanding concerning all five 
of these factors.  On the Chechen wars, these elements, and the research in this thesis, can reflect 
on how the Russian government has responded to, or ignored, Russian public opinion in 
differing circumstances.
5  Lippmann, Walter, Public Opinion. Macmillan Company, New York, 1947.
6 Hennessy, Bernard, Public Opinion. 5th edition, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Monterey CA,  1985, p. 8.
7 Information from Hennessy, Bernard, Public Opinion. 5th edition, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Monterey 
CA, 1985, pp. 8-14.
12Additional analysis of what makes an opinion must be explored.  Over the course of this thesis, 
many attempts will be made to describe Russian public opinion in a meaningful way.  Robert 
Lane and David Sears, in their own book entitled Public Opinion, espouse two concepts for a
o
proper description of an opinion: ‘direction’ and ‘intensity.’  Both of these ideas are of 
importance.
Direction has the meaning that an issue ‘includes some affective or emotional quality of 
approving or disapproving of something.’9  Intensity depends additionally on how strongly 
opinion is in favour or against on any particular issue.  Understanding Russian public opinion on 
the Chechen war will frequently depend on how the Chechen war matters for public opinion in 
any given context, and then to what degree the war is an emotional issue.  As will be shown, the 
Putin administration has sought to dilute the intensity of Russian public opinion through an 
active PR policy in regard to the Chechen war, while acknowledging that the public portrayal of 
the war could potentially affect its continuing prosecution.  This is in contrast to the first 
Chechen war where the Yeltsin administration had arguably less understanding of the role of 
public opinion, and thereby had a far more vague policy towards winning the public relations 
war on the issue.  Extensive study of these concepts will be all too necessary for understanding 
the effects of the war for public opinion.
Perhaps the best book looking at Russian public opinion in general in the post-Soviet era is 
Matthew Wyman’s 1997 book Public Opinion in Post-Communist Russia.1 0   From his 
examinations of continuity in Russian political culture to his analysis of Russian attitudes 
towards the collapse of the USSR, market economy and the unity of Russia itself, there has never 
before or since been such a complete review of Russian public opinion.  Particularly, Wyman’s
8 Lane, Robert E. and David O. Sears, Public Opinion. Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs NJ,  1964, pp. 6-9.
9 Ibid, pp. 6.
1 0  Wyman, Matthew, Public Opinion in Post-Communist Russia. Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke, Hampshire and 
New York, 1997.
13eighth chapter has proven insightful as to the issues that this thesis attempts to explore in the 
third chapter covering cleavages in Russian public opinion on the Chechen wars.  He writes:
‘What is clear, however, is that understanding the social bases behind attitudes in Russia 
will improve our ability to identify likely directions of change.’11
This thesis has, for instance, attempted to expand on the understanding of cleavages as he 
outlined in that chapter.  Ultimately, in further looking at his data, this thesis seeks to focus only 
on Russian opinion and the Chechen wars but, in consideration of his conclusions, such as when 
he states, ‘[...]what is crucial for Russia’s democratic prospects is the behaviour of her political 
elites,’1 2  study here has sought to use Wyman’s quality of analysis as a benchmark on which a 
better understanding of the topic at hand can be brought.
Furthermore, Timothy Colton’s book on Transitional Citizens has a great deal of information and 
analysis on Russian public opinion in the realm of what has become Russian ‘citizenship.’
While he spends very little time in covering the Chechen war, Colton’s statistical analysis of 
party support in Russia on various issues is unparalleled.  I especially like his characterisation of 
Boris Yeltsin’s special place in Russia’s political landscape:
‘Russian presidential elections, where individual politicos rather than party organizations 
compete, and their faces smile out at voters from countless billboards and television 
screens, would seem to afford even greater latitude to personalism and charisma.  Not all 
those faces are equal in stature.  Of the Russian presidential personalities on our radar 
screen, Yeltsin is a rare bird, the patriarch whose name— like Charles de Gaulle’s in 
France, Nelson Mandela’s in South Africa, or Lech Walesa’s in Poland—is indelibly
n Ibid, p. 229.
1 2  Ibid, p.  148.
14linked with epoch-making events and with the laying of the foundations of the political 
system.’1 3
Given this position in Russian society, this must explain part of why Yeltsin was able to survive 
the negative reaction towards the first war in Chechnya.  Psychologically and politically in 
regard to Russian society, it must also necessarily correlate that Putin would lack such a secure 
consideration in his own era.  On a more basic level, it must be emphasized that, for Colton, 
Russian public opinion is indeed important:
‘There is no need to wonder whether Russian voters hold politically relevant opinions: 
they do.’1 4
There are few things that let the wind out of a Russian public opinion researcher’s sails more 
than the argument that Russian public opinion does not matter, as referred to next.
The more sceptical argument for Russian public opinion must be attributed to Vladimir 
Shlapentokh in his Communist and Post-Communist Studies article entitled, ‘No One Needs 
Public Opinion Data in Post-Communist Russia.’  In this article, Shlapentokh argues that:
‘Today, the major political forces in Russia seem completely immune to the voice of the 
people.  They look upon the masses as an ever mutable thing, a population that endures 
rather than rebels, obeys the current political authority, and even votes for it.  In their
1 3  Colton, Timothy, Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA and London, 2000, p.  175.
1 4  Ibid, p.  139.
15opinion, the fate of the country has always been determined by the politicians in 
downtown Moscow, and particularly by those who control the army and police.’1 5
While taking into account the similarities that Shlapentokh relates between the roles of Russian 
and Soviet public opinion in their respective governments, it could be argued that Russian public 
opinion has not been ignored as easily as he professes.  This is not to say that there ever has been 
any quid-pro-quo in the triangle between Russian public opinion, Russian government and the 
Chechen wars, instead it is perhaps to suggest that there is far from a complete lack of a 
relationship.  While alleging any sort of impact is not a facet of this thesis, it is nevertheless an 
interesting focal point of study.
Emphasizing this difference, John O’Loughlin argues that Russian public opinion is actually 
coming closer to Western public opinions, such as, specifically, American public opinion:
‘The vast majority of Russians however, like the vast majority of Americans, do not have 
a strong interest in world affairs; only events inside the Russian Federation (including 
Chechnya), in the “near abroad” and the fate of ethnic Russians outside Russia’s borders 
command public attention. ’1 6
O’Loughlin argues that Russia has an incomplete democracy, but that Russia has also:
‘[...]seen a dramatic switch from a foreign policy immune to public pressure to a close 
correlation of public opinion with military actions, especially in the “near abroad”i7
1 5  Shlapentokh, Vladimir, ‘No One Needs Public Opinion Data in Post-Communist Russia,’ Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4, Dec.  1999, p. 458. (pp. 453-460)
1 6  O’Loughlin, John, ‘Geopolitical Fantasies and Ordinary Russians: Perception and Reality in the Post-Yeltsin Era,’ 
Paper first presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Pittsburgh, PA, 6 April 
2000 in the panel on “Geopolitical Trends and Futures at the Turn of the Century,” p. 3.
17Ibid.
16Using a number of public opinion surveys, O’Loughlin effectively shows how the attitudes of 
Russian public opinion, especially in foreign policy areas, are remarkably parallel to Western 
public attitudes on foreign policy and their separations from everyday life.  Such similarities are 
briefly to be examined in this thesis in chapter two.
Research in this thesis sometimes will utilize public opinion polling data.  Some sources of this 
data will be professional polling services in Russia, such as the All-Russia Centre for the Study 
of Public Opinion, henceforth referred to by its Russian initials (Vserossiiskii Tsentr po 
Izucheniiu Obshchestvennogo Mneniia or VTsIOM).  Also to be used will be polling data from 
the Public Opinion Foundation (Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie or FOM) and from ROMIR 
Monitoring (Rossiiskoe Obshchestvennoe Mnenie I Issledovanie Rynka).  This data, of course, 
has the accompanying limitations, such as distribution, question format, and weighting, and these 
issues must be discussed in the context of which the data is used.  Memoirs of political actors can 
also be used to augment this polling data, as well as interviews conducted by the author for the 
purpose of this thesis.
In the area of polling data, VTsIOM, specifically under the leadership of renowned sociologist 
Yuri Levada, will be seen to possess remarkable clarity and reliability, having conducted surveys 
on the subject of Russian public opinion since the Soviet era.1 8   As detailed on the VTsIOM 
website of March 2000:1 9
‘The Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research (VCIOM) is the largest 
organization in Russia conducting marketing, social and political research on the basis of
1 8  Such was the case until, beyond the purview of this thesis, in September 2003 VTsIOM was taken over by the 
Russian state under the Putin administration, leaving Levada and his sociologists to be forced to form a string of 
newly-named organizations that have culminated in today’s Levada-centre.
1 9  www.wciom.ru. Valid as of 3 March 2000 (No longer availabile).
17regular mass surveys in Russia, CIS and the Baltic States since 1987. Thirty VCIOM 
regional branch offices and more than 3500 trained interviewers are involved in carrying 
out various research programs. VCIOM has been accumulating unique trends reflecting 
the dynamics of the society and market. VCIOM issues a number of special publications 
based on the collected data.’
Also very good, having started in 1992 (after breaking away from VTsIOM), FOM had a strong 
and consistent structure for survey conduct.  On the subject of their direct home polling data:20
‘Weekly nationwide population polls are conducted with representative samples in  100 
settlements in 44 regions, territories and republics in all Russian economic-geographic 
areas. Interviews are conducted in the respondents’ homes. Sample size:  1500 
respondents. The margin of statistical error does not exceed 3.6%. Additional weekly 
representative polls are conducted in Moscow (sample size: 600 respondents,  100 of 
whom are included in a national sample).’
ROMIR has similar, and no less professional, origins from which to analyse Russian public
9 1
opinion.  Their web site for a long time has boasted that:
‘The agency was formed by leading specialists in the field of sociology, psychology, 
statistics, and data processing.
Our staff are 50 well-educated, experienced researchers and motivated young 
professionals, all of them are bilingual. They have been trained in various qualitative and 
quantitative research techniques or in statistics and analysis in West European and US
20 www.fom.ru. See ‘Strategies and Methods’ sub-page. Originally from website: May 2000, Updated 19 May 2005.
2 1  www.romir.ru. 20 May 2000.
18Universities, Gallup International and Research International affiliates. Our staff is being 
regularly trained at seminars organized by WAPOR and ESOMAR.
Our team of part-time interviewers totals to 1,000 in Russia and to 500 in the CIS and 
Baltic states.’
Particularly their associations with Western polling organizations such as Gallup are quite 
impressive, and should be taken into account when weighing their polling source data.
Russian election theory will also have a prominent position within this paper.  Few books detail 
the method of understanding voting, referendums, and opinion polling in Russia better than the 
1997 book, How Russia Votes, by Stephen White, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister.  In this 
book, the authors explored Russia’s progress to democracy at that time and the methodology of 
Russia’s electoral system.  Although ten years old now, their examinations of how to best 
accurately poll Russian public opinion still have usefulness today.  Their definition of opinion 
polling as ‘a sample of the electorate rather than a tabulation’22 and their explanations as to how 
such a sample could be reliable in studying Russian public opinion have been useful in many 
ways in the development of this thesis.
A 2004 Post-Soviet Affairs article by Richard Rose, Neil Munro and William Mishler brings this 
data more up-to-date.  Using Rose’s New Russia Barometer polling data from 2003, they find 
that Russians considered their level of democracy far from ideal, but that there is a level of 
acceptance of this fact.  To the point where there is ‘no majority for any alternative,’ Russian 
public opinion has reached a ‘stable equilibrium’ that can only be changed by upcoming events, 
in which Rose et al. project the end of Putin’s second term as being a ‘predictable challenge.’23
22 White, Stephen, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes. Chatham House Publishers, Chatham NJ, 
1997, p.70.
23 Rose, Richard, Neil Munro and William Mishler, ‘Resigned Acceptance of an Incomplete Democracy: Russia’s 
Political Equilibrium,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 3, Jul.-Sept. 2004, pp.  195-218.
19Rose et al. have extremely good data to back up these assertions and are necessary to consider in 
the context of this research.
Expanding on this research, Rose, Munro and Mishler published in 2006 their material in a book 
entitled Russia Transformed based further on Rose’s New Russia Barometer surveys.  In their 
research, in understanding the ‘steady-state equilibrium’ and ‘equilibrium of support’24 for the 
existent regime in Russia, they spend much time considering what:
‘[...]risks that could challenge the regime if they came to pass, such as the outbreak of 
another ethnic conflict like Chechnya or another nuclear accident like Chernobyl.’25
This terminology in examining Russia is found often to be true in the context of this thesis; the 
wars in Chechnya have threatened the viability of the continuation of the regime in the present 
state, however the Putin administration (again within the context of this thesis) seems to have 
weathered the storm.
We already know also that Russian public opinion is moving increasingly away from a perceived 
dependence on the state.  In research by N. I. Lapin, he found that percentages of those who 
depend ‘only on you and those close to you’ for ‘improvement of your life’ rose from 55% in 
1994 to 78% in 2002.26  Along these lines, Lapin also found that between 1990 and 2002, trust in 
‘institutions of authority’ fell in all cases except the Presidency.27
24 Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Neil Munro, Russia Transformed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
UK, 2006, pp.  16-17.
25 Ibid, p.  186.
26 Lapin, N.I., ‘How the Citizens of Russia Feel and What They Are Striving For,’ Russian Social Science Review, 
Vol. 45, No. 6, Nov.-Dee. 2004, p. 6. (pp. 4-21)
21 Ibid, p.  15.
20We further have some evidence from Lapin’s data and analysis that, over the course of the 
overall time period studied in this thesis, Russian public opinion, given a choice of ‘individual 
freedom’ or ‘personal safety,’ changed to value personal safety more.  Lapin cites survey data 
showing that, in 1994, 47% chose individual freedom as more important versus 31 % who 
selected personal safety.  In comparison, in 2002, only 20% picked individual safety against 56% 
who put personal safety as more important.
Combining the above findings in Lapin’s work, in the connection between trust in institutions 
and values associated with safety versus freedom, he makes the interesting point that:
‘At the cutting edge of these interweavings a contradiction has emerged between the 
value of the freedom of the individual and the fact that his safety has not been insured.
An echo of this contradiction now is the critically low level of Russians’ trust in the 
institutions of authority.  As a result, the first stage of the transformation of Russian 
cannot be completed successfully as long as the freedom of the individual stands in
*)Q
opposition to the fact that his life is not adequately protected[...]’
As to be discussed in chapter five, this thesis agrees that as long as freedom and the protection of 
life are considered to be contradictory, in the form of lacking the rule of law, little progress can 
be made or stability found in Russia’s democracy.
Valid parallel research to this thesis also can be found in Theodore P. Gerber and Sarah E. 
Mendelson’s paper on ‘Russian Public Opinion on Human Rights and the War in Chechnya.’j0 
They have a decidedly negative opinion of the state of Russian democracy, finding that support
28 Ibid, p.  18.
29 Ibid, p. 20.
30 Gerber, Theodore P. and Sarah E. Mendelson, ‘Russian Public Opinion on Human Rights and the War in 
Chechnya,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.  18, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 2002, pp. 271-305.
21for human rights and demand for civil liberties is quite low.  This thesis will look at similar 
issues, and Gerber and Mendelson’s paper was instrumental in providing an interesting basis for 
analysis and discussion.
Bias as an issue in the study of Russian public opinion is important to consider further.  Adam 
Berinsky and Joshua Tucker have researched extensively this subject in their paper on 
‘Transitional Survey Analysis: Measuring Bias in Russian Public Opinion.’  Representing a 
crucial side-note in a consideration of this thesis, their studies of systematic biases and the ‘silent 
voices’ in Russian society are quite important.  Essentially, they were looking for trends among 
those respondents to surveys who refused to conclusively answer questions on certain topics (i.e. 
‘don’t knows’ and ‘difficult to answer’).
Using three waves of surveys conducted surrounding the 1995 and 1996 Russian Duma and 
Presidential elections, Berinsky and Tucker found that, unlike other issues they researched, the 
questions of law and order and on Chechnya did not reveal a ‘consistent direction to the 
sentiments of the question abstainers.’3 1   When they tried to analyse these ‘silent voices’ more 
deeply, they found ‘no strong pattern of difference.’32  This study is important in the context of 
this paper by perhaps showing the data environment of the abstainers present in all of the survey 
results presented herein, and to what extent possible must not in such cases be overlooked.
The political society of Russia is also at issue here.  What role do elites play in relation to the 
regime and to public opinion?  Linz and Stepan refer to political society as:
3 1  Berinsky, Adam J. and Joshua Tucker, ‘Transitional Survey Analysis: Measuring Bias in Russian Public 
Opinion,’ A paper prepared for the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 2-6 
Apr. 2003, p.  16.
32 Ibid, p. 20.
22‘[...]that arena of the polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, 
movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and 
solidarities, and advance their interests.’33
By this definition of political society, Russia’s experience with attempting democratisation has 
followed Huntington’s rollback theory on the ‘reverse wave’ of democratic progress (as also to 
be discussed in chapter five).  Russia’s autonomous groups, movements, and individuals have 
focussed on opposition to an authoritarian centre: over time becoming more difficult to criticize 
freely and even more difficult to dislodge from power.  At the same time, when reform has been 
sought after by the government, the centre is unable to break the bureaucratic deadlock of the 
Soviet authoritarian regime that not so long ago preceded it.
The authoritarian counter to political society is perhaps the movement against local government 
and distrust of the ability of the electorate to choose new leadership.  This is indeed a lack of 
trust going in both directions, from leadership and elites towards the populace, and the populace 
towards the former, as detailed by Richard Rose.34  As Pavel Baev discusses35, President Putin’s 
regime has sought to establish order through the added centralization of power and the utilization 
of his ‘friends’ in the secret services:
‘For Putin, with his initially narrow political base, it was only natural to look upon the 
special services as the main pool of cadre for his undertakings in reshuffling and 
reinvigorating the state machinery.’36
33 Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan, ‘Toward Consolidated Democracies,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, Apr. 
1996, pp. 14-33.
34 Rose, Richard, ‘Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust,’ The Global Resurgence of Democracy. Second 
edition, (eds.) Larry Diamond and Marc E. Plattner, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore MD and London, 
1996, pp. 251-263.
35 Baev, Pavel, ‘Instrumentalizing Counterterrorism for Regime Consolidation in Putin’s Russia,’ Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism, Vol. 27, No. 4, July/Aug. 2004, pp. 337-52.
36 Ibid, p. 341.
23Even in this context of possible reform, at many points, Russia’s bureaucracy is still 
extraordinarily rigid, which in combination with the entrenched ‘special service networks,’ 
prevents Putin from successfully modernizing the country.37
A war of the nature of Russia’s conflicts in Chechnya can be deduced in this atmosphere to 
almost have a mind of its own.  Putin can only respond to developments in the war; new means 
at his disposal for addressing the war beyond the secret services have been exhausted.
This thesis will also be looking at the environment in which Russian public opinion exists in the 
context of the global war on terrorism.  President Putin, from the time of the terrorist attacks in 
the United States of 11  September 2001 (which will be an event and date of focus in the 
construction of argument in this thesis), has sought to portray the Chechen war as being part of a 
greater struggle against global terrorism.  This has been the case both to enhance support for the 
war domestically and to dampen opposition to the at times brutal military campaign 
internationally. John O’Loughlin, Gearoid O Tuathail and Vladimir Kolossov term this 
representation of 11 September as being systematic as a ‘global Chechnya.’38
Furthermore, they dispute the depiction of Putin’s policy of open support for the international 
war on terrorism, even when the war brought American troops to countries of the former Soviet 
Union, as being ‘risky’ in terms of domestic policies.39  It would be ‘risky,’ they allege, only ‘if 
it were opposed by a large majority of Russian voters and/or by the political elite.’40 
Persuasively, using in part polling data, they find that:
37 Baev, Pavel, ‘The Evolution of Putin’s Regime,’ Problems of  Post-Communism, Vol.51, No.6, November- 
December 2004, pp.3-13.
38 O’Loughlin, John, Gearoid O Tuathail and Vladimir Kolossov, ‘Putin’s Risky Westward Turn,’ Post-Soviet 
Affairs, Vol. 56, No.  1, January 2004, p. 4. (pp. 3-34)
3  Consideration of this topic is also explored in a paper by Gail W. Lapidus entitled: ‘Putin’s War on Terrorism: 
Lessons From Chechnya.’  She examines particularly how Putin has represented the Chechen war in the post 9/11 
era, and then scrutinizes some facets of this projection in detail.  See Lapidus, Gail W., ‘Putin’s War on Terrorism: 
Lessons From Chechnya,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.  18, No.  1, January-March 2002, pp. 41-48.
40 Ibid, p. 4.
24‘[...]a large majority of Russians support [Putin’s] foreign policy in the abstract but the 
population is split on some key policies the President is pushing,’ while at the same time: 
‘the elite (intellectual, political and military) remain much more critical of the US.’4 1
Much as with the earlier noted John O’Loughlin paper, they find that Russian public opinion is 
much like other democratic societies in that Russians ‘are much more concerned with domestic 
circumstances than with foreign policy.’42  This has bearing specifically in the degree to which 
Russia is however a democratic society.  Elements of this thesis must necessarily question these 
assumptions in more depth.
It is already known that Russian public opinion has been responsive to the portrayal of the 
Chechen war by the state.  Corresponding to this, Russian public opinion has had more 
confidence in Putin as a leader than it had of Yeltsin as a leader.  Each time the Russian 
government rose to the challenge of confronting Chechnya militarily, the Russian public has 
been compliant in this.  However, research in this thesis will show that public opinion 
consistently does tire of the war, at times quite quickly.  Considering these cross-alterations, this 
thesis seeks to add to academic knowledge of the existence of Russian public opinion in Russia’s 
democracy and how the wars in Chechnya have influenced this discourse.
Public Opinion and the Military
Elements of understanding the two Chechen wars require a brief discussion of the state of the 
Russian army, and how Russia’s conscript army related to Russian public opinion.  Following 
the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Russian military reformed as singularly ‘Russian,’ but
4 1 Ibid, p. 25.
42 Ibid, p. 26.
25along essentially Soviet operational lines.  Very little practical change occurred during this 
crossover.  For Russia, the Russian military was essentially a downsized Soviet military 
defending a smaller territory plus maintaining bases and operations in the now-foreign post- 
Soviet sphere (i.e. both external and internal in relation to former Soviet territory).
Russian public opinion was affected in several ways by this change.  Frequently, public opinion 
recognized the ‘dilapidated state of the army’43 and responded as such.
New political actors and organizations appeared in Russian life to attempt to influence public 
opinion and the Russian government in order to improve conditions for soldiers in the Russian 
military.
One well known such organization, which will be referred to frequently over the course of this 
paper, is the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers.  Founded in 1990 by Maria Kirbasova, this 
organization has sought to monitor abuse within the military and secure some degree of rights for 
soldiers.  The struggles of this organization have been discussed in detail by Andrew Spivak and 
William Pridemore and warrants interest in any discussion of this subject.44
Pavel Baev again studies the Russian military and its policies on regionalism in his chapter, 
‘Military Aspects of Regionalism.’  The effects of the two Chechen wars are reviewed briefly in 
this short piece.  This paper will agree with some aspects of Baev’s writing; it is undoubtedly 
true that ‘the First Chechen War was a multi-dimensional disaster that served no rational 
political purpose and inflicted much damage on every component of Russia’s national interest.’45
43 Spivak, Andrew L. and William Alex Pridemore, ‘Conscription and Reform in the Russian Army,’ Problems of 
Post-Communism, Vol.51, No.6, November-December 2004, pp. 33-43.
44 Ibid, pp. 39-40.
45 Baev, Pavel K., ‘Military Aspects of Regionalism,’ Russian Regions and Regionalism, (eds.) Graham P. Herd and 
Anne Aldis, RoutledgeCurzon, London and New York, 2003, p.  123. (pp.  120-137)Baev then contrasts this in regard to the second Chechen war as he explains that the second war 
partially re-develops the ‘identity and image’ of the military.
He further explains the differences in public opinion on the two wars in Chechnya as being due 
to three reasons that took precedence during the second war:
1)  ‘The Kremlin’s firmer control over and skilled manipulation of the media’46
2)  Fear of terrorism
3)  Frustration over economic decline
These points will be further covered over the course of this thesis.  This paper will argue 
alongside Baev that these three reasons were entirely cogent to any understanding of differences 
in Russian public opinion between the two wars.
Chechnya
There are a number of books and articles written by both academics and non-academics 
concerning Chechnya in regard to some aspects of Russian public opinion that should be 
examined here.
Leon Aron firstly reflects on Russian democracy in the context of the war in Chechnya in an 
article in Post-Soviet Affairs in 1995:
‘Yet the victory of the [August 1991] revolution did not bring about democracy.  Indeed, 
the invasion of Chechnya in December 1994, less by the fact of the invasion itself than by
46 Ibid, p. 129.
27the manner in which it was conceived, executed and prosecuted in the face of nearly 
unanimous popular protest, illuminated a deep residue of inherited authoritarianism and 
militarism lying just beneath the surface of Russia’s first democracy.  The war also 
revealed vast lacunae in the mechanisms for holding governmental institutions 
accountable for their actions.’47
His judgements in that article concerning a perceived need for authoritarianism among war 
supporters in some ways closely mirror future constructs of Russian political thought in regard to 
the war.
Most important academically concerning Russia’s path into confrontation with Chechnya in the 
1990s is perhaps John B. Dunlop’s Russia Confronts Chechnya book.  Dunlop details quite well 
how in some ways Yeltsin and his top advisors, in respect to Russian public opinion, unilaterally 
decided on war in Chechnya with little consideration of how the public would react to this, 
especially if the war was not short and militarily concise.48
No study of Russian public opinion on the Chechen wars, and particularly on the first war, is 
complete without an examination of the journalist Anatol Lieven’s 1998 book, Chechnya: 
Tombstone of Russian Power.
Lieven’s study of five shortages49 is valuable in looking at why Russian public opinion did not 
support the first war.  These ‘shortages’ were:
1)  Shortage of Training and Equipment
47 Aron, Leon, ‘Russia Between Revolution and Democracy,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.  11, No. 4, October-December 
2005, p. 305. (pp. 305-339)
48 Dunlop, John B., Russia Confronts Chechnya. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,  1998.
49 Lieven, Anatol, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power. Yale University Press, New Haven CT and London, 
1998, pp.274-290.
282)  Shortage of Men
3)  Shortage of Money
4)  Shortage of Honesty
5)  Shortage of Unity
Lieven’s further examination of the failure of Russia to win the propaganda war in the first 
Chechen war will also be particularly indispensable in examining changes in media policy during 
the second war.50
Another book detailing the Chechen wars specifically is Matthew Evangelista’s 2002 book, The 
Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Wav of the Soviet Union?  Evangelista covers the reasons for 
war and the situations surrounding the beginning of each of the two conflicts.  Primarily in 
reference again to regionalism, Evangelista studies the point of whether the Chechen wars were 
endemic of a Russian political, cultural and societal system that was destined to separate over 
time or would it stabilize in the present Russian political form of post-Soviet Russian federalism. 
Using Russia’s settlements with Tatarstan and other ethno-territorial regions over the political 
question as a benchmark, the Chechen wars are in this book an examination of what made 
Chechnya unique in arousing military conflict.
Concerning public opinion and public support for the second war, Evangelista makes a number 
of assertions relevant to study in this thesis.  One such statement is that:
‘Vladimir Putin, appointed prime minister and heir apparent by Boris Yeltsin just days 
after the attack on Dagestan, seized on the opportunity to prosecute the war while it still 
enjoyed public support.’5 1
50 Ibid. pp.  119-121.
29This view of coincidentally supported justification (in Russian public opinion) for the second 
war is vital to recall in consideration of changes in Russian public opinion concerning each war 
in turn.
Parallel in many ways to the topic of this thesis is Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko’s 2004 
book with Anatol Lieven, Russia’s Restless Frontier.  Trenin and Malashenko’s chapters on the 
effects of the Chechen wars on Russian society and in regard to the ‘Islamic factor’ are cogent in 
any study of Russian public opinion on this topic.
With direct bearing on this thesis, Trenin and Malashenko state that ‘public opinion in Russia on 
the Chechen war has fluctuated, reflecting developments on the battlefield.’52  This paper will 
disagree on this point; Russian public opinion will be shown to reflect perceptions of  policy in 
regard to developments on the battlefield.  In this paper, it will be shown that, only when leaders 
are shown through numerous polities to be strong in regard to the war, then there is general 
support for the war.  When leadership is perceived as weak, then support drops precipitously.
Furthermore, Trenin and Malashenko state that:
‘[...Jalthough opinion polls have made it possible to capture general trends in the public’s 
attitude to the conflict in Chechnya, such findings can hardly be used as a basis for 
judging the conflict’s impact on the popular state of mind in Russia.’
5 1  Evangelista, Matthew, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Wav of the Soviet Union?. Brookings Institution 
Press, Washington DC, 2002, p. 64.
52 Trenin, Dmitri V. and Aleksei V. Malashenko with Anatol Lieven, Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya 
Factor in Post-Soviet Russia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2004, p. 49.
53 Ibid, p. 50.
30They are correct in this regard, although as will be argued, the popular state of mind in Russia 
can be examined in regard to public opinion polls on the war and on support for democracy 
within the context of government intervention and policies to engender support for the Chechen 
wars.  These, points must be explored further over the course of this thesis.
Chechnya Revisited, edited by Iu. K. Nikolaev, is an excellent collection of papers concerning 
aspects of the wars in Chechnya.  The fourth chapter written by Dianne Leigh Summer is 
particularly interesting.  In this section, entitled ‘Success of Terrorism in War,’ Summer finds in 
her conclusion that in reference to the first Chechen war, terrorism ‘determined Chechnya’s 
success and Russia’s loss.’54  This is an excessively strong statement that overlooks several 
matters, including that it lessens the redoubtable strength of the Chechen people when the 
struggle was based on nationalism and then confronted with invasion.  Also the statement 
confuses guerrilla warfare, which has often been used by oppressed peoples to fight oppressors 
throughout history, with terrorism and its connotations of pointless attacks on civilians, a point 
which necessarily must be examined further over the course of this thesis.
John Russell wrote a well-known article, later made into a book chapter, on the subject of the 
perceptions of Chechens in Russian public opinion.  Popularity of the second Chechen war in 
Russian public opinion can be linked to the rise o f‘Islamic jihad’ as a factor in the Chechen 
conflict.  Russell has previously found that there has been a number of effects from the failures 
of the Chechen government in the interim period between 1996 and 1999 to reign in localised 
virtual anarchy, resulting in a number of kidnapping and murders, and also ‘a series of public 
executions under the newly-imposed sharia law.’  Russell finds that these occurrences have:
54 Summer, Dianne Leigh, ‘Success of Terrorism in War,’ Chechnya Revisited, (ed.) Nikolaev, lu. K., Nova Science 
Publishers, Inc., New York, 2003, p.  117. (pp.69-125)‘further alienated the West and diluted any romantic notions among Russians as to the 
rectitude of their cause; and the presence on Russian soil of foreign Islamic militants, the 
Wahhabites, who were portrayed as representing the same threat to Russian 
fundamentalists such as Osama Bin Laden did to the West [did not lessen these fears].’55
This thesis will seek to further investigate these topics.
Russell’s later 2005 article entitled ‘Terrorists, Bandits, Spooks and Thieves: Russian 
Demonisation of the Chechens Before and Since 9/11’ is focussed on the ethnic consideration of 
Chechens by Russian public opinion.  Russell’s articles do well in exploring the ethnic element 
of examination, and in many ways, they provide crucial background for any exploration of how 
each of the wars were understood by public opinion on the level of the ethnic divide between 
Russians and Chechens.
Indeed looking again at the idea of a perception of the necessity for war:
‘[...]by shamelessly playing the ‘Islamic’ card, Putin has effectively created in Chechnya 
a self-fulfilling prophecy.  By offering those that still advocate any degree of Chechen 
separatism a choice between abject surrender and continuing a campaign of sabotage, any 
that follow the latter path are perceived in Russia and the West as advocates of the very 
Islamic terrorism against which Putin has warned.’56
This idea of the Chechen war as a policy presupposing its own reasoning is a vital perception 
that has much relevance in consideration of this topic as well.
55 Russell, John, ‘Mujahadeen, Mafia and Madmen: Russian Perceptions of Chechens During the Wars in Chechnya, 
1994-96 and 1999-2001,’ Russia After Communism, (eds.) Rick Fawn and Stephen White, Frank Cass, London, 
2002, p. 83.
56 Russell, John, ‘Terrorists, Bandits, Spooks And Thieves: Russian Demonisation of the Chechens Before and Since 
9/11,’ Third World Quarterly -  Journal of  Emerging Areas, Mar. 2005, p.  113.
32The book Chechentsv: istoriia. sovremennost’ written in part by members of the Russian 
Academies of Natural Sciences and Social Science and edited by Iu. A. Aidaeva is an 
exceptionally good collection of works on the general subject of the Chechen wars as well as the 
difficulties faced by the Chechen nation in history.57  This book includes particularly important 
articles written and published also by the media in regard to the war and must be recalled in 
future arguments of this thesis.
Tracey German, through her work and her PhD attained by studying in the region, has written a 
book of good quality on the Chechen war, particularly on the period until the second war. 
Published in 2003, her view in her conclusion that the Russian government’s ongoing approach
C O
to the territorial integrity of Russia as being non-negotiable is ‘unrealistic’  in reference to the 
Chechen conflict should be considered particularly interesting, and will be considered in future.
Books on specific incidents will be of importance also.  One such book on an individual subject 
is Viktor Stepakov’s Bitva za «N ord-O st».59  This book’s step-by-step exploration of the 
Nord-Ost incident and the comparisons to past hostage crises, with quotes by victims, are quite 
interesting in the study of this episode, particularly from the book’s relatively open anti-Chechen 
tone.
Stefan Hedlund, in his book on Russian Path Dependence where he reflects on where Russia 
might be headed in future, had this to say on the role of Chechnya in the evolution of Russia’s 
post-Soviet era:
57 Aidaeva, Iu. A. (ed.),  Chechentsv: istoriia. sovremennost. “Mir domu tvoemu,” Moskva, 1996.
58 German, Tracey C., Russia’s Chechen War. RoutledgeCurzon, London and New York, 2003, p.  160.
59 Stepakov, Viktor, Bitva za «N ord-O st». Izd-vo Ekhsmo, Moskva, 2003.
33‘By far the most troubling dimension of Putin’s punitive agenda was his launching of the 
second war in Chechnya.  Gross violations both of human rights and of international 
treaties to which Russia is committed have been amply demonstrated in numerous reports 
by reputable organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and 
Doctors Without Borders.  The conduct of the Russian armed forces in Chechnya has also 
been subjected to harsh criticism by Russian human rights advocates like Sergei Kovalev, 
who served briefly as human rights commissioner under Yeltsin.
In stark contrast to Yeltsin’s war, however, this time round the reactions from foreign 
governments were muffled at best, and from the Russian public at large the proclaimed 
cause of dealing once and for all with the Chechens met broad support.  Although such 
support tended to weaken with the increasing stream of Russian casualties, there would 
be nothing resembling the broad mobilization of discontent that faced the Yeltsin regime.
The near-total absence of serious political criticism against Putin’s war in Chechnya also 
could be seen as a reflection of the broad successes that were scored in the second 
dimension of his political programme, that of achieving an emasculation of all effective 
political opposition in the Duma.’60
In a nutshell, many of these points confirm theories that will be explored over the course of this 
thesis.  The idea of a parallel between the war in Chechnya and a silencing of opposition to the 
Kremlin, despite some remaining voices of protest, is a central theme to be examined herein.
Over the course of this thesis, many such arguments will be explored more extensively.  What is 
the role of separatism in the Chechen wars, what is the theory of Russian reinstitution of law and
60 Hedlund, Stefan, Russian Path Dependence. Routledge, London and New York, 2005, p. 298.
34order in conducting the war, what is the role of Islam in the conflict, and most, importantly, how 
does Russian public opinion exist and change in regard to these and other factors?
Mass Media and Internal Influences on Russian Society
The role of the mass media in Russian society has been the subject of a great deal of debate in 
the post-Soviet era.  In both Chechen wars, the Russian government has tried to control news 
coverage, as many argue, beyond heavily debated contemporary and necessary norms concerning 
secrecy in regard to tactical troop movements.  Not surprisingly, in both the first and second 
Chechen wars, the Russian government has considered contact between journalists or news 
agencies and Chechen military and political actors to be against the interests of the Russian war 
effort.
In both wars, the Russian government has sought to make its portrayal of the conflict to be 
dominant, thereby attempting to have the ‘friendliest’ depiction possible for its actions in 
Russian public opinion.  Although perhaps some direct influence exists here between media 
policy and the people, this thesis will not attempt to quantify this in any way.  Instead, this paper 
will seek to examine the atmosphere created by the Russian government in relation to changing 
media policies on each Chechen war, and therefore what this developing situation says about 
Russian democracy.  Thereby, research in part will examine this statement by Frances Foster:
‘In Russia’s case, however, the government effort to become the “monopoly of power” of 
information to its citizenry has proven to be not only futile but harmful.’6 1
6 1  Foster, Frances H., ‘Information and the Problem of Democracy: The Russian Experience,’ Russian Media Law 
and Policy in the Yeltsin Decade: Essays and Documents, (eds.) Monroe E. Price, Andrei Richter, and Peter K. Yu, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London, New York, 2002, p.  115. (pp. 95-118)Further to this, in the first war, where public support could be seen as to be lacking, the Russian 
people frequently were less likely to accept official news coverage at face value.  In the second 
war, however, when support seems to have been higher, the Russian people have been less 
concerned on the subject of discerning independent versus official coverage of the war in the 
media.  How all of these factors come together will be a necessary focus of this thesis.
Part of a reinstitution of order following the first war in Chechnya reflected on the application of 
informal practices, known as the ‘grey area,’62 to journalism.  Perceived mistakes in media 
policy during the first war, thereby allowing elements of coverage that enhanced opposition 
against the war, led the Russian government to refine its policy in this area. During the first war, 
the government’s media policy was deficient almost to the point of irrelevance.  Seeking to 
correct this deficiency, the Russian government has sought to define a stronger media policy 
during the second war, heightening control of the media to a point where many question the 
freedom of the media.63
Accordingly, Martin Dewhirst in his chapter on the subject details four types of censorship in the 
post-communist period by 2001.  These are: (1) administrative censorship, (2) economic 
censorship, (3) censorship resulting from actions by or threats from criminals, and (4) censorship 
resulting from editorial policy.64  In various ways, each of these applies to Russian policy on the 
Chechen war.  All four types of censorship have relevance in melding the image that Putin has 
attempted to present in his Chechnya policy.  Dewhirst’s presentation of these elements in the 
context of pre-Soviet/Soviet period also has accurate bearing on any study of public opinion in 
Russia.
62 The ‘grey’ area as discussed in chapter five on democracy concerning the politically-unstable area between viable 
democracy and authoritarianism.
63 Many relevant government acts are available in: Pravovve i eticheskie normv v zhumalistike. Aspect Press, 
Moskva, 2004.  Other applicable legislation of importance will be referred to over the course of this thesis.
64 Dewhirst, Martin, ‘Censorship in Russia, 1991  and 2001,’ Russia After Communism, (eds.) Rick Fawn and 
Stephen White, Frank Cass, London, 2002, pp. 21 -  33.
36Further to all four points, Laura Belin in her chapter on ‘The Russian Media in the 1990s’ 
highlights many of the examples of such censorship.  Particularly on the issue of Dewhirst’s 
second point and thereby on the fourth point as well:
‘The financial vulnerability of Russian media was the key factor limiting journalists’ 
ability to shape editorial policy independently during the 1990s.’65
Belin, in her chapter on ‘The Kremlin Strikes Back,’ found in her research on the election of the 
Unity party to power that:
‘The newcomer Unity, which offered no clear ideology or program, received massive 
favourable publicity on Channels 1  and 2.  Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the air 
time devoted to various blocs on ORT and RTR revealed bias in favour of Unity but not 
the full extent of its advantages.  The Kremlin’s proxy benefited indirectly from a huge 
amount of coverage that showed Putin in a positive light (Putin endorsed Unity about a 
month before the election).  In addition, sympathetic coverage of the military campaign in 
Chechnya boosted the government’s popularity and created many opportunities to 
showcase Minister for Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu, the top candidate on Unity’s 
party list.’66
As previously noted, and as will be argued in this thesis, the Russian government has always 
seemed to think that public popularity for the war was necessary for its success.  During the first 
war, when for the first time the Russian government attempted to fight information warfare (IW)
65 Belin, Laura, ‘The Russian Media in the 1990s,’ Russia After Communism, (eds.) Rick Fawn and Stephen White, 
Frank Cass, London, 2002, p. 154.
66 Belin, Laura, ‘The Kremlin Strikes Back: The Reassertion of State Power over the Russian Media,’ Russian 
Media Law and Policy in the Yeltsin Decade: Essays and Documents, (eds.) Monroe E. Price, Andrei Richter, and 
Peter K. Yu, Kluwar Law International, The Hague, London, New York, 2002, p. 280. (pp. 273-301)
37in a democratic environment, the effort was botched, to such an extent that during the second 
war, it is obvious that the Putin administration insisted on improvement.  This second attempt at 
IW, as will be argued in this paper, has been extensive in some aspects, especially in theory, but 
also equally porous in some practical ways.
There is some literature that should be considered on this topic.  Propaganda research and 
analysis has a long history.  Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell’s book, most recently 
published in 1999, Propaganda and Persuasion probably has the best history in recent times of 
the role of internal governmental influence on public opinion.  As written by Jowett and 
O’Donnell:
‘[...]the use of propaganda as a means of controlling information flow, managing public 
opinion [my italics], or manipulating behaviour is as old as recorded history.’67
Furthermore, Jowett and O’Donnell finds that there are three elements on which success in 
propaganda are based, all of which are important for understanding its role in Russian society. 
These are:68
1)  The perceived necessity of winning the information war
2)  The increase in ‘sophistication’ in propaganda distribution
3)  The increase in understanding the role of propaganda itself
To these three ‘elements,’ this paper will add a fourth, that is, the establishment of a state 
capable of doing the three, and it is on this point where a primary difference can be found in 
relation to the two Chechen wars.  As to be argued in detail, propaganda is more established for
67 Jowett, Garth S. and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion. 3rd edition, Sage Publications Inc., 
Thousand Oaks CA, London, New Delhi, 1999, p. 47.
68 See further: Jowett, Garth S. and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion. 1999.the second war because the Russian state is more stable and ostensibly less wavering in policy 
for the second war.
Ellen Mickiewicz’s book Changing Channels is quite valuable on the study of the mass media in 
post-Soviet Russia.  Her section on ‘Television at War’ is quite revealing of how private Russian 
television regarded parts of the first Chechen war.  In separate parts of this thesis, it is important 
to again review some of the points made in this chapter.  As Mickiewicz indeed points out:
‘It would be inaccurate to say that television “caused” Russian to turn away from the war 
in Chechnya.  The cause was more complex.’69
The relationship of television to Russian public opinion and the wars in Chechnya will be further 
explored in chapter four of this thesis.
Terhi Rantanen’s book The Global and the National has a great deal of insight into the effects of 
media on modem democracies.  One purpose of this thesis is to make a diagnosis of changes in 
Russian democracy and Russian public opinion using the two wars in Chechnya as a reference. 
Relative to this, comparative elements will be used to show Russian society in dealing with the 
two Chechen wars in contrast to wars in other more established democracies within what is now 
known as the electronic ‘information age.’  This will in turn be defined as, for Russia, beginning 
with the domination of television over newspapers as a method of news reportage in 1991 (the 
period when television broadcasts overcame newspaper reportage as the dominant source of 
information in Russia).70  Such a model in part also consists of defining the ‘actors’ of Russian 
public opinion, which is the nexus of understanding public opinion at least in the context of 
Russia’s attempted modem ‘democracy.’
69 Mickiewicz, Ellen, Changing Channels. Duke University Press, Durham NC and London,  1999, p. 258.
70 Rantanen, Terhi,  The Global and the National.  Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Lanham MD and 
Boulder CO, 2002, p. 25.
39There are a number of books from recent years written by journalists and researchers that are 
worth mentioning at this point.  Their views, stories, observations, and arguments on the 
Chechen war, on Putin, on Yeltsin and on the state of Russian government will continue to be of 
value in many sections of this thesis.  Some of these are: Andrew Jack’s book Inside Putin’s 
Russia (2004)71, Lilia Shevtsova’s books Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Reality (1998)72 and 
Putin’s Russia (2003)73, Peter Truscott’s Putin’s Progress (2004)74, the many writings, articles 
and books of the now-deceased Anna Politkovskaya, including:  A Dirty War (2001)75, Vtoraia 
Chechenskiaia (2002)76, and A Small Comer of Hell: Dispatches From Chechnya (2003),77 P 
Khlebnikov and A. G. Rikhter’s Zhumalista I voina : osveshchenie rossiiskimi SMI voennvkh 
deistvii v Chechne (1995),78 and Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal’s Chechnya: A Small 
Victorious War (1997)79.
Also quite interesting along these lines is Nikolai Mamulashvili’s recent book (2005): Moia 
Chechenskaia Voina.80  This documentary book details his adventures as a journalist in 
Chechnya including a humorous (or at least as humorous as possible) account of his 94 days in 
captivity, held by Chechen fighters in part in a cellar in Chechnya.
7 1  Jack, Andrew, Inside Putin’s Russia. Granta Books, London, 2004.
72 Shevtsova, Lilia, Yeltsin's Russia : Myths and Reality. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington 
DC, 1999.
73 Shevtsova, Lilia, Putin’s Russia, second edition, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 
2005.
74 Truscott, Peter, Putin’s Progress. Simon and Schuster, London and New York, 2004.
75 Politkovskaya, Anna, A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya. Harvill Press, London, 2001.
76 Politkovskaya, Anna, Vtoraia Chechenskaia, Zakharov, Moskva, 2002.
77 Politkovskaya, Anna, A Small Comer of Hell: Dispatches From Chechnya. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
2003.
78 Khlebnikov, P. and A. G. Rikhter, Zhumalista I voina : osveshchenie rossiiskimi SMI voennvkh deistvii v 
Chechne, Rossiisko-amerikanskii informatsionnyi Press-centre, Moskva, 1995.
79 Gall, Carlotta and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War. Pan Original, London and Basingstoke, 
Hampshire, 1997.
80 Mamulashvili, Nikolai, Moia Chechenskaia Voina. Vremia, Moskva, 2005.
40These books, chapters and articles are written by those who have done extensive reportage on the 
political actors involved and on the Chechen region add a vital viewpoint to any understanding 
of what is Russian public opinion of the two Chechen wars.
External Influences on Russian Society and on the Russian Government
As Russia’s role in the post-Soviet era has been one of direct and indirect intervention on the 
territories of the former Soviet Union where there has been a Russian interest, other world 
powers have sought to counsel against Russia’s worst ‘impulses’ on these matters.  Some writers 
like Matthew Evangelista have referred to Russia’s engagement in conflicts in the former Soviet
o 1
Union as being ‘over-determined.’
In response, some foreign governments have sought to admonish or punish Russia in some way 
for these military interventions, and to the consternation of the Russian government, this 
criticism has extended on some occasions to Russia’s Chechen policy.  As Sarah Mendelson 
points out in a paper for Problems of  Post-Communism, ‘Chechnya has become the site of some 
of the worst human rights abuses in Europe since World War II,’ yet the response from the
o7
‘international community’ has been muted.
In some sections of this paper, Russian public opinion will be analysed in relation to how the 
public reflects on what attempts by foreign entities have been made to influence Russian 
governmental policy on the Chechen wars.
8 1  Evangelista, Matthew, ‘Historical Legacies and the Politics of Intervention in the Former Soviet Union,’ The 
International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, (ed.) Michael L. Brown, MIT Press, Cambridge MA and London, 
1996, p.  121. (pp.  107-140)
82 Mendelson, Sarah E., ‘Anatomy of Ambivalence: The International Community and Human Rights Abuse in the 
North Caucasus,’ Problems of  Post-Communism, Vol. 53, No. 6, Nov./Dec. 2006, p. 3. (pp. 3-15)Russia’s policy on initiating the second open Chechen war came under intense criticism from the 
European Union; the governments of the EU being under pressure from their own public 
opinions:
‘The reputations of the EU leaders were to an extent challenged by public opinion 
because of probable protests if the catastrophe occurred and the EU had remained 
passive.’83
This criticism has often not extended to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, and both wars will be studied in this context.  In his chapter on ‘CIS Southern Belt; 
Regional Cooperation and Integration,’ the Middle East academic on Islam and the CIS at the 
University of Aarhus, Mehdi Mozaffari, comments on the first war that:
‘[...]the multiple Russian interventions in Tajikistan and in the Caucasus illustrate very 
well the asymmetrical relations inside the CIS with respect to the security issues.  The 
war in Chechnya is a good example that demonstrates the very cautious and highly 
prudential attitude of the CIS member states vis-a-vis Russia.  The fact is that only 
Georgia of the CIS (the member most affected by the wars) had publicly criticized the 
Russian military intervention in Chechnya.’84
Margot Light particularly highlights the importance of the current understanding of foreign 
governments on Chechnya and the war there in the context of Russia’s democracy in the Yeltsin 
era.
83 Lintonen, Raimo, ‘Understanding EU Crisis Decision-Making: The Case of Chechnya and the Finnish 
Presidency,’ Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol.  1, No.  1, March 2004, p. 31.
84 Mozaffari, Mehdi, ‘Regional Cooperation and Integration,’ Security Politics in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, (ed.) Mehdi Mozaffari, Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke, Hampshire,  1997, p. 171.
42‘Whether or not these characteristics of Russia’s political structures and culture have an 
effect on particular policies, they illustrate how democratization has diminished the 
coherence and predictability of Russian foreign policy.  Moreover, by affecting the way 
in which Russian foreign policy is perceived, they influence the responses of other states 
to Russia and this, in turn, has an impact on the options available to Russian policy 
makers.  But has democratization made Russian policy more peaceable or more war- 
prone?’85
This question, which Light depicts as ‘difficult’ is worth further attention in the context of this 
paper.  In some ways, in the context of the two periods studied jn this thesis, democratisation has 
made Russia more prone to the use of military means, if for no other reason than the fact that 
Russia no longer had the financial or diplomatic (the ‘superpower’) means to affect the situation 
otherwise.  What however does this mean for Russian public opinion on the Chechen wars?  This 
will mean that the Russian public, given democratisation, in fact can be more diligent to oppose 
foreign intervention in the affairs of Russia, even more so than in Soviet times, based on the 
perceived lack of status due to loss of empire (the ‘underdog’ perception).
One book by former American foreign service officer Yale Richmond is worth mentioning as an 
interesting addition to literature on the topic of Russian society and external influences.  His 
book, last published in 2003, entitled From Nvet to Da  gives unique insight into the Russian 
mindset, as he has perceived it after years of service.  Understanding Russian public opinion on 
the Chechen wars is as much of a study of when the Russian mind believes that force is 
appropriate as anything else, and books such as this add an increased level of insight into the 
situation.
85 Light, Margot, ‘Democracy, Democratization, and Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet Russia,’ CEU Working Paper 
IRES No. 99/2, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, April  1999, p. 21.
86 Richmond, Yale, From Nvet to Da. Intercultural Press, Inc., Yarmouth ME and London, 2003.
43Altogether, given Russian tradition, attempts by foreign entities to effect change in Russian 
public opinion will be found to be profoundly unsuccessful.  This element of discussion must be 
studied briefly in chapters two and four in order to create a greater understanding of what is 
Russian public opinion, why does it reject foreign influence, and how has it changed between the 
two wars in Chechnya.
Conclusions
These sources show the parallels of other literature to this thesis as concerning study of Russian 
public opinion in regard to the two wars in Chechnya.  As appropriate, further reference to these 
texts will be necessary in answering the questions relevant to this thesis.
In the post-Soviet era, previous studies of Russian public opinion per se have found that 
understanding the social bases of public opinion and the role of the political elite (according to 
Matthew Wyman’s work) have been unique subjects on which to examine the focus of this 
thesis.  Further to this, previous studies have made brief or rudimentary assumptions about 
Russian public opinion on specifically the issue of the Chechen wars that this research seeks to 
investigate in detail.  In the context of Rose, Mishler and Munro’s research from their article and 
book, as to be discussed markedly in chapter five, this thesis examines what analysis of Russian 
public opinion on the wars in Chechnya says about the wider perspective of Russia’s 
‘democracy.’
In summation, to highlight future chapters, academic knowledge of differences in Russian public 
opinion about the Chechen wars has not been fully explored in reference to Russia’s attempted 
democratic system.  Other academics have sought to study democracy in Russia through the use 
of some other issues, but less in relation to Chechnya, and so this thesis seeks to fill this relevant
44gap in literature.
45Jason Vaughn 
Chapter Two
Trends of Russian Public Opinion within the Two Chechen Wars 
Introduction
This chapter is written to discuss and map trends in Russian public opinion over time in each of 
the two post-Soviet era Russian wars in Chechnya, 1994 to 1996 and 1999 to 2003, and to 
attempt to connect this to a wider parallel political context.
Herein, this chapter will seek to examine as precisely as possible, given research accumulated for 
these purposes:
•  The long-term trends concerning Russian policy in Chechnya of Russian public opinion 
during each of the two time periods of the Chechen war being examined.
•  What these trends say about the wider political context of Russia.
Appropriate public opinion polling data taken from published primary sources will be used to 
document mass opinion trends generally covering the majority of the territory of the Russian 
Federation.87  Although a few specific points will be made in regard to specific regions of Russia
87 For polling data used, corresponding footnotes will detail the question used, number of respondents, dates, sources 
and detailed location data (if available).  In regard to the margin of error, this chapter will accept the VTsIOM 
standard recognized in VTsIOM Press Reports as generally plus or minus 3.8% according to surveys taken of 1600 
respondents in 83 population centres in 33 regions of the country.  Corresponding to this, when acknowledging other 
surveys by VTsIOM, ROMIR, FOM and other sources, it will be generally recognized that, in the absence of 
information found dealing with the specifics of polling data beyond what is published, margin of error could be 
higher or lower in regard to respondents’ size.  If, for instance, 2300 respondents are polled nationwide in any given 
survey by ROMIR, then the margin of error would therefore be considered less.  The opposite of course would be 
true for surveys with fewer respondents.  There is necessarily an assumption of professionalism here in taking
46within this chapter, a more detailed discussion about variations in public opinion dealing with the 
Chechen war issue on a regional and local basis will be saved for chapter three.
Methodologically, this chapter will separate discussion of the two wars in Chechnya (1994-96 
and 1999-2002) into four parts.
Firstly, the beginning of the first war will be examined.  Polling data will demonstrate that there 
was little support for Boris Yeltsin when he first ordered an invasion of Chechnya in late 1994.
If Yeltsin sought to improve his political position by taking this course of action in Chechnya, 
then this decision was flawed.
Secondly, the course and conclusion of the first war will be discussed.  Any existing support for 
the first war will be shown to abate quickly.  Over the course of the next two years, until the end 
of the war and the negotiated settlement of the Khasavyurt Accords, what little public support 
existed will ebb, and to a degree examined in this paper, support for the Yeltsin administration 
will also degrade even more than previously.  To what degree is the Chechen war connected to 
support for Yeltsin?  What other factors might contribute or not to this erosion of support?  If 
given that the failure of the war effort is arguably a reason for his low polling numbers, how does 
Yeltsin rise again to be re-elected to a second term as President?
Thirdly, the beginning of the second war in Chechnya will be discussed, centring on how 
Russian public opinion regarded a new beginning to hostilities in 1999.  A number of incidents 
can be seen as priming the Russian people again for war, including apartment bombings in 
Russian cities and an actual Chechen invasion outside the borders of Chechnya.  Given that these
account of respondent class and location distribution as regarding agencies conducting general nationwide surveys 
used in this thesis, however all sources have a record of reliability in this area.
Also, again in the case of the minority of survey data collections of a regional basis used in this chapter, there is a 
limitation of application to mass Russian trends in opinion as will be acknowledged in each appropriate case.
47events were blamed by the Yeltsin administration on Chechen lawlessness, whether as a real or 
perceived threat, to what degree did they prepare the Russian people for a second invasion?
Fourthly, Russian public support for the second war will be analyzed after initiation of a new 
invasion.  It will be shown that, as opposed to the first war, there would be a greater level of 
support for the second Chechen war, perhaps reflecting a newly created sense of justification for 
the conflict in public opinion.  Can this justification be understood in real terms?  How can this 
renewed support for war be connected to policies of the Putin administration?
This chapter will primarily concern the connection of public opinion to perceptions of 
justification and of the presidential administrations’ conducting offensive military policies in the 
Chechen region.  Special emphasis will be placed at times on the status and perceptions of the 
economy as a comparative basis for analysis, and how this relates to support (or lack thereof) for 
the presidential administration at issue and the respective policies on Chechnya.  Unlike in other 
chapters of this thesis, the author uses a linear approach in order to catalogue adequately 
developing trends in Russian public opinion.
1994 -  The Beginning of War I
Russian society underwent a dramatic transformation between 1991 and 1994.  Especially among 
activists in Moscow, in 1991, the fall of the Soviet regime created positive speculation about the 
future:
‘Within three days, it [the Coup] was all over, defeated by the opposition of the Russian 
leadership, the heroism of the people who took to the streets unarmed against tanks, the
48resistance in the Army, the media and the factories, and by the lack of resolution by the 
plotters themselves. ’88
Furthermore:
‘On the third day of resistance, when victory was already at hand, a chant of ‘za sebia,’ 
for yourself, erupted among the defenders of the White House because this moment was 
seen as much as a triumph for the individual Russian citizen as it was a political victory
OQ
for Yeltsin and his allies.’
Within three years, feelings among some Russians90 of success at getting rid of the totalitarian 
Soviet government transformed into bewilderment about what their country, the Russian 
Federation, had become.  Many complained that Yeltsin and his administration were responsible 
for Russia’s instability in 1994.  The first Chechen war became an example of this endemic 
culture of strife where the Russian government felt the requirement of using force as an option. 
Michael McFaul points to the necessity of Yeltsin’s 1993 decision to use force against 
parliament, and thereby the continuation of violence as a possibility in Russian politics, as being 
representative of the lack of consensus in Russian public opinion over the course of change.  It 
was true that:
‘[...]although Yeltsin and his government had significant popular support, especially 
after the failed coup attempt of August 1991, their reform agenda represented their own 
preferences and not the desires of all elites or the will of the masses.’9 1
88  Sakwa, Richard, Russian Politics and Society. 3rd edition, Routledge, London, 2002, p.  15.
89 McFaul, Michael, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution. Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY and London, 2001, p. 
124.
90 The role of ‘politically-active’ Russians in relation to the general population will be discussed in chapter three.
9 1  McFaul, Michael, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution, p.  161.
49Difficulties with adapting to the new capitalist system, policies of denationalization and 
privatization, the collapse of the Union and increasing crime and corruption all contributed to 
decline in the standard of living for ordinary Russian citizens.  In 1991 alone, levels of real 
income and production fell by 17%.  Output too fell by 40% in light industry.  Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) for Russia would go on to fall by an overwhelming 50% by 1995.92
Despite gaining more Presidential powers, Boris Yeltsin’s attempts at improving the lot of 
ordinary Russians proved fruitless.  Gaining the temporary power to enact economic reforms by 
decree in October 1991, at the Fifth Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Republic, 
Yeltsin devoted his administration to short-term economic policies for restructuring, including 
programs for rapid economic liberalization.93  This and the accompanying policies of 
privatization would do little except cause the economy to drift aimlessly, and give the Russian 
Parliament an opening to contest Yeltsin directly, leading to the next great constitutional crisis 
which Russian society had to endure, the late-1993 showdown between Yeltsin and the Russian 
Parliament.
VTsIOM polling data collected monthly between March 1993 and January 1994 show that, on 
average, the Russian public considered the economy negatively; with 60% (to sometimes over 
70%) saying that the economic position of Russia was bad or very bad.94
Similarly, later continuing VTsIOM polling data between March 1993 and September 1994 
revealed that at least 39% said that their family’s ‘material position’ was bad or very bad, at least
92  Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, pp. 233 -  236.
93  For more information on this form of economic policy, see Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, pp. 233 - 240. 
See also, Murrell, Peter, ‘What is Shock Therapy? What Did it Do in Poland and Russia?,’ Post-Soviet Affairs,  1993, 
Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 111-140 and Remington, Thomas F,  ‘From Soviets to Parliamentarians,’  Developments in 
Russian Politics 4.  (eds.) Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman, Macmillan Press, Ltd, London,  1997, pp. 
65 -  67.
94 Question: ‘How do you presently rate the material position of your family?’ Possible responses:  1) ‘Very Good’
2) ‘Good’ 3) ‘Medium’ 4) ‘Bad’ 5) ‘Very Bad’ 6) Difficult to answer 7) no answer.  Asked monthly of between 
3918-4001 respondents, VTsIOM, Informatisionnyi bulletin, Aspect Press Ltd., Moskva, No. 2, Marta-Aprel’  1994, 
p. 52.
5048% said that their town’s economic position was bad or very bad, and at least 65% said that the 
economic position of Russian was bad or very bad.95
On this basis, Yeltsin’s public support was demonstrably low even before Chechnya became a 
divisive subject in Russia.  As President of Russia, from May to September of 1994, Boris 
Yeltsin’s approval ratings trended downwards.  Particularly those who ‘entirely’ supported the 
President’s actions were decreasing steadily in relation to those who thought the President should 
resign.  According to relevant VTsIOM data, this lag in support is apparent:
(Graph  1):
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Nevertheless, as seen from the graph if you combine those who completely support Yeltsin with 
those who agree with some of his actions, the percentages generally rival those calling for his 
resignation.
95 Question:  ‘How do you presently rate the material position of your family?’ Second question:  ‘How would you 
rate the economic position of Russia?’ Possible responses as in footnote 7. VTsIOM, Informatisionnyi bulletin, 
Aspect Press Ltd., Moscow, No. 6, November-December  1994, p. 46.
96 In answer to the question, ‘What is your personal attitude to the President of Russia?’ asked in May, June and 
September 1994 of respectively 2975, 2958 and 2959 general respondents.  Possible answers as in Graph  1,  see
VTsIOM, VTsIOM Informatsionnyi bulletin, Aspect Press Ltd.,  No. 4,  Moskva,  Iuli’-Auguste  1994, p. 49.
VTsIOM, VTsIOM Informatsionnyi bulletin, Aspect Press Ltd.,  No. 5,  Moskva, Sentiabr’-Oktiabr 1994, p. 71.
VTsIOM, VTsIOM Informatsionnyi bulletin, Aspect Press Ltd.,  No. 6,  Moskva,  Noiabr’-Dekabr’  1994, pp. 48-49.
51Public Opinion Foundation data showing ‘trust’ in Yeltsin mirror VTsIOM data, as seen from the 
following graph:
(Graph 2):97
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The lagging economy was with little doubt a central issue in the above polling results.  In an era 
when the Chechen situation was relatively unknown throughout Russia and there was little 
danger for Chechen terrorism outside of the North Caucasus, issues dealing with Chechnya were 
not a central focus at this time.
Additionally, according to other VTsIOM questions, by September of 1994, all politicians in 
Russia were generally getting low marks.  In answer to a question asking for respondents to 
name five or six politicians in Russia they had trust in, Yeltsin came in tied in first place among
QO
named politicians with the consistent democrat Grigory Yavlinsky at  10%.  Highest overall
97 Question:  ‘To what degree do you Trust Boris Yeltsin?’ Possible answers as in Graph 2, Public Opinion 
Foundation, January  1994:  1064 respondents, March  1994:  114 respondents, July  1994:  1230 respondents, 
September  1994:  1010 respondents, October  1994: 688 respondents, 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/policv/president2/eltsin/rating  eltsin/ofl9943308.
98 Question of 2959 general respondents: ‘Please mention 5 or 6 Russian political figures in whom you have 
confidence.’  Potential answers:  1) Ye. Gaidar, 2) B. Yeltsin, 3) V. Zhirinovsky, 4) G. Zyuganov, 5) A. Rutskoi, 6)
52percentages went to, in sequence, ‘Difficult to answer’ (39%), ‘No one’ (22%), and ‘Other’ 
(13%).
Three months before Yeltsin ordered the war in Chechnya, relatively speaking, his position in 
public opinion seemed no better or worse than anyone else’s.  No other politician inspired 
significant public confidence, particularly given Yeltsin’s role as the incumbent President.
Yeltsin’s standing in public opinion was low, but not politically dangerous.  There is little 
evidence of any direct challenge to his authority by late-1994.  Yet, there was the perception that 
between 1991 and 1994, some of the energy of Yeltsin’s Presidency in light of the 1991 post­
coup euphoria had been lost.  Yeltsin in the last months of 1994 sought to recapture some of this 
lost ‘vitality,’ particularly in regard to his struggle to maintain a strong presidential system 
against the parliamentary rebellion, constitutional construction and referendum of 1993.
On the question of Chechnya, that republic had been rebelling against Russia since the 
immediate post -coup era of October 1991.  The issue of whether to maintain Chechnya as a 
constitutional member of the Russian Federation (and, if yes, then how to do this) became a 
point of contention in the Yeltsin administration.  Also prominent is the issue of banditry in the 
region.  Yeltsin in his memoirs, Midnight Diaries, contended this point: that Dudaev’s 
government made no effort to fight corruption and in fact supported the criminal domain, and 
therefore the Russian invasion was justified."  Allegations have also been made that there were 
direct financial reasons for invasion, such as for oil or over weapon transfers.100
N. Travkin, 7) V. Chernomyrdin, 8) S. Shakhrai, 9) G. Yavlinsky, 10) Other,  11) No one,  12) Hard to answer,  13) 
No answer. VTsIOM, VTsIOM Informatsionnyi bulletin, Aspect Press Ltd., No. 6, Moskva, Noiabr’-Dekabr’  1994, 
p. 50.
9 Yeltsin, Boris, Midnight Diaries. Phoenix Publishing, London, 2000, p. 55.
100 Dunlop, John B., Russia Confronts Chechnya. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,  1998, p.  132.
53In the context of the post-Soviet era, Chechnya, or the issue of Chechens in Russian society, had 
not been a point of significance in Russian society.  Before the Russian invasion of 1994, few 
sources found that Russian public opinion considered the situation in Chechnya to be of 
paramount importance, although there was remaining the longstanding stereotype of Chechens as 
‘criminals.’
VTsIOM polling data published in January 1994 (surveys conducted October 1993) revealed that 
Chechens had the highest negative to positive responses (48%: 35%) in regard to ‘relations.’1 0 1  
Despite the fact that, as pointed out by John B. Dunlop analyzing another VTsIOM survey 
conducted in late-1992, ‘only 31 percent (of Russians) had ever encountered a Chechen,’102 that 
particular ethnic group produced a larger amount of negative feeling among the Russian public 
than any other group.
In relation to the possibility of conflict, the Russian public was decidedly opposed.  In a summer 
survey of the Russian (non-Caucasian) public, 40% of respondents thought that Russia should 
not take a position on the Chechnya matter until the Chechens had worked out their own internal 
problems.  If Chechnya so desired, 23% believed that it should be allowed to leave the Russian 
Federation.  Only 5% believed that Russian should have a military role in the Chechen area.10 3  
This would change little over the following six months.  Just before open invasion, 59% of 
respondents in a VTsIOM poll again said that they were in favour of either a peaceful solution to 
the conflict or desired a quick exit of Russian troops from the situation.104
1 0 1  Data taken from table: VTsIOM, Informatisionnyi bulletin, Aspect Press Ltd., Moskva, No.  1, Ianvaria 1994, pp. 
18.
102  Dunlop, John B, ‘Russia: In Search of an Identity,’ New States. New Politics, (eds.) Ian Bremmer and Ray 
Taras, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 61.
1 03  Ibid, p. 62.
1 04  Question: ‘What is to be done? (in reference to a previous question regarding who is to blame for the war)’ 
VTsIOM, Poll conducted 16-19 December 1994, 1,600 respondents, Data collected from: Levada, Yuri, ‘Narod i 
voina: bol’shinstvo protiv, ’ Izvestiia, No. 246 (24353), 23 Dekabr 1994, pp.  1-2.
54However, perhaps taking note of the mere ‘regard’ of the Russian societal view for Chechens in 
view of the then-current situation, in December 1994 Boris Yeltsin and his administration 
decided to order the Russian military to mount a full scale invasion of Chechnya.  Russian public 
opinion must be analyzed in this section parallel to study of this initial operation.
In response to the invasion, the Russian public was quite unenthusiastic.  A Russia-wide survey 
conducted after the invasion by the Public Opinion Foundation explains the mood persuasively. 
1,270 respondents, sampled from rural and urban Russian populations, were asked what their 
opinion was of the necessity of Russia’s armies to enter in Chechnya.  65% said that they 
disagreed with the use of force.  19% were in support, and 16% gave the ‘hard to answer’ 
choice.105  In a parallel survey, exactly on the point of the introduction of Russian troops in 
Chechnya, 63% viewed this negatively, 23% positively.106
Conjecture was rampant also as to the motive for invasion, given that Yeltsin had not yet 
explained his reasons yet (this would not take place until 16 days after the beginning of the 
conflict).  A second question asked why people thought Yeltsin ordered the invasion of 
Chechnya.  33% speculated that it was to hold Russia together.  30% thought it was meant to 
restore some type of abstract order.107
Another question asked Russians what the consequences would be of the military campaign.  In 
this regard, public opinion necessarily did not equate the Chechen war with being a threat to 
democracy.  Polls by Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) confirmed this, with only 19%
105 Question: ‘Do you believe it is necessary for Russia to send armies into Chechnya?’ Public Opinion Foundation, 
Dec. 1994, 1270 respondents, http://bd.fom.ni/report/map/proiects/finfo/fmfol994/ofl994  38/of19943801.
106 Question: ‘How do you regard the introduction of Russian troops in Chechnya?’ Public Opinion Foundation, 
Possible answers:  1) Positively 2) Negatively 3) Difficult to answer, 24 Dekabr 1994, 1366 respondents, 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnva/truck  war/ofl 9943913.
107 Question: ‘In your opinion, what was behind the decision of the President to send troops in Chachnya?’ Public 
Opinion Foundation, 1,367 respondents, Data collected from: Alyonnik, Lev, ‘Vvod voisk v Chechniu snizil reiting 
presidenta El’tsina,’ Segodnia, No. 247 (354), 27 Dekabr 1994, p. 2.
55connecting the conflict in Chechnya with a large possibility of the end of democracy in 
Russia.108
As for the future of the conflict, Russian public opinion was not positive. In another FOM 
survey, 63% answered that they thought that the Chechen war would start a ‘protracted war with 
the people of the North Caucasus.’  Only 22% opposed this understanding of the conflict.109 
This is a statement of the fear within Russian public opinion that, as was to be the case, Russia 
might be drawn into a continuing war in the region.
Additional data by Public Opinion Foundation continued to show this doubt.  Polling data 
showed that Russians maintained their initial disapproval of the war in Chechnya after the one 
and a half month point, with the majority (52%) saying that they did not approve of the war in 
Chechnya from the very beginning.110
As for Yeltsin’s personal polling numbers, the beginning of the war was definitively not good. 
Focusing strictly on the beginning of invasion, a weekly polling segment of the survey asked 
Russians how much they trusted their President.  61% responded that they distrusted Yeltsin on 
10 December.  The same question asked a week later on 17 December found that the level of
108 Question: ‘How do you think, does the military conflict in Chechnya mean the end of Democracy in Russia?’ 
December 1994, 1367 respondents.  See Mindsova, Svetlana and Elena Petrenko, ‘Every Fourth Links the Military 
Conflict in Chechnya With the End of Democracy in Russia, and Every Second Does Not Agree,’ Public Opinion 
Foundation, 23 December 1994, http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnva/truck  war/ofl 9943909.
109 Question: ‘Are you afraid that the military actions of the Russian army in Chechnya can turn into a long war for 
Russian in the Northern Caucasus?’  Possible answers:  1) Yes (63%) 2) No (22%) 3) Difficult to answer (15%), 
Public Opinion Foundation, December 1995, 1367 respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnva/truck  war/ofl9943910.
110 Question: ‘Today, one and a half months later, has your attitude towards the decision of the leadership of Russia 
changed about the beginning of military actions in Chechnya?’ Possible answers and responses:  1) No, it has not 
changed, from the very beginning I understood the necessity of this decision (52%) 2) No, it has not changed, from 
the very beginning I understood the inaccuracy of this decision (15%) 3) Yes, it has changed, I now understood the 
necessity of this decision (6%) 4) Yes, it has changed, I now see the inaccuracy of this decision (11%) 5) Difficult to 
answer (15%), Public Opinion Foundation, January 1995, 1353 respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnva/truck  war/ofl9950302.
56distrust rose distinctly, by 6% to 67%.  The ‘trust’ answer during that same weeks time, fell by 
3% despite being at a low level in the beginning anyway.1 1 1
Polls taken by VTsIOM in early December demonstrated similar results.  Whereas a similar poll 
in August 1994 gave Yeltsin the lowest ratings at 49%, his negative ratings (those who rated 
Yeltsin at 1-3 out of a possible 10) in December rose to 54%.112
Likewise, there were protests taking place in Moscow.  On ‘Starii ploshad’ in Moscow, the 
group ‘Memorial’ protested on 26 December and attracted the attention of the police, who 
arrested a number of well-known dissidents, including Aleksandr Lavut, Arsenii Roginskii, 
Aleksandr Podrabinek, Susanna Pechuro, Gennadii Molchanov and others.113
Available evidence shows that the build-up to, and initiation of, the Chechen war did nothing to 
improve Yeltsin’s position in Russian public opinion and much to hinder.  The Russian people 
were far from convinced that the war was justified, at least in the context of Yeltsin’s portrayal 
of the war, which will be covered in future sections and chapters.
Early 1995 -  June 1996: the Evolution of War I
This section will discuss trends of Russian public opinion from January 1995 when Grozny was 
taken (and thereby the beginning of Russia’s static military occupation of Chechnya) until the 
end of the war in July 1996.
1,1 Question: ‘To what degree do you trust Boris Yeltsin?’ Potential answers as in Graph 2. Public Opinion 
Foundation, 10 December 1994:1367 respondents, 17 December 1994:1311 respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/policv/president2/eltsin/otsenki  i  oshibki/ofl 9943912.
112 Question: ‘What rating between 1  and 10 would you give to Boris Yeltsin?’  Possible answers between  1   and  10, 
with 10 being the highest.  For this examination, ratings 1  to 3 will be consider negative, 4 -7  will be medium, and 
8-10 will be considered positive ratings.
http://sofist.socpol.ru/lin  que.shtml?B=Displav+frequencies&NQ=5714&sch  xml=5&en= 1.
113 Alyonnik, Lev, ‘«M em orial» vystabil « v ak h tu »  na Staroi ploshadi,’ Segodnia, No. 247 (354), 27 Dekabr 
1994, p.2.
57A new round of polls came out in the days surrounding the taking of Grozny by the Russian 
army.  The first 1995 All-Russia surveys conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation show how 
the Russian people regarded the issue of whether Russian troops should be in Chechnya or not. 
The first of these polls asked in a survey of 1,341 respondents what their attitude was in relation 
to the sending of Russian troops to Chechnya.  66% gave a negative response, while 21% were 
positive and 13% said it was ‘hard to say.’
This is an increase in negative responses by a few percentage points from a similar December 
1994 poll.  Coinciding with this, positive responses were down, and the ‘hard to say’ answer was 
about the same.114  Another question in the same survey asked how their opinion of Yeltsin 
would change depending on what policy move he did next.  37% replied that, if he opened peace 
talks immediately, then their opinion of him would change for the better.  41% said that their 
attitude towards him would not change at all.11 5   To a degree, the war in Chechnya will be shown 
to simply reinforce a negative image of Yeltsin in Russian public opinion.
A majority, 66%, regarded the introduction of the Russian army to Chechnya negatively.11 6  
Another relevant question asked what Russians generally thought of the Russian Army’s actions 
in Chechnya and, in response, a majority (52%) condemned such actions.117  78% said the
114 Question: ‘How do you regard the entrance of Russian troops in Chechnya?’  Possible answers:  1) Positively 2) 
Negatively 3) Difficult to answer, Public Opinion Foundation, January 1995, 1341 respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/proiects/finfo/finfo 1995/of1995  01 /ofl 9950109.
115 Question: ‘Would your attitude towards Boris Yeltsin change if he went on peace talks with the Chechen 
leadership?’  Possible answers:  1) No, it would not change, 2) Yes, it would become better, 3) Yes, it would become 
worse, 4) Difficult to answer.  Public Opinion Foundation, January 1995, 1341  respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/proiects/finfo/finfo 1995/of1995  01 /ofl 9950114.
116 Question: ‘How do you regard the introduction of the Russian Army to Chechnya?’ Possible answers:  1( 
Positively 2) Negatively 3) Difficult to answer.  Public Opinion Foundation, January 1995, 1341  respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/proiects/finfo/finfo 1995/ofl 995  01 /ofl 9950109.
117 Question: ‘How do you judge the activities of the Russian Army in Chechnya? Possible answers:  1) I condemn 
them 2) I approve of them 3) I am indifferent 4) Difficult to answer. Public Opinion Foundation, January 1995,  1341 
respondents, http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/proiects/finfo/finfo 1995/ofl995  01 /ofl 9950110.
581  1  ft Chechen war was a tragedy for all of Russia.  Interestingly, in answer to a question asking 
about why troops were introduced to Chechnya, only military personnel answered, ‘for the 
interests of bosses in Russia.’  Other groups answered that they were opposed because they 
‘condemned all war.’119  Although other surveys have not been found to confirm this, perhaps 
particularly military personnel felt they were fighting for elite interests in the Russian 
government even more so than the (directly) uninvolved overall population.
A survey conducted from the 7th to the 10th of January by VTsIOM exposed again that Yeltsin’s 
disapproval rating had dropped significantly since September 1994 when it was 70%, now in this 
case to 81%.  In the same poll, 69% thought that Russia was going nowhere by carrying out the
1  90 war, up from 53% in September 1994 (at that time, it was just the threat of war).
Luckily for Yeltsin, however, his political opponents could muster little better public support. 
Another poll conducted by Komsomol ’ skaia Pravda (however only in Moscow) found that, 
although 63% of Moscovites disapproved of Yeltsin, only vague possible future challengers such 
as Sergei Kovalev (28% approval: 21% disapproval) had a higher ‘approval’ rating versus
191 disapproval rating on the issue.
Studies in late-January would show that even Yeltsin’s optimism in retaking Grozny, which 
coincided with these surveys, had little effect on the Russian public’s view of the war.  Public
118 Question: ‘How do you consider the events in Chechnya, a tragedy for only Chechnya or for all of Russia?’ 
Possible answers:  1) I don’t consider it a tragedy, 2) It is a tragedy for only Chechnya, 3) It is a tragedy for all 
Russia, 4) Difficult to answer. Public Opinion Foundation, January 1995,  1341 respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/proiects/finfo/finfo 1995/ofl 995  01 /ofl 9950113.
119 Question: If you condemn the actions of the Russian army in Chechnya, then why?’ Answers vary. Public 
Opinion Foundation, January 1995, 1341 respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/proiects/finfo/finfol995/ofl995  01/ofl 9950111.
120  Question: ‘What do you think, are affairs of Russia moving in the right direction, or does it seem to you that 
events are taking us ‘the wrong way,’ ‘down a blind alley?’ Second question: ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the 
way Boris Yeltsin is coping with his duties as President of Russia?’ VTsIOM,  1,597 respondents, ‘81% gorozhan 
schitaet, chto Boris El’tsin ne spravliaetsa obiazannostiami,’ Segodnia, 17 January  1995, p. 2.
1 2 1  Question: ‘How has the Chechen crisis affected politicians’ approval ratings?’ KomsomoFskaia Pravda 
Sociological Survey, 18 January 1995, 1,000 respondents, Data collected from: ‘Sobitiia v Chechnie: vashi otsenki?’ 
Komsomol’ skaia pravda, 18 January 1995, pp.  1-2.
59Opinion Foundation would do yet another survey in this period focusing on the effects of the 
Yeltsin and Chechen propaganda efforts.  Interestingly also, this survey also focused on one of 
the core principles that supported the Russian invasion.  In this poll, 47% of those surveyed said 
that they agreed with Yeltsin in that the Russian army was fighting ‘bandit formations’ (a term 
which would become one of the most typical references during the war and even up until the 
present day).  Against this only 21% agreed with the opinions of Dudaev and the Chechen 
leadership, in their proclamations that the Russian army was committing genocide.122
Given that available Russian polling data were nevertheless against the war in this time period, 
this tells us that ‘bandit formations’ were not yet considered the threat to national security that 
they would later become in the second war.  From this analysis, 47% agreed with Yeltsin as to 
the focus of the war effort but high majorities still opposed the war
To reinforce this point, in comparable polling data taken on 20 January 1995, 71% said that they 
opposed the use of Russian troops in Chechnya.  Also in this survey, 74% said that it was 
‘unfair’ to put on trial service people who refused to go to Chechnya and fight.123
In a survey referred to by Valery Tishkov in his book, Ethnicity. Nationalism, and Conflict In 
and After the Soviet Union, respondents answered a question as to whether Boris Yeltsin should 
be ousted because of events in Chechnya.  In these results, 58% answered either ‘Yes’ or 
‘Probably Yes.’124  As Tishkov noted, the Russian people, particularly because of the issue of
122 Question: ‘Among others, there are two points-of view on understanding with who the Russian Army is at war in 
Chechnya.  With which one do you agree?’ Possible answers and percentage responses:  1) Bandit formations (47%), 
2) the Chechen people (21%) 3) None of them (10%), 4) Difficult to answer (22%), Public Opinion Foundation,
27.01.1995, http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/proiects/finfo/finfol995/ofl995  03/ofl9950304.
123  Question: ‘What is your attitude toward the sending of Russian troops into Chechnya?’ Possible answers:  1) 
Positive 2) Negative 3) Hard to say. Second Question: ‘Do you believe it is fair to put on trial servicemen who 
refuse to participate in military operations in Chechnya?’ Possible answers:  1) Yes 2) No 3) Hard to say. Public 
Opinion Foundation, 20 January 1995, 1353 respondents.  Data taken from: ‘Bolshinstvo rossiian protiv suda nad 
voennimi-otkzaznikami’ Segodnia, No. 17 (375), 28 January 1995, p. 3.
124  Tishkov, Valery, Ethnicity. Nationalism, and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union. SAGE Publishers, London, 
1997, p. 223.
60directly drafting young Russians to fight, were quickly tiring of the war and perhaps even linking 
the campaign in terms of success to the people who ordered the operation.
From January to May 1995, Russian public opinion would change little within this period, except 
for the continuing decline in Yeltsin’s approval ratings.  A number of polls would indicate this 
drop in support.  In late February, in a survey conducted by VTsIOM, 48% thought that Yeltsin 
deserved no confidence at all.  56% thought he should resign.125
Comparable with surveys done before the war, 55% said that force should not be used to stop 
‘autonomous entities’ from seceding from the Russian Federation, while 28% said the opposite. 
57% thought that Yeltsin should resign immediately, and 68% believed he should not run again. 
However, very few Russians blamed his advisors for the war: only 8% thought that Russian 
Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev and Federal Security Minister Sergei Stepashin were 
responsible for the war, while 57% thought that Yeltsin bore sole responsibility for initiation of 
the campaign.126
Perceptions in Russian public opinion focus on the President.  Over the course of this thesis, this 
is a recurring theme.  Competence is gauged largely according to the leader at the top.  At the 
same time, Yeltsin’s comparative freedom to conduct policy in the North Caucasus and 
elsewhere meant that he took responsibility in the public eye.  Yeltsin, as the head of the Russian 
state, could in many ways conduct policy as he wanted to, and so in Russian public opinion, he
125 Question concerning confidence in the President. Possible answers:  1) He deserves full confidence 2) He does 
not fully deserve confidence 3) He does not deserve confidence at all.  Second question: ‘Question concerning 
support for the President’s actions. Possible answers:  1) Fully support his actions 2) Disagree with some of his 
actions 3) Believe he should resign 4) Hard to say.  Data taken from: Sedov, Leonid- VTsIOM, ‘Boris El’tsin pal 
zhertvoi Borisa El’tsina,’ Segodnia, No. 62 (423), 8 April 1995, p. 3.
126 Question: ‘Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Russia should use force to prevent 
autonomous entities from seceding from the Russian Federation.’ Possible answers:  1) Agree 2) Disagree.  Second 
question: ‘In your opinion, who bears the main responsibility for the decision to send troops to Chechnya?’ Possible 
answers:  1) President Yeltsin 2) power wielding ministers (Pavel Grachev, Sergei Stepashin, Victor Yerin) 3) 
Yeltsin’s advisors 4) ministers for nationality affairs 5) Russian Army generals. VTsIOM, published 23 February 
1995, 1500 -  1800 Russian urban respondents.  Data taken from: Gudkov, Lev, ‘Vlast’ i chechenskaia voina v 
obshestvennom mnenii Rossii,’ VTsIOM, Segodnia, No.23 (392), 23 February 1995, p. 3.
61was solely and completely responsible for any problems or failures that resulted from those 
policies.
*
In the context of long-term polling data, as further shown from other surveys conducted by 
VTsIOM for their Monitoring of  Economic and Social Changes series, trends illustrate that 
Yeltsin was regarded increasingly negatively as President of Russia. This is as shown by the 
following graph:
(Graph 3):127
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As seen above, especially notable is, outside of the beginning of the war in Chechnya given the 
events of the time period, it is difficult to find any other reason to account for the spike in people 
demanding Yeltsin’s resignation between October  1994 and March  1995 surveys.
Also useful to note, the belief that Chechnya was a part of Russia continued to be low.  In polls 
not published until mid-July, April polling reflected that 74% thought that Chechnya should not 
be forced to remain a part of Russia.  The understood reason for war was still quite divided, also.
127 Question:  ‘How do you regard the President of Russia?’ Possible answers as in Graph 3, Monitoring Economic 
and Social Changes in Russia 1994-4,  1994-5,  1994-6,  1994-7,  1994-9,  1995-3,  1995-7.  Respondents:  1481,  1492, 
1481,  1476,  1482, 986 respectively, http://sofist.socpol.ru/.
6239% thought that the reason for the war was to ‘conceal illegal business.’  Only just over a 
quarter, 26% responded that the purpose was to ‘preserve Russian unity.’
In another survey conducted by Public Opinion Foundation in March 1995, Russian public 
opinion was for the first time also finally searching around for other people to support for the 
Russian Presidency.  Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the Yabloko (Apple) Party came in first in 
answer to the question of what Russian politician should be the next President, while Boris 
Yeltsin only managed a relatively weak fourth position, given his low approval ratings.  Also for 
the first time, a future major player in Russian politics, particularly in the period close to the end 
of this first Chechen war, would show up in the responses to this question: former general and
po
future peacemaker, Aleksandr Lebed.
The combination of an unpopular war and an unpopular President caused a great deal of 
dissatisfaction with the idea of the application of Western democracy to Russia in the realm of 
Russian public opinion over this period.  Segodnia reported on VTsIOM results in April  1995 on 
how 51% of Russians believed that they were living in anarchy while only a bare 11% believed 
that they were living in a developing democracy.  According to this survey, 9% believed a 
dictatorship was being established.129
Interestingly, as would later be the case in the Putin era, public opinion did not necessarily 
equate Yeltsin’s use of the military in Chechnya to the re-institution of a strong state.  When
128 Question: ‘Which of the politicians listed below would you like to see as Russia’s next President?’ Possible 
answers:  1) Ye. Gaidar (all percentages from March 1995:  1) E. Gaidar (3%), 2) B. Yeltsin (3%), 3) V. Zhirinovsky 
(6%), 4) G. Zyuganov (5%), 5) S. Kovalyov (1%), 6) A. Lebed (6%), 7) A. Rutskoi (4%), 8) I. Rybkin (1%), 9) A. 
Solzhenitsyn (4%), 10) B. Fyodorov (5%), 11) V. Chernomyrdin (2%),  12) V. Shumeiko (1%),  13) G. Yavlinsky 
(11%),  14) None of them (21%), 15) Hard to say (15%), 16) I’m not going to vote (12%), March  1995,  1388 
respondents.  Data taken from: Chubukov, Dmitri, ‘Khoroshii prezident -  novyi prezident,’ Obshchaia gazeta, No. 
14 (90), 6 - 12 April 1995, p. 1.
129  Question concerning public opinion’s assessment of the political situation, Possible answers:  1) A dictatorship is 
being established 2) The old order is being preserved, with new labels attached 3) Democracy is developing 4)
There is a loss of order 5) Other 6) Hard to say, VTsIOM, 1600 urban respondents. Data taken from: Levada, Yuri, 
‘V Rossii ustanovilas’ <Demokratiia besporiadka>,’ Segodnia, No.70 (428), 15 April 1995, p. 3.
63considering the next polls, but also looking at previous anti-war polling data, it was a consistent 
characteristic of Russian public opinion during the first war that an overtly peaceful, however 
strong, state was desired.  Yeltsin on the issue of Chechnya was consistently regarded to be in 
terms of his ‘warmongering’ policies.
This is as opposed to the broader more actively strength-based ‘strong state’ as the Russian 
government would pursue in the future and public opinion then would begin to acknowledge in a 
specifically positive light.  As is to be seen, Russian public opinion will rarely consider Putin to 
be outside the bounds of society when he orders a second invasion of the Chechen region in 1999 
in the same way that Yeltsin was considered isolated from public opinion.
A poll conducted by Public Opinion Foundation at this time has an element of this point-of-view 
on the state of politics in Russia around April of 1995.  43% of Russians in this survey wanted 
their children to live under a socialist system, 20% wanted them to live in a capitalist state, and 
16% did not know or did not care what kind of system their children lived under.130
The first five months of war in Chechnya overall proved to be the least successful time for the 
Yeltsin Presidency during his nine years in office.  Although his approval ratings would go down 
more, as will be explained, it was his actions during this period that would scar not only himself 
and his Presidency, but it would define the image of democracy in Russia for many years to 
come.
The first war in Chechnya came to an apogee in the summer of 1995.  Largely due to 
overwhelming numerical superiority, as Charlotta Gall and Thomas De Waal discuss in their
130 Question: ‘Under what system would you like your children to live under?’ Possible answers:  1) according to a 
socialist system 2) According to a capitalist system 3) To me, it does not matter 4) Difficult to answer, Public 
Opinion Foundation, 21.04.1995, 1370 respondents, 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/proiects/finfo/finfo 1995/ofl 995  15/ofl 9951502.
64Chechnya: A Small. Victorious War book, the Chechens were now seriously outgunned and
1^1
lacking in medical supplies and ammunition.  The stage was set for the Budyonnovsk crisis at 
this point, which was the first serious venture of the Chechens outside of the recognized borders 
of Chechnya.
On 14 June 1995, Shamil Basaev led a small group of his men into Stavropol krai in order to 
take the war into Russia.  Eventually deciding to make his stand in a hospital in the small town 
of Budyonnovsk, Basaev took an estimated 1600 hostages (with 150 children).  After a few days, 
a long standoff with the MVD and FSB, and after a failed police/special forces raid, Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin had to finally resolve the situation himself on the telephone with Basaev. 
This prompted a beginning of the end of the standoff on 19 June 1995, with Basaev and his men 
being allowed to return to Chechnya (with 120 living hostages to guarantee safety), and therefore
1  ^9
being allowed to get away.
Although the Budyonnovsk crisis was a setback for Russia’s policy of conflict containment, a 
worried Russian public opinion was largely happy that the event was over.  Anything that could 
be successfully resolved, at this point in time, seemed to be quite popular in public opinion, even 
if the results were not positive for Russia.  Again and again, as to be discussed in detail on this 
issue, the status quo in Russian public opinion will be seen to be superior to any rapid changes 
that might affect society.
A survey by the Public Opinion Foundation demonstrated that Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin received a substantial public boost from this situation, having had a part in
1 3 1   Gall, Charlotta and Thomas De Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War, p. 253.
132 A more precise timeline available here: ‘Budyonnovsk,’ http://www.auentura.ru/timeline/1995/basaev/.
65negotiating Russia out of the crisis, with 56% giving him positive marks and 21% negative, in 
comparison to 14%: 60% for Yeltsin.133
Popular opinion as to who was actually responsible for the attack was relatively divided.  49% 
blamed the Yeltsin administration; 32% blamed the Chechen leadership.  On Stepashin’s 
command skills, 72% gave a negative response, while 9% said there was justification for his (and 
the tactical leadership’s) order to storm the hospital.134
The Budyonnovsk event in some ways changed the fundamental tone of the entire campaign in 
Chechnya.  The immediate effect of the raid was to shock the Yeltsin administration into trying 
to end the war at any cost; no doubt partly because of fear of public opinion should raids like 
Budyonnovsk become commonplace.
Whereas the Russian administration had previously been pushing the Russian Army to drive for 
a quick victory, now Russia started to attempt to find a peaceful settlement.  An armistice was 
negotiated, and Russia tried to arrange for new elections in the rebel republic.  At the same time, 
the war continued intermittently while the elections were being set up.  This volatile environment 
was far too chaotic for an election to take place, and soon the ‘armistice’ was broken, causing 
outright fighting to start again.
133  Respondents answered two questions:
1)  ‘How do you rate actions of the chairman of the Russian government V. Chernomyrdin in regard to the 
tragic situation in Budyonnovsk?’
2)  ‘How do you rate actions of the President of Russia B. Yeltsin in regard to the tragic situation in 
Budyonnovsk?’
Possible answers:  1) Positively 2) Negatively 3) I know nothing about their activities 4) Difficult to answer, 
Public Opinion Foundation, 30.06.1995, 1368 respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/proiects/finfo/finfol995/ofl995  25/ofl 9952505.
134  Ibid.
66All of the events in Chechnya ran parallel in this period with the new Russian Parliamentary 
elections of December 1995.  Yeltsin’s supporters did not do well in this election, with the 
Communists gaining first place.
Success at Budyonnovsk for the Chechen rebels, combined with the Yeltsin administration’s 
willingness to negotiate, indeed invited further attempts to bring the war on Russian soil.135 
Chechen rebels seeking to find weaknesses to exploit in damaging the Russian government’s will 
to continue the war saw how that could be accomplished.  Time was on the side of the Chechen 
rebels also, in that the Yeltsin administration seems to have been extremely sensitive to public 
opinion, with a Presidential election coming in 1996.
July Russia-wide polls conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation showed that Aleksandr 
Lebed was making some of his first strong showings when Russians were asked who should be 
the next President.  Lebed came in first place for the Presidency (9%), with Yavlinsky and 
Zhirinovsky (7% each) giving him serious contention.136  It was in this month when Russians 
began their period of showing particular interest in Lebed, although (as will be explained) this 
high opinion of him soon faltered, as much due to the poor judgment of Lebed himself as to 
Yeltsin’s positioning.
Not atypically, from the month of August, many media centres began to speculate on a Lebed 
Presidency. Feeding off the high opinion of Lebed held by many in the Russian public, Russian 
media outlets frequently cast the Chechen war as the catalyst for bringing the former general to
1 35  Information gathered from Siren, Pontis and Ben Fowkes, Russia and Chechnya: The Permanent Crisis. 
Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke, 1998, pp. 178 -  179.
136 Question: ‘If the election for President was held today, for which of the listed politicians would you vote?’ 
Possible answers:  15 choices plus 16) Other 17) I still have not decided 18) None of them 19) Difficult to answer, 
Public Opinion Foundation, 14.07.1995, 1364 respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/proiects/finfo/finfo 1995/ofl995  27/ofl9952701.
67power.137  In September, poll results of which the Russian public ‘trusted’ also lent to his 
credibility.  That poll showed that only five people got double-digit ‘trust’ ratings, and Yeltsin
was not one of them.  Lebed, Chernomyrdin (still riding high after Budyonnovsk), Yavlinsky,
*
Zyuganov, and Fedorov all had above ten percent in trustworthiness, with Yeltsin coming in at a 
paltry tenth place (5%). For Yeltsin, this was a one percent increase from a similar poll in March
1995.  Clearly, these seven months had not been good for his Presidency.  The following chart
1^0
shows VTsIOM data published in data form by the cited article:
(Graph 4):
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Since he was a relatively unknown political ‘commodity,’ Lebed captured the Russian 
imagination, especially since he as yet had no obvious shortcomings.  Before December  1994, 
despite his leadership in Moldova, Lebed remained a relatively unknown political actor and 
VTsIOM did not have his name yet on surveys.  Here was a former general who seemed to know 
what he was talking about when he discussed Chechnya.  Also, he seemed to represent, four 
years before Putin, a younger semi-politician who could bring a ‘strong’ hand to Russia.
137  Shevtsova, Lilia, ‘Iz teni Kremlia,’ Segodnia, No.  160 (518), 25 August  1995, p. 5.
138  Question: ‘Name the five or six political figures in Russia whom you trust the most.’ Possible answers as in 
Graph 4, VTsIOM,  10 September -   1   October 1995, 2392 respondents (against similar number of respondents in 
previous polling), Data taken from: Savelev, Oleg-VTsIOM, ‘Chetvertaia chast’ rossiiskikh izbiratelei ne doveriaet 
nikomu iz politikov,’ Segodnia, No.  199 (557),  19 October 1995, p. 3.
68Also useful to note is the perceived comparative physical weakness of Yeltsin in this era.
Yeltsin again had heart problems on 26 October 1995, forcing him into hospital again, as he had 
at various times in the past.139  Worth noticing is the fact that, according to VTsIOM, only 35% 
were upset at this development, and 46% of those who were upset were only upset because ‘any 
human suffering upsets me.’  Only 7% of those who were upset believed that they should be 
upset because Yeltsin was a ‘guarantor of reforms.’140
As with previous polling data, and reflecting the number of parties in the 1995 Russian political 
system, the Russian public, leading up to the December Parliamentary elections, was unsure as to 
whom it would be voting for.  Particularly in one VTsIOM poll in October, opinion was sharply 
divided.  Only the Communists, Yabloko and ‘Our Home is Russia’ managing to get more than 
5% in this survey, 13%, 7% and 7% respectively, with other votes going to a wide range of 
parties all across the Russian political spectrum.1 4 1   Opposition was still factionalized to 
Yeltsin’s benefit.
In mid-January 1996, Yeltsin fired his First Deputy Prime Minister and main economic advisor, 
Anatoli Chubais, ‘who was blamed for all the unrealized promises of the government and of the 
president himself.’142  One of the crosses that Chubais was supposedly meant to bear was the 
sagging economy.  Also, since confidence among the Russian public was negative in regard to 
perceived progress on economic issues (according to a VTsIOM survey at the time, only 12% 
thought that their own families were in a better financial position while 84% thought their
139 Korotchenko, Igor, ‘Bolezn’ prezidenta,’  Nezavisimaia gazeta, No.  198 (1035), 27 October 1995, p.  1.
140 Question: ’Were you upset at the news of Yeltsin’s illness? Why?’ Extensive list of possible responses, VTsIOM, 
28-30 October 1995, 1000 Moscow residents. Data taken from: Savelev, O.-VTsIOM,  ’Moskvichi o bolezni 
El’tsina,’ Moskovskii komsomolets, No. 209 (17221), 1  November 1995, p.  1.
1 4 1  Question: ’Should the elections to the State Duma be held next Sunday, which of the following parties, blocs 
would you vote for?,’ VCIOM Express 1995-15, 19.10.1995 - 25.10.1995,  1541 respondents. 
http://sofist.socpol.ru/oprview.shtml?en=l.
142  Shevtsova, Lilia, Yeltsin’s Russia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 1999, p.  159.
69financial situation was about the same or getting worse)143, Chubais inspired little reaction in the 
public domain.  This fact, along with a range of other real and imagined issues, caused the 
downfall of Chubais who was in fact one of the more progressive of Yeltsin’s remaining non­
security-related advisors.
On 21 April 1996, a Russian missile that homed in on his car phone killed the by-this-time 
mythologized Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudaev.  This rare show of Russian technological 
prowess dealt a severe blow to the Chechen leadership, despite the fact that they committed 
Dudaev’s memory to martyrdom.  In Dudaev’s place, his Vice-President, Zelimkhan 
Yanderbiev, took over as acting President.  For the Russian side, given Dudaev’s history with 
Yeltsin, it was easier to negotiate with Yanderbiev than it was to deal with Dudaev given his 
headstrong nature.
Fear of Russian public opinion was one factor in the minds of Russia’s political elite at the time 
of the 1996 Russian Presidential election and following the perceived sour results of the 1995 
Parliamentary elections.  If not Yeltsin, as befitting his aging support, Zyuganov seemed the 
second choice of the electorate.  However, the election of a Communist for president was for 
many not a possible consideration.
A February 1996 VTsIOM poll asked what the Russian people expected most out of a President 
in which they were likely to vote for.  Out of ten possible answers, an overwhelming 60% 
answered that ending the war in Chechnya should be the first priority of any elected Russian 
President.  Keeping Russia on the reform path came in ninth place with 11%.  Again in this
143  Question: ‘How would you assess you family’s financial position?,’ Also, 4% said ‘difficult to answer’ and  1% 
refused to answer, VCIOM Express 1996-1, 20.02.1996 - 25.01.1996, 1599 respondents. 
http://sofist.socpol.ru/xml  view.shtml?en= 1  &HO= 12077&SQ=221  &HSO=3survey, as to whom the people would vote for, Yeltsin was generally far behind Zyuganov and 
sometimes behind even Zhirinovsky.144
There are a number of reasons for this increase by late-February.  Yeltsin publicly got into the 
impending struggle for his re-election with the announcement of his candidacy on 15 
February.145  In line with this, Yeltsin also actually started campaigning, which marked a great 
difference from his long time spent in hospital beds.  By 16 February, Yeltsin was in 
Chelyabinsk making a number of promises to the people of the Urals and calling Moscow a 
‘depraved Babylon.’146  Whatever his connection to that order or wherever fault lay for Moscow 
being such a ‘Babylon,’ if it was indeed such a thing, Yeltsin nevertheless started pushing at this 
point to separate himself from the Moscow establishment.  Once again, Yeltsin the populist 
asserted himself.  The Chechen war was unpopular, and so peace must be made.  Moscow was 
unpopular in the regions, and so he had to distance himself from the centre.
Henceforth, there were to be no more drunken and disorderly appearances by Yeltsin as there 
had been in the past.  As for his main opposition, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
(CPRF) nominated the communist candidate, Gennadi Zyuganov, on the same day.147
A ‘Davos Pact’ negotiated in Switzerland by eight leading Russian oligarchs148 led by Boris 
Berezovsky determined that a Yeltsin victory must be ensured.  Fearing Zyuganov’s courting by 
‘Western moneymen’ also in Davos, these oligarchs agreed ‘on the spot’ that Zyuganov was an
144  Question: ‘What do you expect from the President, who you could vote for?’
VCIOM Express 1996-3, 15.02.1996 - 20.02.1996, 1584 respondents. 
http://sofist.socpol.ru/oprview.shtml?en=l
VCIOM Express 1996-4, 05.03.1996 - 13.03.1996, 1596 respondents. 
http://sofist.socpol.ru/oprview.shtml?en=l
145  Malkina, Tatiana, ‘Boris El’tsin: start mezhdu blagimi namereniiami,’ Segodnia,  16 Feb.  1996, EastView, 
http://dlib.eastview. com/sources/article. isp?id=2000182.
146  ‘Boris El’tsin perehodit v nastuplenie,’ Nezavisimaia gazeta, Issue 32,  17 Feb.  1996, EastView, 
http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=289022.
147  Nerushimyi blok kommunista Ziuganov i bespartiinogo Tuleeva,’ Kommersant-daily, No. 24,  16 Feb.  1996, p. 3.
148 Boris Berezovsky , Vladimir Gusinsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Potanin, Vladimir Vinogradov, 
Alexander Smolensky, and Mikhail Friedman-Pyotr Aven (Friedman-Aven). See Hoffman, The Oligarchs, p. 328.
71improper choice for being President of Russia and was, in effect, only pretending to be a ‘kinder 
gentler Communist. ’149
Chubais, chosen to lead the Yeltsin re-election campaign by the Davos Pact members150, put 
forward a strong campaign in a potentially hostile environment, given that only six months 
previous, according to a VTsIOM poll, Yeltsin had a 5% approval rating.  Using advice from US 
electoral campaigners, including the well-known Bill Clinton political planner Dick Morris151, 
his re-election team put a lot of effort into demonising the Communist candidate, Zyuganov, and 
let it be known that supposedly a vote for the Communist was a vote for a return to Stalinist 
times.  Apparently, Russian public opinion was not so willing to sympathize with the ‘socialist 
period’ as it supported in some polls.
Also to be discussed in more detail in a later chapter on the influence of Russian media, the 
Yeltsin campaign’s excellent handling of the media was a large factor in this.  An alliance of
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Gusinsky’s NTV and Berezovsky’s ORT dominated the media in favour of Yeltsin.  On
television, Yeltsin was able to connect Zyuganov with old Stalinist imagery, while Yeltsin 
appeared several times as being the reformist who would lead the country with vigour.  These 
two efforts, when combined, reminded the Russian people why they felt like they needed to vote 
for Yeltsin.
To respond to this, Zyuganov would have had to show some degree of dynamism in addressing 
the public.  Zyuganov was however unprepared for a struggle for election against Yeltsin.  He 
was slow in responding to many of Yeltsin’s campaign ploys, including Yeltsin’s marshalling of 
media forces.  Despite the great advantage of having a ‘real national political party,’ the
149 Hoffman, David E., The Oligarchs. BBS PublicAffairs, New York, 2002, pp. 325-326.
150 Ibid, p. 328.
1 5 1  Thomson, Oliver, Easily Led: A History of Propaganda. Sutton Publishing, Gloucestershire UK,  1999, p. 33.
152 McFaul, Michael, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution. Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY and London, p. 293.
72Communists and their allies were unable to even come close in matching Yeltsin’s financial 
advantage as the incumbent.
* •
Zyuganov proved not to be as dynamic a personality as Yeltsin.  Relying on nationalist themes in 
speeches and on television, he did not however inspire people to vote for him outside of his 
‘electoral base.’153  He also failed to bring any new ideas to the table, thereby relying on old, 
previously used material to get himself through the campaign.  In the end, he allowed Yeltsin to 
create the perception that Yeltsin was the only person who could keep Russia stable.
Beginning in March 1996, the Yeltsin star began to rise, slowly passing both Lebed and 
Zyuganov, until, by the eve of the election, most polls predicted a sound defeat of Yeltsin’s main 
opposition candidate, the Communist Zyuganov.  Through a well-run campaign, Yeltsin’s voting 
support in surveys started to accelerate rather quickly, as can be seen in the graph below:154
(Graph 5):
153 Ibid, pp. 295 - 297.
154  Question: ‘The Central Election Commission has registered the following candidates for the post of President of 
Russia. For which of them would you cast your ballot, assuming the election was this Sunday?’ Possible answers as 
in Graph 5, VTsIOM, 2-12 June 1996, 1582 respondents (against previous similarly representative polling data). 
Data taken from: ‘Poslednii predvybomy opros VTsIOM: El’tsin-Ziuganov 36-24,’ Segodnia, No.  102 (707),  13 
June 1996, p. 3.
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On the other hand, Lebed apparently failed to extend his support beyond his initial base as a 
potential presidential candidate.  Yuri Levada, in his book Ot mneniie k ponimaiu, termed the 
appearance of Lebed on the political scene as ‘the most colourful and strange event in real 
politics and in public opinion in 1996.’  At the same time, however, Levada acknowledges that 
those who ‘trusted’ Lebed always polled 2 to 4 times those who actually said that they would
74vote for him.155  Always he gathered roughly 7% who, in direct VTsIOM polls, vowed to vote 
for him.156
Clearly, Russian public opinion had enough nuance to generally like someone without deciding 
to potentially elect them as President, despite the media’s quick attention at the time to 
suggesting anyone involved in politics might be a Presidential contender.
As a side note, Frank Thames found evidence that there existed something of a political business 
cycle in Russia as relating to Yeltsin’s federal-state intergovernmental fiscal policy.  Thames 
asked the rather simple question, ‘Did Yeltsin buy elections?’ basing his analysis on data 
surrounding wage arrears payment.  He found evidence that Yeltsin attempted to do this at 
various points, including the 1996 Presidential election, although it was debatable as to its 
success.157  This is research done further from Daniel Treisman’s earlier studies on payment of 
wage arrears in 1995 and 1996 by the Yeltsin administration as relating to the Duma and
1  S ft
Presidential election cycles.
Percentages however of those who ‘trusted’ Yeltsin only rose however slightly in the pre­
election period, as documented in the following graph159, which probably reflects the Russian 
public’s unhappiness with their reasons for voting for Yeltsin:
1 55 Levada, Yuri, Ot mneniie k ponimaiu: sotsiologicheskie ocherki  1993-2000. VTsIOM, Moskovskaia skola 
politicheskikh issledovaniie, 2000, p.  119.
Slight variations of the question: ‘The Central Election Commission has registered the following candidates for 
the post of President of Russia.  Which of them would you vote?’
Alexandr Lebed:
7%, VCIOM Express 1996-7,  17.04.1996 - 24.04.1996,  1600 respondents.
7%, VCIOM Express 1996-9, 26.04.1996 - 05.05.1996,  1599 respondents.
7%, VCIOM Express 1996-11, 31.05.1996 - 05.06.1996, 1596 respondents. 
http://sofist.socpol.ru/lin. shtml?en=l
157 Thames Jr., Frank C., ‘Did Yeltsin Buy Elections? The Russian Political Business Cycle,  1993-1999,’ 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 34, No.  1, March 2001, pp. 63-76.
158 Treisman, Daniel, ‘Deciphering Russia’s Federal Finance: Fiscal Appeasement in 1995 and 1996,’ Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol. 50, No. 5, 1998, pp. 893-906.
159 Question: ‘In what measure do you trust Boris Yeltsin?’ Possible answers as in Graph 6, VCIOM Express 1996- 
5, 1996-6, 1997-7, 1996-9, all with 1600 respondents.
Website: http://sofist.socpol.ru/lin  que.shtml?B=Displav+frequencies&NO=: 12477&sch  xml=4&en= 1
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Yeltsin’s position as the best of bad choices was secure.  Many times, the same people who in 
the past called for his resignation would vote for him again.
In actual voting Yeltsin won, following an indecisive first round, on 3 July the second round of 
voting was held.  In this official poll, Yeltsin received 53.82% of the vote while Zyuganov 
received 40.31% of the vote, thereby giving Yeltsin another term in office.160
Soon after this, the conflict was concluded, following another short span of violence.  Lebed’s 
negotiation of the Khasavyurt Accords, thereby ending the war, put to rest for the moment the 
Chechen war.  Having survived to re-election, Yeltsin no longer had the political will to continue 
the conflict, especially after successful Chechen military operations during this time period.
Except for VCIOM Express  1996-11, Question: ‘To what extent do you trust Boris Yeltsin?,’ 31.05.1996 -
05.06.1996,  1596 respondents.
Website: http://sofist.socpol.ru/oprview.shtml?en=l
160  Sakwa, Richard, Russian Politics and Society. Routledge, London, 2002, pp. 393 -  394.
76Ultimately, no matter how unpopular Yeltsin became, substantially (however not exclusively) 
because of the Chechen war, his presidency won another term in office.
In this section, there is an apparent disconnect.  Russian public opinion, although perceived by 
Yeltsin to be a threat to his presidency, did not effectively pose an imminently fatal challenge. 
With only minimal effort and a large amount of money, Yeltsin was able to rebound from 
collectively negative polling results in 1995 to victory in mid-1996.  The perception of danger 
from public opinion seems to be more important than Yeltsin’s actual ability to carry out policy, 
at least when he had the political and military machinery and means to do so.
For re-election, Yeltsin had at least to be perceived as being responsive to Russian public 
opinion, suing for peace in Chechnya.  As seen in this section, Yeltsin was still seen as the 
‘lesser’ of all evils, and his initiation of the Chechen war did nothing to help, and much to nearly 
destroy, his political standing.
1999 -  The Beginning of War II
In 1999, following a series of career promotions from being an almost unknown former KGB 
colonel to being Prime Minister,161 Vladimir Putin led Russia once again to attempt to militarily 
pacify Chechnya.  This section will look at trends in public opinion as connected to the 
resumption of Russian offensive military action including invasion.  Also to be examined is the 
role of the Chechen war in affecting support for Putin’s rise as the second President of Russia.
From his August 1999 appointment as Prime Minister to his designation as Yeltsin’s successor in 
December 1999, Vladimir Putin, in concert with his policy of renewed invasion of Chechnya,
1 6 1  A short list as told by President Putin’s website: http://www.kremlin.ru/articles/V  Putin.shtml.
77sought to create for himself the image of the strong hand necessary to right the perceived chaos 
and injustices of the Yeltsin era.  At the same time, Putin’s orientation as future President of 
Russia evolved from his, as Vladimir Shlapentokh explains, ‘lack of ideology.’
‘The deeply eclectic character of Putin’s ideology suggests that he simply does not have 
an ideology at all.  His mind continues to puzzle the Moscow experts who have been
1  A   9
trying to track down Putin’s vision of the world for the last 4 years.’
Putin’s basis for his rise to power was natural to an extent.  In an interview with Matthew 
Evangelista 17 days before her suspicious death (after introducing a motion in the Duma to 
censure an anti-Semite Communist deputy), even a progressive Russian parliamentarian such as 
Galina Starovoytova had this to say about Putin, ‘The Chief of the FSB, Mr. Putin, is a pretty
I A T
reasonable guy. I know him.’  Further to this was, it must be noted, the support for the second 
Chechen war by even liberals like Anatoli Chubais (formerly of the anti-war camp for the first 
Chechen war).164
In the context of this, both for the purposes of resolving the Chechen issue and for at least 
seeming to fight against corruption, Putin became the most popular domestic politician in 
Russia.165  This level of popularity came about with extraordinary ease given the nature of 
Yeltsin’s political standing, and relatively without resistance, as shown by Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov’s and former Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov’s failure to adequately oppose this 
change through their Fatherland-All-Russia Party (OVR).  Such is the case also in view of and
162 Shlapentokh, Vladimir, ‘The Short Time Horizon in the Russian Mind,’ Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, Vol. 38, No.  1, Mar. 2005, p. 10. (pp.  1-24)
1 63 Evangelista, Matthew, ‘An Interview With Galina Starovoytova,’ Post-Soviet Studies, Vol.  15, No. 3, Jul.-Sept. 
1999, p. 289 (pp. 281-290).
164 Shevtsova, Lilia, Putin’s Russia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2003, p. 43.
1 65 ‘According to the latest public opinion poll conducted by the Public Opinion 
Foundation, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin is the indisputable leader in
the Man of the Year title. 43% of the respondents gave that title to Putin
in replying to an ‘open’ question, one containing no prompts.’ Strana.ru, 27 December 2000, Johnson’s Russia List, 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/iohnson/4711 .html.
78including arguments of Unity’s necessarily superior support: ‘The resources at OVR’s fingertips 
were evidently second only to Unity’s.’166
Research by others has found that this failure to oppose Unity extended to the regions of Russia 
also.  As Natalya Lapina finds:
‘With the end of 1999, in Iaroslavsk and Samarsk oblasts, there began to create regional 
departments of the new party of power, Unity.  Mechanisms to create a new party in the 
regions were distinctive.  In Iaroslavsk oblast, Unity became a straightforward successor 
to ‘Fatherland.’  Unity -  says one from the leadership of the city administration -  it was 
80% of the former Fatherland.  In the regions, all transferred into Unity, and Fatherland
167 practically disintegrated.’
Returning to the question of Chechnya, initially from a personal standpoint, Putin was put into a 
position of responsibility for decisions that were not necessarily his own.  As Pavel Baev 
describes it:
‘Putin, therefore, was placed in the uncomfortable position of assuming full 
responsibility for a decision he had not made and presiding over an operation he had no 
possibility to control. Nevertheless, he did the best possible job in this position, making 
the war into his personal crusade and reassuring the suspicious generals that he was ready
16k to go all the way for a hard-won triumph.’
166 Colton, Timothy J. and Michael McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy. Brookings Institution Press, 
Washington DC, 2003, p. 88.
167 Lapina, N., ‘Politicheskie partii I perspecpektivy pertiinogo stroitel’stva v Samarskoi I Iaroslavskoi oblastiakh,’ 
Regional’nve protsessv v sovremennoi Rossii. Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, Moskva, 2003, p.  154.
168 Baev, Pavel K., ‘Putin’s War in Chechnya: Who Steers the Course?’ PONARS Policy Memo No. 345, 
International Peace Institute Centre, Oslo, November 2004.
79However, many accounts say that Putin took this responsibility with something of a great desire. 
Michael McFaul refers to this even as a ‘passion:’
‘Everyone who has discussed the Chechen war with Putin personally will tell you that he 
expresses real passion only about his resolve to “destroy the Chechen terrorists.”169
Contrary to much of the conspiracy theory to be mentioned (especially from those saying that the 
whole year of 1999 in Russian politics and the Russian presidential succession was carefully 
staged), a successful and popular Chechen policy based on invasion, especially in the eyes of 
Russian public opinion, was not necessarily automatic.  This section found that this is the case 
from the standpoint of Putin himself as well.  It is difficult to believe that the sequence of events 
as to be discussed next was part of any grand plan or high strategy contained within.
Looking at catalysts for the war, perhaps most immediate in regard to Chechen policy in Russian 
public opinion is what has become known collectively as the apartment bombings.
The August 1999 apartment bombings in Russia, in Moscow, in Buinaksk and in Volgodonsk 
together causing almost 300 deaths, brought alarm to Russian public opinion.  Such was the case 
not least of which because, as will be explored, the Russian government blamed an old enemy, 
Chechen rebels, without substantial evidence, for these terrorist attacks.  Further attacks in 
Moscow at ‘Okhotny Riad’ brought the death toll to about 700 people.170  These events hit 
Russian public opinion close to home, and gave a level of immediacy to the Chechen issue as 
portrayed by Putin.  Due to these events, a degree of panic set in, with some inhabitants in the 
major cities organizing round-the-clock patrolling of their own apartment buildings.  Journalists
169 McFaul, Michael, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,’ Journal of  Democracy, Vol.  11, No. 3, Jul. 2000, p. 21.
170 Kagarlitsky, Boris, Russia Under Yeltsin and Putin, p. 230 - 231.reported on stories concerning the possibility of bombs in other locales, thereby enhancing the 
level of terror at the time.
Differing accounts of possible bombings were rampant at the time, some blaming the FSB also. 
Only one example of these stories is necessary here:
‘In the aftermath of the apartment bombings, increased awareness further led to the 
possibility of a fifth bomb in Ryazan that had failed to explode.  This particular story 
relates to when a resident of an apartment block in Ryazan called the police in response 
to a strange car being seen in front of his building:  ‘A few minutes later, so did Vladimir 
Vasiliev, a 53-year-old radio engineer, who not only saw the Zhiguli and the pasted-on 
license numbers but got a look at the people inside before it pulled away. There were two 
men and a woman, he says. They looked not like Chechens, who tend to be darker- 
skinned, but like Russians.’
And later when the police investigated:
‘Vasiliev, the radio engineer, watched the police load the sacks into the back of a police 
car. He says that they looked like ordinary 100-pound bags of sugar and that some of the 
white powder fell on the ground. But when a resident who works in a chemical lab went 
to take a sample the next day, the spill had been cleaned up.’
The next day, FSB chief Nikolai P. Patrushev announced on the evening news that it was 
just an ‘exercise.’1 7 1
1 7 1  Reynolds, Maura, ‘Fears of Bombing Turns to Doubts for Some in Russia,’ Los Angeles Times, 15 Jan. 2000, 
Johnson’s Russia List, http://www.cdi.Org/russia/iohnson/4039.html#2.In respect to opinion on support for a Chechen invasion, based on other polling data analysed in 
this chapter, there is however little evidence from research that these stories focussing on the 
possibility of a FSB plot had serious traction in public opinion.  Support for the government 
increased, if anything, during this time period.  Based on reports such as where Putin was chosen 
by public opinion to be ‘Man of the Year,’ there is a basis for showing that Russians had little 
regard for questioning their new leader after these incidences.172
Notably, the type of terrorism had changed also, as Irina Mukhina points out:
‘[...Jbetween the wars, kidnappings (which previously occurred only 
episodically) assumed a mass character, and explosions replaced hostage-taking as a
1  7^
major form of Chechen terrorism.’
As Mukhina also points out, this would remain the case until the 2002 Nord-Ost incident.  It 
could be argued that, in the context of this thesis, this change in terrorist tactics could have a 
bearing on analysis.  However it is important to note that, as will be reiterated in future sections 
on the time period, unlike in previous hostage-taking episodes, the Nord-Ost incident caused 
little change in favour of the Chechen rebels in Russian public opinion and much support for 
Putin against them.
Secondarily immediate for the Russian government specifically in trying to contain Chechnya 
were the August and September 1999 invasions of Dagestan by elements of Chechen ‘militia’ 
led by the familiar name and well-known warlord Shamil Basaev.  Some say these invasions
172 See again: ‘According to the latest public opinion poll conducted by the Public Opinion 
Foundation, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin is the indisputable leader in
the Man of the Year title. 43% of the respondents gave that title to Putin
in replying to an ‘open’ question, one containing no prompts.’ Strana.ru, 27 Dec. 2000, Johnson’s Russia List, 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/iohnson/4711 .html.
173 Mukhina, Irina, ‘Islamic Terrorism and the Question of National Liberation, or Problems of Contemporary 
Chechen Terrorism,’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, No. 6, Nov. 2005, p. 520. (pp. 515-532)
82were connected to Al-Qaida.174  Basaev shared in the belief of a number of Chechen fighters that 
the state borders of Chechnya in effect did not exist, and that a large republic should be created 
encompassing a greater section of the northern Caucasus, setting up an Islamic state, with law 
strictly based on the Qo’ran and shariat.  Foreign jihadists now had a prominent role in these 
incursions; one co-leader of this invasion was Emir al Khattab, a Jordanian of ethnic Chechen 
origins.
This development made the Russian governmental position between  1996 and 1999 of Chechen 
containment no longer tenable.  Little regard had been given in this period to settling the 
situation with the elected second Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, and so Russia was by 
1999 suffering the effects of this.  Of course, one can also argue the inverse of this.  This is the 
position that elements of the Russian government were using the rise of Chechen fanaticism and 
instability towards gaining power themselves.
In this complex environment, the rise of Wahhabist influence in Chechnya and in neighbouring 
Dagestan was no help.  Although always a minority: ‘usually estimated at 5 to 10 percent, the 
Wahhabis became very active and vocal.’175  Through their orthodoxy, relative rigidity of 
religious order, and their desired application of political Islam, they represented a rising threat to 
both secular Chechen and secular Russian regimes, and to less fundamentalist religious order in 
the region.
On this subject, perhaps the best source for explaining the ascendance of different ‘Islams’ as 
arising from a global struggle involving radicalism, including in Chechnya, Brian Glyn Williams
174 Kisriev, Enver and Robert Bruce Ware, ‘Russian Hegemony in Dagestan,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 21, No.  1, 
Jan.-Mar. 2005, p. 26. (pp. 26-55)
175 Lanskoy, Miriam, ‘Dagestan and Chechnya: The Wahhabi Challenge to the State,’ SAIS Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, 
Summer-Fall 2002, p.  171. (pp.  167-192)
83wrote an excellent article detailing the ‘role’ of the Chechen conflict in the broader schemes of 
worldwide confrontation:176
‘The Wahhabis used their considerable funds to undermine local religious authorities 
(including the Mufti-Head Cleric of Chechnya, Akhmed Kadyrov, who is a Sufi) and to 
combat the influence of the moderate political leaders among the Chechens. On occasion, 
secular nationalist Chechen field commanders, such as the notorious Yamadiyev brothers, 
responded by clashing with the overbearing Wahhabi fighters who made themselves as 
unwelcome among Sw/i-moderates in Chechnya as the swaggering Arabs of the 055 
Brigade had among the average people of Afghanistan.’
In such an atmosphere analyzed in the above article, Russian influence and their ‘backyard’ 
understanding on Chechnya during the inter-war period further discouraged both internal and 
external aid to the area.
Thereby, international aid was no more forthcoming.  Relative to the instability of the time 
period, research by Tomila Lankina found that as proportional to overall aid to Russia in respect 
to population density, EU support was lacking for the North Caucasus region.  While again 
cautioning that ethnicity was not a clear factor in aid distribution, Lankina finds that:
‘A closer look at the data reveals that entities most under-represented [in respect to aid] 
are the Muslim republics of the North Caucasus and Volga areas, and not ethnic regions
176 Williams, Brian Glyn, ‘Jihad and Ethnicity in Post-Communist Eurasia. On the Trail of Transnational Islamic 
Holy Warriors in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Chechnya and Kosovo,’  The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 
Vol. 2, No. 3-4, March/June 2003, p.  16. (pp. 3-24)
177 Lankina, Tomila, ‘European Union Aid to Russia,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 2005, p. 326. 
(pp. 309-334)
84Putin’s view of Russia as a great power has been interconnected with what Russia specialist 
Andrei Tsygankov calls the Russia’s great power normalization.  This thesis disagrees with 
Tsygankov when he writes:
‘The state’s record of responding to Russia’s security needs, however, is dismal, with the 
Chechnya issue remaining the No. 1  source of concern.  Although people continue to 
have trust in the president, increasingly, many feel he has failed to deliver on his promise 
to eliminate the sources of terrorism.’178
In fact, much data has been found and will be explained in future sections and chapters that 
particularly Tsygankov’s implication that the Chechen issue is people’s ‘number 1   concern’ is 
misplaced.  However, this thesis finds that he has a point when he later writes:
‘The issue of Chechnya, as well as Russia’s international situation, will continue to affect 
Putin’s strategy of great-power normalization.’179
There is evidence, some within this thesis, to show that Putin does have, as Tsygankov 
principally writes, a view that Russia can only survive as a country if it is a great power that can 
actively address military problems in a ‘normal’ global context.  Also part of this attempt by 
Putin to improve Russia’s ability to address military problems at this point was his policies to 
reform the Russian Army itself, which, as Dale Herspring argues, were only partially successful 
in terms of creating ‘a modem fighting force.’180
178 Tsygankov, Andrei P., ‘Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.
21, No. 2, Apr.-Jun. 2005, p.  154. (pp.  132-158)
179 Ibid, p.  154.
180 Herspring, Dale R. ‘Putin and the Re-emergence of the Russian Military,’ Problems of  Post-Communism, Vol.
54, No.  1, Jan./Feb. 2007, p. 20. (pp.  17-27)
85In so far as the initiation of hostilities at this point in  1999, support was quite high for Putin and 
the invasion.  The first test of the acceptance of Putin as a potential future president and for his 
war policy can be inferred from looking at the 1999 Russian parliamentary elections.  August to 
December of 1999 showed a remarkable amount of support amongst Russian public opinion for 
a war in Chechnya and for a Prime Minster whom the Russian people in many ways barely 
knew.  Discrediting Luzhkov and Primakov as presidential contenders by the defeat of their 
Fatherland All-Russia (OVR) party in December 1999 was paramount in this time period also.
In this context, Vladimir Gel’man finds that a coalescing of a new ideological elite from  1994 to 
the present era.  Examining the 1999 parliamentary elections on this basis is essential.  Gel’man 
finds that:
‘Putin’s presidency changed the structure of the elite dramatically, which had a decisive 
impact on political opposition in Russia.  Simultaneously, elite integration sharply 
increased and elite differentiation became very limited as a result of the “imposed 
consensus” of elites.  Thanks to these developments, the new ruling group around Putin 
overwhelmingly dominated Russia’s political scene, and all remaining elite sections 
(parliamentary factions, media, business, and regional leaders) had to agree on their 
subordinated role or lost their elite status as such.’1 8 1
As part of this, the Kremlin-engineered Unity party led by Sergei Shoigu became representative 
of Putin himself in this context.  Aiming at the centre of Russian public opinion, Unity was 
portrayed by the Yeltsin administration as the party of stability.  Striving for unity above all else, 
hence its name, the party also quickly became the focus of the national media attention as well.
18 1  German, Vladimir, ‘Political Opposition in Russia,’ Post-Soviet Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 232-233. (pp. 226- 
246)  Gel’man also refers in this quote to his previous article: Gel’man, Vladimir, ‘Russia’s Elites in Search of 
Consensus: What Kind of Consolidation?’ Elites and Development in Russia, (eds.) Anton Steen and Vladimir 
Gel’man, Routledge, London, 2003.
86The fight between Unity and the Fatherland-All-Russia (OVR) alliance was ‘extremely 
negative’182 in this time period.  Yeltsin opponents Yuri Luzhkov, Yevgenii Primakov, and their 
allies did not give up their earlier dominance so easily.  Yet, the perks of incumbency proved to 
be overwhelming, and pro-Yeltsin oligarch Boris Berezovsky183, was on Unity’s side.  Protecting 
the ‘existing Kremlin team’184 from these outsiders was the biggest priority.  OVR was 
overwhelmed by these forces, and failed to break through.  Another side of this struggle, as to be 
discussed later, was that Gusinsky’s NTV media company supported OVR, and in time this 
would make both NTV and Gusinsky himself into a target of the Kremlin.
Russian public opinion, owing to the low amount of party support, loyalty, and affiliation 
inherent to the country was certainly open to the introduction of a new movement representing 
the centre of Russian politics.
ROMIR had similar polling results on assessing parties, but showing Unity even in the lead 
against the Communists (22% to 18%).185  Reasons for this support can be seen in the aspirations 
of Russian public opinion at the time.  It had been a long time since Russian public opinion had 
had a leader and a party supported overtly by that same leader that appeared to be strong and 
gave some small degree of hope in the strength of Russia as a country.
It is clear that, in many ways, Russians supported whatever might be the policy of the Russian 
government on the subject of the second Chechen war.  Primarily, research finds that Russian 
public opinion cared little for the ‘Chechnya’ issue in regard to Putin.  Unlike during the first
182 Wyman, Matthew, ‘Elections and Voters,’ Developments in Russian Politics. Edition 5. (eds.) Stephen White, 
Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 67.
183 ‘With slavish coverage of ORT television, Berezovsky helped Putin get elected president for a four-year term on 
March 27, 2000.’ Hoffman, David E., The Oligarchs. Public Affairs, New York, 2002, p. 485.
184 Wyman, Matthew,  ‘Elections and Voters,’ Developments in Russian Politics. Edition 5. (eds.)  Stephen White, 
Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001,p. 66.
185 Karush, Sarah, ‘MT Poll: Shoigu’s Bloc Is Soaring,’ Moscow Times,  15 December 1999.
87war, Putin and his perceived image would dominate the Chechen war, and not the other way 
around when the Chechen war policy seemed to dominate Yeltsin.  However, this modality led to 
some contradictions in data.
For example, a late December 1999 poll by VTsIOM shows 59% of people who supported the 
war also supported an independent Chechnya, and 48% said they would support a negotiated end 
IF Putin supported it versus a 42% saying no.186 These figures seem to show further how 
Chechnya was an independent variable in the Russian public consideration of Putin.
However, developments in Chechnya, and in the broader scope of the Russian military, can be 
shown to affect public support for Putin over the long term, as will be documented in the next 
section.  It is clear when studying facts of this nature that the ‘Cult of Putin’ went far beyond a 
simple drive for war, but was still attached to Chechnya through Putin’s initiation and 
maintenance of the conflict, and it is another representation of the aforementioned respect for 
Russian public opinion of the leadership in building a consensus for government.  Given that a 
more pronounced war on information will develop and a public willing to accept that state of 
affairs did each have its own limits, Putin enjoyed a fair amount of leeway in public support for 
his prosecution of the war, unlike the more immediate drop in support for Yeltsin in regard to the 
first war.
2000 Conflict Continuation -  Sustained Support
Trends in Russian public opinion continued to show support for Putin, and at least tacit 
acceptance for his Chechen policy at least in the time period studied in this thesis.  Specifically, 
Russian public support did not fail to acknowledge the second war as being something of a
186 Hale, Henry, ‘Is Russian Nationalism On The Rise?’ PONARS Policy Memo No.  110, Harvard University, Feb. 
2000.policy of necessity (i.e. Putin’s portrayal) as it did in the first war.  Nevertheless, over time the 
second Chechen war was consistently unpopular on a theoretical level, although this did not
translate into unpopularity for Putin.
*
Firstly, however, we will examine the overall trends of support for the second Chechen war over 
the course of the time period studied.  Particularly thanks to improved surveying by Yuri Levada 
and his foundation and by others, a more thorough study of these overall trends can be made, 
much more so than in the case of the first war, where statistics are more uneven and questioning 
over time had greater variation.  After this discussion, there will be an analysis of the point by 
point trends concerning specific events relative to the conflict.
(Graph 7):187
Overall trend Jan 2000-Dec 2002
Continue the war effort 
Begin negotiations
Time  Period
According to these statistics (which are confirmed by other data that will be discussed), only at 
two points does Russian public opinion converge between the two opposing answers after April 
2001  when the percentage of those who support the war drops considerably below the percentage 
who want to begin negotiations.
187 Question: ‘How do you consider, should war actions in Chechnya continue os should negotiations begin?’ 
Possible answers as in Graph 7, Levada Foundation web site: http://www.levada.ru/chechnva.html.
89The first time is the period surrounding the 11  September tragedy in America.  Notice 
particularly how, in September and October 2001, the percentage of those who would opt to 
continue the war effort rose over ten percentage points in correlation with the opposing drop in 
those supporting a beginning to negotiations.
The second instance of a significant parallel rise is the time of the Nord-Ost hostage-taking 
incident, which will mark the conclusion of the time periods studied in this thesis.  In October 
and November of 2002, for the first time since January 2001, the percentage of those who 
supported the war effort rose about those who wanted to begin negotiations.
This is significant because only in the beginning of the war and during these two instances were 
percentages tending to favour the war in Russian public opinion.  Otherwise, percentages of 
those who favoured negotiations have a significant lead on percentages of those who favoured 
continuing the war effort.
At this point there must be a discussion of the relative points in the conflict:
Combined with Yeltsin’s resignation on New Year’s Eve 1999, thereby giving him the additional 
position of incumbency, Putin carried over Unity’s success in the Parliamentary election into his
1  fifi
own election in March 2000 as President with 52.9 percent of the vote.
From the beginning, there was little doubt that Putin would be victorious in the Presidential 
election; polling results indicated that the public at the very least accepted Putin as a future 
President, his opposition was unimpressive, and was combined with a mass media that was 
conveniently ‘light’ on Putin criticism.  Often, the biggest topic of conversation among political
188 Brudny, Yitzhak M, ‘Russian Electoral Patterns:  1999-2000,’ Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader, (ed.) 
Archie Brown, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.  173.
90observers was in fact, given the state of the media, whether or not Gennadi Zyuganov, who ran 
again for the Communists, could push Putin into a second round or not, and not whether Putin 
could be defeated.
In surveys conducted by the for Public Opinion Foundation189 on Putin, Yavlinsky, and 
Zyuganov voters after the presidential vote, there were clear trends that were developed between 
the choices by voters.  For all three of those candidates, those in favour of Chechnya leaving 
Russia were fairly steady, with responses of 17 to 20%.  There were marked differences, 
however, between voters’ choices for President and the lengths to which Russia should go to in 
order to keep Chechnya.  Those who voted for Yavlinsky tended not to make the strongest 
choice on the survey, ‘to keep Chechnya at all costs’, categorised as a 1  out of 5 on the survey 
answer (5 being ‘to let Chechnya go’).  This is in contrast to Putin’s voters, who had the 
strongest low answers, with 42% responding that Chechnya should be held at all costs.  Also, not 
surprisingly, Yavlinsky had the strongest support of people who supported democracy, with 
80%, while Zyuganov had the lowest support in this category, with 50%.  Putin was pointedly in 
the middle in this debate, with 68% saying that they supported democracy.190
Some polling data did however show that Putin was still not completely unassailable, but still in 
a period of making his views and policies known to the Russian people.  July 2000 national 
polling by ROMIR revealed that 33% of Russian citizens were still unsure of Putin, while still a 
majority (54%) either approved or somewhat approved of President Putin.  At the same time,
63% had not changed their opinion of President Putin.1 91  What this reveals is that by July 2000, 
Putin had still not anchored his hold over Russian public opinion, at least not to the heights of
189 As quoted by Colton, Timothy J. and Michael McFaul, ‘Putin and Democratization,’ Putin’s Russia, (ed.) Dale R. 
Herspring, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Oxford, 2003.
190 Colton, Timothy J. and Michael McFaul, ‘Putin and Democratization,’ Putin’s Russia, (ed.) Dale R. Herspring, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Oxford, 2003, p. 34.
1 9 1  ROMIR, ‘Otnoshenie rossiian k Vladimira Putinu (Iiul’),’ July 2000 polling of 2000 adults in  115 locations of 40 
federal subjects: http://web.archive.org/web/20000829181640/www.romir.ru/socpolit/vvps/07  2000/putin-iuly.htm.
91support that he would in future acquire, ranging between 70 to 80% support as he gained years 
later.  Still a very large percentage saw him with a bit of scepticism, which was muted however 
as no other Russian politician like Zyuganov could gain the support of this undecided quotient.
When examining this data, some parallels can be seen.  Similarly as compared to the Yeltsin era, 
Russian public opinion by September 2002 still had an element of romanticism with the past.  In 
VTsIOM polling data, 39% still preferred to live in the times of Brezhnev versus 23% who 
preferred to live in Putin’s times.192  When put against the backdrop of socialism (as per 
Brezhnev) versus ‘democracy’ as per Yeltsin/Putin, this is little changed from previously cited 
polling data from  1995.  Nevertheless, Russian public opinion will be trending somewhat 
differently in the Putin era.
The first months of 2000 revealed that, according to VTsIOM polling data, optimism for the war 
declined slightly, even among war supporters between December of 1999 and April of 2000. 
43% of war ‘hawks’ thought that the rebels would be defeated and Chechnya soundly returned to 
Russia in April 2000, as compared to 52% in December 1999.  35% of ‘hawks’ and 36% of 
‘doves’ believed in April 2000 that the conflict would spread to the whole of the northern 
Caucasus, versus 22 and 29% in  1999.  Corresponding to this, respondents who believed that the 
war would take the same course as the first war went up slightly.193
By July 2000, the Chechen resistance began to rely more and more on a tactic used by other 
Muslim uprisings in particular the Arab Middle East, but until this point (and especially in the
192 Question, ‘If you could live your life anew, in what times and where would you prefer to live?’ Possible answers: 
1) In Brezhnev’s times 2) In Putin’s times 3) In another country 4) In Russia before 1917 5) In times of the first 5- 
year plans 6) In Khrushchev’s times 7) In perestroika times. VTsIOM, October 2002, 1600 respondents. ‘Russian 
Public Opinion 2002,’ VTsIOM, Moscow, 2003, p.  12.
193 Gudkov, Lev, ‘Antimobilizatsionnyi potentsial rossiiskogo obshestva,’ VTsIOM, Monitoring obchestvennogo 
mneniia, No. 6, Vol. 50, Nov.-Dee. 2000, p. 48.
92first war) had not had a role to play in the overall Chechen situation, that is the role of the 
unpredictable suicide bomber.194
In the same period of time, Russian public opinion agreed with the political direction that Putin 
supported.  VTsIOM data revealed that 61% said they viewed Putin’s performance positively, 
against 26% who said the opposite.195  The change in tactics in Chechnya apparently had little 
effect on the view of Putin in Russian public opinion, and thereby on the issue on which Putin 
had rode to Presidential victory.
Overall, this time period also corresponded with a new trend in public opinion to gain some 
degree of national pride again in Russia.  Putin began to promote for instance, a return to the 
Soviet national anthem to acknowledge this pride.  November polling data showed that, whereas 
the coat of arms and the flag adopted under Yeltsin were easily acceptable to Russian public 
opinion, the music was deficient.196  Soon hereafter, the Soviet anthem was once again adopted, 
with new words to clear the taint of communism.  In regard to the Chechen war, the need for 
Putin to summon sources of patriotic fervour could not be understated.  In a developing state 
such as Russia of 2000, with a popular President sitting at the head of what was supposed to be a 
‘democratic’ state, such choice opportunities for public support could not be ignored.
In monthly opinion polling conducted by VTsIOM from June to August, and then in November 
and December 2000, Putin’s approval rating remained solidly high and generally increased,
194 See Speckhard, Anne and Khapta Akhmedova, ‘The Makings of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,’ Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 5, 2006, pp. 429-492.
195 Question: ‘Could you say if you on the whole approve or not of the job Vladimir Putin is doing as President of 
Russia?’  61% approved:26% did not approve: 13% no answer, VCIOM Express 2000-17,
Question asked of 1600 respondents between 30.06.2000 and 04.07.2000. 
website: http://sofist.socpol.ru/xml  view.shtml?en= 1  &HO=8Q29&SO= 156&HSQ=2
196 Positive to Negative Responses on question: Do you like the present [...], or not?
Russian State Flag: I like it: 68%/I don’t like it: 20%/Hard to answer:  12%.
Russian State Coat Of Arms: I like it: 64%/I don’t like it: 24%/Hard to answer:  12%.
Russian State Anthem: I like it: 32%/I don’t like it: 43%/Hard to answer: 25%.
Question asked of 1500 respondents in 29 regions, territories and republics on 14-15 October 2000.
Public Opinion Foundation website.  http://english.fom.rU/survev/dominant/6/16/57.html
93except for the month of August, in response to probably the damage inflicted on the reputation of 
the government and on the Putin Administration from the mismanagement of the Kursk disaster. 
Of course, incompetence197 in dealing with the lost flagship submarine of the Russian naval fleet 
was less easy to hide than any incompetence in the remote Chechnya, given the level of media 
manipulation as to be examined in chapter four.
Corresponding to this, disapproval ratings went generally down for Prime Minister Kasyanov 
and President Putin, again except for the August Kursk imbroglio.  As usual, the Russian 
government continued to suffer from high disapproval ratings, as befitting its reputation in 
Russian society as being responsible for the usual host of problems from popular perceptions of 
corruption and from economic issues.
(Data Set 1): 
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Governor of Your Oblast 47 53 j 53 i 52 j 50
Disapproval:
June 2000  July 2000  Aug. 2000  Nov. 2000  Dec. 2000
President Putin 
Prime Minister Kasyanov 
Govemment of Russia as a Whole 
Governor of Your Oblast
26 17 30 22 23
30 25 37 32 34
47 42 49 46 48
39 36 38 37 37
197 See Moore, Robert, A Time To Die: The Kursk Disaster. Doubleday, London, 2002.  Also recommended for 
some argument on this issue in relation to the Chechen conflict, see: Daly, John C. K, ‘The Kursk Explosion: A 
Result of Dagestani Sabotage?’ The Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 25 Oct. 2000.
198 Information from Levada-era VTsIOM website (no longer posted), Special Report, 25 September 2001, 
http://www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/Dress
94It is clear that in the second half of 2000, with Putin consolidating his position as the now fully 
elected President of Russia, some trends that would set the tone for the entirety of the next two 
years of the Chechen war become obvious.
When asked what politicians they ‘trusted’ as opposed to ‘approving the activities of, 
respondents were similarly in favour of their President.  A second point is also at issue, in what 
could have been an advantageous possibility for the Communists.  Representing what was the 
major opposition candidate in the previous Presidential election and also the head of the major 
‘opposition’ party in the Duma, Zyuganov came in second in similar polling data from a 
collection of surveys from the Monitoring of  Economic and Social Changes in Russia series.
In this data, Zyuganov was the only other politician who could reliably muster double-digit trust 
ratings.  In individual months, Sergei Shoigu, Yevgeni Primakov, and Tuleev could manage 
barely 10% trust ratings, but overall they remained in single-digit level ratings.  In every month, 
Putin’s rating was easily more than 20% above Zyuganov.199
ROMIR polling data from a national survey conducted in 22-24 September 2000 of 1111  adults 
revealed much the same result.  Putin’s approval ratings in this survey (of those who wholly or 
somewhat approve of his performance) measured 65% versus 24% who had opposite negative 
views of the President.  Measuring change from March 2000, 78% had a better or the same view 
of Putin as before.  Only 17% said their perception was worse.200
199 2405 respondents surveyed with 58 possible answers plus ‘other,’ ‘no one’ and ‘difficult to answer.’  In answer to 
the proposition, ‘List 5-6 Russian Politicians You Trust Most.’ Monitoring of  Social and Economic Changes in 
Russia 2000-09, website: http://sofist.socpol.ru/xml  view.shtml?en= 1  &HO=4Q61  &SO=49&HSO=2Q 
[also see: VTsIOM, Special Report, 25 September 2001, http://www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/press.]
ROMIR, www.romir.ru/eng/research/putin-september.htm.
95Additional October to December 2000 ROMIR polling data confirms this as seen from the graph 
below, in answer to the question: ‘To what degree do you approve or disapprove of the activities 
of President Putin?’
(Graph 8):201
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Especially noted from the above graph the level of consistency over the last months of 2000 in 
general support for Putin.
Further surveys conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation found that in regard to Russia, 
Putin’s hold over the Presidency was as secure as ever with only a two percent deviation 
between mid-September and early November (41% on 16-17 September 2000 said they would 
vote for him again should an election be held versus 43% on 4-5 November 2000).  Putin’s 
closest rival, Zyuganov, held at 15% throughout this time period.  Noticeably, whereas Putin’s
201 Question: ‘To what degree do you approve or disapprove of the activities of President Putin?’ Possible answers 
as in Graph 7, ROMIR, 2000 respondents from fieldwork conducted  1.10.2000 to 31.12.2000.  Data from ROMIR 
Omnibi 2000-10, 2000-11  and 2000-12:
http://sofist.socpol.ru/lin  que.shtml?B=Displav+freauencies&NO=395Q&sch  xml=3&en= 1
96rejection numbers (people saying they would never vote for him) never rose above 8%, all major 
rivals had rejection figures not below 21%.202
On the issue of the Chechen war, to the end of 2000, public opinion was drifting in favour of 
negotiations.  Analyses conducted by VTsIOM confirm that between September and October 
2000, those who favour negotiations with the leadership in Chechnya surpass those in favour of 
continuing the war.  In September 2000, data shows that 49% supported continuing the war 
against 40% who favoured entering negotiations.  In October 2000, 47% supported negotiations 
against 44% saying to continue military operations.203
Nevertheless, this downturn in support is more gradual than in the Yeltsin era, and public 
opinion was less actively against the war.  As seen from previous study in this chapter, Yeltsin 
never had a majority in support of his first war.  In comparison, Putin had majority support for 
his Chechen policy for the first 11 months.  This is particularly significant in that the first war 
only lasted 19 months.
Putin seemed to be representing the will of the Russian people in general and, in reference to his 
Chechnya policy, public opinion appears to have possessed less enthusiasm for meaningful 
opposition.  Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White relate this in an article for Post-Soviet 
Studies to the idea of a desire of Russians for a ‘military-security president’ operating under the 
continuing myth of a Yuri Andropov figure that could have saved the Soviet Union.204  This
202 In response to the question: ‘Please imagine that the presidential elections are going to be held this Sunday. 
Which of the following Presidential candidates would you vote for?’  Nation-wide surveys conducted in 29 regions, 
territories and republics.  1500 respondents. Additional polls of the Moscow population, with a sample of 600 
respondents. Public Opinion Foundation website:  http://english.fom.ru/reDorts/frames/ed002901 .html
203 Question: ‘How do you consider, right now should Russia continue the prosecution of war in Chechnya or enter 
into negotiations with the leadership of Chechnya?’ Possible answers:  1) Continue the war 2) Enter into 
negotiations. VTsIOM, Monitoring obchestvennogo mneniia, Vol. 6, No. 50, Noiabr-Dekabr’ 2000, p. 7.
204 Kryshtanovskaya, Olga and Stephen White, ‘Putin’s Militocracy,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.  19, No. 4, October- 
December 2003, p. 291. (pp. 289-306)
97indeed surely had some bearing on Russian public opinion, and continuing on many fronts, 
economic, political and military, this is of great importance in consideration of prevailing issues.
For example, in polling data for the New Year 2001, positives appeared on the economic front 
along with the usual negatives.  Surveys by ROMIR and published by Vremia novostei 
revealed that many Russians had ‘restrained optimism’ with 33% saying that the new year would 
be better, 37% saying it would be the same, and 22% saying the new year would be worse.’
Similar polling from the Public Opinion Foundation found that the Yeltsin era at this stage was 
considered the ‘Dark Past.’206  On the Chechen front, VTsIOM polling revealed that only 16% 
thought that the ongoing war in Chechnya was one of the ‘Top 10 Most Important Events in the 
Year 2000.’  More specific polling from the Agency for Regional Political Research showed 
that ‘50% to 55%’ believed there had been many casualties in Chechnya but the war should 
continue.  This is against 26% who believed there had been too many casualties and that the war 
should be ended.208  Fighting the war was still a high priority in Russian public opinion, even 
given the high casualty rate; they figures were only slightly below previously recorded polling 
data.
Even for the second war, as an overall trend, Russian public opinion was never progressively 
increasing in favour of war.  Opinion polling reliably shows that support for war went steadily 
downwards except when something newly terrible happened, and then Putin in turn would play 
up his ‘war on banditry’ in the media and so support for war would rise again, but only 
temporarily before starting to drop again.
205 Hedlund, Stefan, ‘Will the Russian Economy Revive Under Putin?’ Problems of  Post-Communism, Vol. 48, No. 
2, M.E. Sharpe Inc., March/April 2001, pp. 54-62.
206 ROMIR and Public Opinion Foundation data collected from: Bashkirova, Elena and Petrenko,  Elena, ‘God
optimista,’  Vremia novostei, 27 Dekabr’ 2000, http://www.vremva.ru/2000/195/19/4927.html.
207 Data taken from: Levada, Yuri, 2000 god: razocharovaniia i nadezhdi’ Issue 51, Moskovskie novosti, EastView, 
http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id= 140441.
208 Data taken from: Popov, Nikolai, ‘Songs of the Year,’ Novoe Vremia, No. 52, 31  December 2000,  p. 17,  Current
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 53, No.  1,31 January 2001, p. 4.
98Therefore, as a general rule, increasing support for war was always sudden and reactive to 
changing events.  Otherwise, support for the conflict was reliably decreasing.
Looking back on the overall trends, as Lev Gudkov of VTsIOM points out:
‘[...]in the end of October 2000, the number of supporters of peaceful negotiations with 
Chechen leaders first exceeded the number of supporters of active war action in the 
federal search against Chechen fighting formations: 46% agreeing against 44% with 10% 
having difficulty to answer.’209
Gudkov recognizes however that those who are not supporters of the war are the most politically 
disconnected, comprising women, the elderly, and inhabitants of outlying regions.
On a broader military scope, trends in public opinion towards the military in this time period 
seem to move downward because of other situations independent of the Chechen issue.  As 
previously mentioned, tragedy struck Russia’s military on 12 August 2000 with the sinking of 
the Kursk, Russia’s premier ‘flagship’ submarine, during war games in the Barents Sea. 
Although this event had little direct bearing on the second Chechen war, it is useful to discuss 
this accident in the context of Russian public opinion in regard to the Russian military, of which 
much can be extrapolated in regard to this thesis.
According to a ROMIR Moscow poll at the time, where people were most informed about the 
tragedy due to having the most access to television mass media, Putin’s approval rating dropped 
from 73% to 65%, a number that was still quite high.  However, 59% of Russians held that ‘the
209 Gudkov, Lev, ‘Antimobilizatsionnyi potentsial rossiiskogo obshchestva,’ VTsIOM, Monitoring obchestvennogo 
mneniia, No. 6, Vol. 50, Noiabr-Dekabr’, p. 46.loss of the submarine in no way affected their attitude towards the President.’210 211  Data such as 
this seem to agree that Putin is the type of President that the Russian people want, even in view 
of tragedy of this type.
Looking at the Chechen people, support for Maskhadov at this point was however maintained. 
Despite the promotion of Akhmad Kadyrov by Putin as a leader of Chechnya, few seem to have 
forgotten Maskhadov.  Polls conducted in the region by the LAM Center between December 
2000 and January 2001 suggested that 80% still supported Maskhadov and desired him to 
negotiate with Russia.212
As will be further elaborated in future chapters, connected to this are the new use of the word 
‘extremism’ by the Russian government and media.  In response to the frequent use of this word 
in media, Public Opinion Foundation decided to ask in a survey what Russians thought this word 
meant.  A variety of responses were given, coming in first was the general response ‘Aggressive 
methods of fighting’, with 23% in Russia and 37% in Moscow.213
VTsIOM surveys in 2001 confirmed that Russian public opinion continued to put the blame for 
the explosions in Moscow and other cities in 1999 on the heads of various elements of the 
Chechen insurgence, particularly upon the Islamist elements of the conflict, despite all of the 
debate and arguments put forward in the intervening two years.  55% place blame on Basaev and
210 ROMIR, ‘Moskvichi o tragedii na rossiiskoi podvodnoi lodke “Kursk”,’  19-20 August 2000, Survey of 500 adult 
Moscovites, website:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010306021902/www.romir.ru/socpolit/actual/08  2000/submarine.htm.
211 Additional analysis, using same polling data, from Nikonov, Vyacheslav, ‘A Political Tsushema,’  Trud, 26 
August 2000, http://www.cdi.Org/russia/iohnson/4482.html#7.
212 ‘Chechens Support Secular Government; Believe Maskhadov Government Should Represent Chechnya 
in Negotiations with Russians,’ Dispatches from Chechnya, No.7, http://www.idee.org/lreport7.html.
213 Open-ended question: ‘How do you understand the word “Extremism”, what does it mean?’  Highest rating 
answers:  (37%) Aggressive methods of fighting, (16%) Extreme expression of political views, (5%) General 
negative appraisal, (2%) Extreme situations, (2%) Achieving aims by any means, (1%) Non-standard responses, 
(1%) International conflicts, (39%) No response, wrong response.  Polling data from Public Opinion Foundation, 
conducted 14-15 October 2000, 1500 respondents in 29 regions using household interviews: 
http://english.fom.rU/survev/dominant/6/15/53.html
100his soldiers, 19% on Khattab and his people, and 6% place blame on Maskhadov.  This makes 
for a combined 80% that believe, in August 2001, that some element of Chechen resistance 
planted bombs in Russian apartment blocks.  Unlike in the first war, it is clear that, in the 1999 - 
2002 period covered in this chapter, Chechen forces were unable to impress the Russian public 
with the possible ‘futility of war’ dogma there.214
More surveys by VTsIOM done at the time show that in the period of January 2001 to August 
2001, approval ratings of Putin’s activities as President maintained constantly between the levels 
of 72 and 76%.  Prime Minister Kasyanov, rarely a central figure outside of the shadow of Putin, 
had approval ratings of 47 to 49%.  Not surprisingly, the ‘representatives’ of the President have 
far lower approval ratings, hovering between 30 and 33%.  When put against their unfavourable 
ratings in another part of the same survey, their mean approval rating dropped to, and at certain 
points below, zero.215  These results continued the trend started in the last months of 1999, and 
lasting throughout 2000, reflecting high levels of constant polling support for a portrayed central 
‘purposeful democratic leader’ such as Putin, as opposed to lower levels officials who inspire a 
far lower level of respect.
For the first time in 2001 however, some began to doubt their devotion to a one-party state, 
which had been a recurring theme in the Yeltsin era and the early Putin era.  In regard to the 
overall political situation, Russian public opinion was not totally comfortable with one-party rule 
as was developing under the Putin administration through the Unity party.  For the first time in 
VTsIOM yearly polling data, more Russians (41%) desired having two or three strong parties 
versus having one strong unified party (34%).  This is as opposed to  1999, when 43% said they
214 Data taken from: VTsIOM, ‘SotsiaPno-politicheskaya situatiya v rossii v avguste 2001 g,’ 2001, NVAvw.wciom.ru.
215 Question: ‘To what degree do you trust Putin?’ Possible answers as to varying degrees of trust from Entirely trust 
to Entirely don’t trust, VTsIOM,  1600 respondents, Jaunary 2001-August 2001, ‘Sotsial’no-politicheskaya situatsiya 
v Rossii v avguste 2001 g’, 2001, Nvww.wciom.ru.
101wanted to have one strong party, while 35% responded that they wanted two or three strong 
political parties.216
On a tangent perhaps descriptive of the Russian government, Yuri Levada, in an interview with 
Vremia MN in July 2001, professed his belief that Putin seems ‘too concerned about what people 
think about him.’  Even though he stated that people are disillusioned with the war, he believed 
that Putin had become a ‘symbol of hope,’ stating that 72% approve of Putin’s performance no 
matter what.  In the end, however, he believes that Putin ‘has become a hostage to his popularity
• »  217 rating.
11  September 2001 was however a milestone not for the Chechen war, because very little 
changed in its prosecution, but for Putin’s defence of his version of the necessity of war.  In its 
aftermath, Putin was able to again argue his reasons for invading Chechnya, both domestically 
and internationally.  Effects were however primarily international allowing Putin to fight off 
foreign criticism.
Russian public support for the war continued to drop gradually.  From a peak around the third 
month of 2000, where those in favour of continuing military action in the region topped 70%, 
support for war dropped below 40% in August, where it held at a constant level with statistically 
insignificant changes of  just above 41% in September 2001.  Likewise, support for negotiations 
in Chechnya went from a low of around 22% in the third month of 2000, crossing the 50%
216 Question: ‘How many political parties, in your opinion, do you need right now in Russia?’ Possible answers:  1) 
One strong right party 2) Two or three big parties 3) Many relatively small parties 4) We don’t need political parties 
5) Difficult to answer, VTsIOM,  1600 Russian respondents, 24-27 August 2001, 83 population centres, 33 regions, 
Press Report No. 25, 30 August 2001. http://www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/press
217 Tokareva, Yelena, ‘Vlast’ ne interesuet nichevo, krome nee samoi,’ Issue  120,  Vremia MN,  13 July 2001,
East  View, http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=2420131.
102threshold in March 2001, then well over 50% in August 2001, only to fall again to close to 40% 
in late September.218
In December 2001 interviews published in January 2002, President Putin put down his views on 
the Chechen issue.  In this interview, he agreed with the fact that the Khasavyurt Accords of 
1996 granted Chechen independence, and that Russia could not be held responsible for trying to 
destroy the idea of Chechen independence.  However, because Maskhadov and other forces in 
Chechnya failed to erect a viable and cohesive Chechen state in order to govern the region, 
Russia could not be held in a negative light for needing to establish government there according 
to Russian rules.  The suggestion was that because Chechnya failed to establish a stable 
government, they then forfeited their right to independence.219
From public opinion polling data, simply to ‘not calm down Chechnya,’ was in fact the largest 
basis of unpopularity for Putin  , even though, in another poll conducted at the same time, 
Russian public opinion was indicating that the issue of Chechnya seemed to be separating from 
the issue of Putin’s popularity.  A majority (59%) had answered in survey that Putin has never 
given them an occasion to be disappointed, while amongst those who were disappointed, only 
3% of Russians believed the continuation of the war in Chechnya was a source of 
‘disappointment’ in Putin.221
218 Question: ‘How do you consider, right now should continue war activities in Chechnya or begin negotiations?’ 
VTsIOM, Press Report No. 29, 22 October 2001, web site: http://www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/press.  These surveys 
are of 1600 Russians, in 83 population centres in 33 regions of the country.  See also:  VTsIOM, VCIOM Press Ltd., 
No. 5, Sept-Oct 2001, p. 6.
219 Jonsson, Anna, is  Putin Preparing the Ground for a ‘Solution’ to the Chechen Issue?,’ Central Asia Caucasus 
Institute, 16 Jan. 2002, http://www.cacianalvst.org/view  article.php?articleid=5Q&SMSESS10N=NQ.
220 Open-ended question: in  what do you mainly consider, in the respondents’ point-of view, the failures of Putin in 
the highest post?’  11% said ‘no end’ to the war in Chechnya, 5% criticized Putin’s rapprochement with the West, 
4% said the ‘decrease in the standard of living,’ and 2%said that the ‘victory of corruption’ and ‘coping with 
criminality.’  This survey was taken of 1500 respondents on 16 March 2002.
Petrova, A. S., ‘The Main Failure of Putin -  To Not Calm Down Chechnya,’ Public Opinion Foundation, 21  Mar. 
2004, http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnva/putin  chechnva/ot021102
221 Respondents were asked when Putin had ever disappointed them, and if yes, then why?  59% said that Putin had 
never given them a reason to be disappointed in them.  26% said that there had been occasions of disappointment. 
7% said that seeing Putin in Sochi during the Kursk tragedy disappointed them.  4% thought that Putin had not 
protected Russian athletes during the Salt Lake City Olympic Games, presumably referring to doping scandals
103In regard to popular appraisals of Putin’s performance as President, many of these trends 
continued in the year 2002, as seen from the graph below:
(Graph 9):222
*(In this graph, in rating Putin’s performance between  1   and  10,  1   is the lowest response and  10 the highest)
Month
Unlike in the Yeltsin era, economic status does not seem to be a contributing factor to the view 
of President Putin.  Russian public opinion seems to continue to understand their families’ 
material position to be roughly no better (albeit with no relatively slight but constant decline and 
with some differentiation) than in the pre-Putin era, as seen from the following graph:
(Graph  10):223
although this is not elaborated upon.  3% said continuing the war in Chechnya was a source of disappointment in 
Putin.  2% criticized Putin’s pro-American foreign policies and 2% expected Putin to make greater social actions. 
1% criticized Putin’s refusal to judge Yeltsin. Public Opinion Foundation,  16 Mar. 2002,  1500 respondents.
Petrova, A.S., ‘When Did the President Disappoint Russians?’ Public Opinion Foundation, 21  Feb. 2002, 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnva/putin  chechnva/ofl)21104
222 Data from:  ‘Appraisals from President V. Putin’s Performance,’ VTsIOM, 2400 respondents. ‘Russian Public 
Opinion 2002,’ VTsIOM, Moscow, 2003, p. 24.
Question: ‘How do you rank in the current time the material position of your family?’ Possible answers as in 
Graph 9, VTsIOM, Yearly polling data: May  1994 -  May  1999, quarterly polling data: May 2000-October 2000, bi­
monthly polling data: January 2001-May 2002, ~2107 respondents except in May  1994: 2975 respondents. 
VTsIOM, Monitoring obchestvennogo mneniia, Vol. 59, No. 3, May-Jun. 2002, p. 54.
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While those who say that their families’ material position is ‘very bad’ has generally gone down, 
those who say that their position is ‘medium’ or ‘bad’ is still highly erratic and generally high 
(although ‘medium’ responses are trending upwards).
Another interesting development of 2002 in regard to examining trends in Russian public 
opinion on the Chechen war is the Nord-Ost incident.
During a showing of the play ‘Nord-Ost’ on 23 October 2002, Chechen rebels burst in with guns, 
having bombs tied to their bodies, and took the audience hostage.  The rebels’ principle threat 
was that if the Russian forces stormed the building, then they would then blow up the building. 
Much different from Budyonnovsk, Russian FSB and OMON were quick on the scene and 
closed off the theatre (relative to past such situations) with relative speed.  The crisis ended with 
the use of anesthetics to gas the entire building; putting most healthy people in the building to 
sleep before anyone could blow it up, then afterwards Russian forces burst in killing most of the 
rebels and arresting a few of the terrorists224.  Many people who were not in top physical 
condition, children and the elderly, did not survive the use of gas, and they died from heart
224 ‘Dubrovka Theatre Siege,’ MN News, http://www.mosnews.com/mn-files/dubrovka.shtml.
105failure and other related medical problems.  Over a hundred theatre-goers consequently died, far 
more than were killed by the Chechens who took over the building.225
On the issue of government response to hostage taking, Russian public opinion seems to have 
changed in response to the perceived successful outcome of the raid.  Polls taken after the event 
and compared to opinion polling before the event demonstrate this as seen in the graph below:
(Graph  ll):226
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Reaction was initially very nervous among Russians during the standoff, with many asking how 
such terrorists could ever be allowed to do this sort of thing in downtown Moscow.  35% of 
Russians thought that the secret services were not in control of even the situation in Moscow, but 
only  15% related this to the Russian leadership.  Ultimately, the conclusion to the theatre 
situation caused many Russians to breathe a sigh of relief and to regard such events as typical of 
the Chechens, and thereby support rose for the Russian government and the ‘superb’ work of the 
FSB.  In the end, only 7% thought the Chechen situation should be re-considered again.  The fact 
that far more people died in the audience from the use of gas, including the fact that Russian
225 ‘  129 hostages died in the wake of the siege. All, but two of them died of gas poisoning.’  ‘Nord-Ost: A Year
On,’  Gazeta.ru, http://www.gazeta.ru/20Q3/10/23/NordOstavear.shtml
226 Question: ‘Now one can more and more often hear of terrorists taking hostages and demanding arms and money 
from the authorities. What do you think is the most important thing to do in such situations?’  Possible answers 
according to Graph  10, VTsIOM,  1600 respondents, ‘Russian Public Opinion 2002,’ VTsIOM, Moscow, 2003, p. 
81.
106authorities failed to tell medical authorities what kind of gas was used (because it was a state 
‘secret’) did not bother much of Russian public opinion.  Many of the Russians I spoke to at the 
time professed that such casualties were the price that had to be paid to fight terrorism.227  Also, 
the usual low opinion of competence in the Russian government allowed public opinion to 
dismiss such mistakes as typical of Russian life.
Support for the Chechen war also correspondingly rose in Russian public opinion, with more 
than half of respondents once again favouring a military solution, but this change was generally 
less than in previous incidents.  Polls by the familiar group VTsIOM revealed that, as opposed to 
September polling where the peace talks to military solution ratio was 56:36, now (in late 
October) 46% favoured a military solution versus 45% who favoured peace talks.  This was 
less of a swing vote than previously.  It seems that at this point, in broad terms, the war was 
becoming more unpopular, as fewer people changed their viewpoint on the war despite another 
extreme development.  Still, 56% of Russians desired no concessions to the Chechen rebels and 
77% approved of the President’s performance.229
Long term polling data reveals trends supporting a sustained level of apprehension towards the 
Chechen war in Russian public opinion, as shown from the following graph:
(Graph 12):230
227 The author was in Moscow at the time.
228 Statistics for the two previous paragraphs came from Levada, Yuri, ‘The War’s Rating,’ New Times, 01 
December 2002, EastView, http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp7idM605477.
229 Ibid.
230 Question: ‘What feelings does information about the operations of Russian troops in Chechnya arouse in you?’ 
Possible answers as in Graph 11, 1600 respondents. ‘Russian Public Opinion 2002,’ VTsIOM, Moscow, 2003, p. 52.
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This graph shows that, of the four choices, anxiety changes very little as the war continues. 
Russian public opinion throughout the time period studied of the second Chechen war has found 
that Russians have always been worried about the conflict, and this has served consistently to 
harden support for Putin.
Conclusions
In reference to the first point of the chapter introduction concerning predominant trends, Russian 
public opinion on the Chechen wars, a recurring theme in all sections of this chapter is that, 
when polling data is examined, Russian public opinion did not sustain support for a war in 
Chechnya.  Support for war decreases inexorably over time, and the extent is connected parallel 
to the level of initial support for war.
There is however difference in the regard of each war in regard to these themes.231  The Russian 
public during these time periods preferred in general a ‘stronger hand’ in the governance of
231  Hereon is in reference to the second point of the chapter introduction, as to what these trends say about the wider 
political context of Russia.
108Russia.  During the first war, there was little sustained public support for war in Chechnya 
because Yeltsin in his handling of the situation failed to, amongst other reasons, project a 
confident perception of the issue with any recognizable level of poise.
Putin has managed to portray the opposite representation, through his image as projected by 
himself, his administration and to an extent by the media232.  With a degree of skill, character 
and ability, and including the means available to his office inherited from his predecessor, Putin 
has conveyed a sense of immediacy to the problem of Chechnya to the Russian people and he 
has been able to successfully argue that he is the strong man who is able to take care of this 
issue.
Further to this, Russian public opinion has followed this theme and has been apprehensively 
supportive of Putin’s policy on Chechnya, while not necessarily being in favour of the Chechen 
war specifically.  These trends find that the wars in Chechnya demonstrate the personality driven 
nature of Russian politics.  While it is true that both Yeltsin and Putin have been elected to the 
office of President of Russia, both have been, over time, hindered and assisted by their policies 
on the Chechen issue.  Of course, it must also be pointed out that the war in Chechnya was in 
many ways an artificial construct (as a policy) began by Yeltsin for short-term political gains, 
outside of a smooth, more peaceful, theoretical transition from communism to democracy, 
although the sought-after political rewards were not felt for many years.
Yeltsin wanted a war to boost patriotism and support for the Russian state and for his 
administration.  However, the remuneration for this policy only went to his successor, that of the 
government of Putin and his ‘strong state’ idea.  Very few of these concepts, it must be added, 
contribute positively to the idea of Russian democracy.233
232 As to be discussed in particularly chapter four.
233 As to be discussed in chapter five.
109The next chapters will seek to examine these trends in light of such factors of regionalism, social 
cleavages and media influence, including government policy on dealing with media.  Ultimately, 
there will be a further exploration of what these outlined trends reflect on the state of Russian 
politics as authoritarianism or as consolidating democracy.
110Jason Vaughn 
Chapter Three
Regional. Social and Other Cleavage Differences: Russian Public Opinion and the Chechen 
Wars 
Introduction
The previous chapter outlined trends in Russian public opinion on the two Chechen wars 1994- 
96 and 1999-2002 over the entire territory of the Russian Federation. This chapter is written to 
outline variations of Russian public opinion in regard to the Chechen war in separate cleavages 
of Russian society.
The central questions here are, given what source material and data that is available:
•  What can we learn about who did typically support the use of Russian Federal troops in 
Chechnya, and who in turn was typically opposed?
•  Especially, in the Putin era, a further question will frequently dominate also: what groups 
are even interested in the Chechen war as a ‘problem’ in Russian society?
•  Ultimately, this chapter will attempt to find out how unified Russian public opinion is on 
the Chechen war issue.
Covering the largest amount of territorial land mass on Earth, the contemporary Russian 
Federation is an attempt at a federal state comprising 86 constituent subjects.  Regard for one of 
these subjects, Chechnya, and for its traditional/native people, the Chechen nation, are among the 
main focuses of this thesis.  The simple facts of the issue have already been discussed.  In 1991,
111Chechnya sought to break away from the Russian Federation.  In 1994, Russia attempted mass 
invasion to prevent this ‘subject’ from full secession.  Both before and after this point, Russian 
public opinion has to an extent formed and diversified on the issue.
Military operations in Chechnya have been initiated under two separate Russian presidential 
administrations.  As covered in chapter two, each of the two administrations responsible for 
conduct of the wars in Chechnya has taken on different public perceptions in the Russian public 
as pertaining to this subject.  One could theorize that Russian public opinion is far from being 
uniform over the expanse of Russia’s territory, and within its ethnic, age, or class divides.  This 
chapter does not however seek to lineally explain cleavages in Russian public opinion over the 
entire periods being studied.  Many times the Putin era will be concentrated on, while showing 
appropriate contrasts to the Yeltsin era when reliable data is available.  In regard to many points, 
it is often found that some cleavages, especially in the political sphere, are still forming.
On the other hand, some cleavages are more fundamental, such as on gender, age, and the like. 
This chapter seeks to better understand the war from the examination of a number of these 
cleavages, defining some divisions simultaneously with analysis.
To a degree, this chapter seeks to explore the cleavages within the larger examination conducted 
in chapter two.  Also, however, this chapter will attempt to expand on the contemporary 
understanding of Russian public opinion, in some cases far beyond what data on Russian public 
opinion can tell us.  Such research is important in that it adds to academic knowledge on the 
subject of Russian public opinion, Russian society, the Chechen wars, and even our 
understanding of Russian democracy.  To accurately explore and distinguish between cleavages 
in Russian public opinion on the Chechen wars is to challenge abstract generalities made by 
some in study of the future of Russia as a state, as a culture, and as a progressive society.
112As will be discussed in each appropriate section, this chapter poses some questions that go 
beyond the limits of this thesis.  It could be argued that in some areas this chapter might present 
more questions than answers or conclusions than are possible to maintain reliably based on 
available research and polling data.  In such cases, the topic will.be hinted at, but the line of 
discussion will not be followed.
In this chapter I will look at eight cleavages in Russian public opinion in order to attempt to find 
boundaries of importance in each.  In each of these cases, there will also be discussed what has 
already been researched regarding each area.  Ultimately, this chapter will try to reflect on who 
in Russian public opinion supports the war in Chechnya.  Again, in many cases due to lack of 
evidentiary data, few conclusions will be found, however there should be a study of these 
cleavages in order to better understand Russian public opinion on the issue of the Chechen wars.
The eight cleavages are:
1) The Ethnic Divide
2) The Gender Divide
3) The Age Divide
4) The Rural/Urban Divide
5) The Regional Divide
6) The Political Divide
7) The Class Divide
8) The Religious Divide
With that said, we must now consider the relevant divisions covered.
113The Ethnic Divide
The ethnic divide in Russian society has been a prevalent part of debate since long before the 
beginning of the post-Soviet Chechen wars.  Russia’s present has been dominated by the legacies 
of the role of the primarily ethno-Russian empire and how a democratic state could evolve from 
a traditionally centralized and almost-exclusively authoritarian past.  Whether by monarchic 
czar, by communist political party, or by democratic representation, Russia has long had to deal 
with extending centralized rule from St. Petersburg/Moscow (capitals of all the three eras) over 
other ethnicities which have not always been open to external rule.
Within this environment of the post-Soviet era, Chechnya stubbornly refused to join the Russian 
Federation, even when other ethno-sections were willing to make a deal.  As befitting their 
tradition, post-Soviet Chechnya under Dzhokhar Dudaev at the very least made the point clear 
that, if Chechnya were to join Russia, then it would join on its own terms.
In some ways, Russian society saw this policy as a rebellion against Moscow in the context of 
the still-existing stereotypes of Chechens.  Soviet rule had not been able to prevent ethnicity 
from being a substantial ongoing factor in Soviet society, and this has continued into the post- 
Soviet era.
In the context of this chapter, a study of the ethnic divisions within Russian public opinion in 
view of the Chechen wars is extremely difficult.  As expressed by Valentin Mikhailov:
114‘In recent years there has been an acute lack of independent public opinion polls and 
sociological research in the republics.  It became virtually impossible to receive reliable 
information in Chechnya after the military campaign started.’234
However, Dimitry Gorenburg wrote a substantial article on this subject concerning popular 
support for nationalism in Russia’s ethnic republics.  In this paper, Gorensburg compares support 
for nationalism in Russia’s ethnic republics to nationalism among ethnic groups not possessing 
their own republic.  Gorenburg finds that:
‘[...jlocal political leaders support nationalism primarily because they recognize that 
greater regional autonomy would increase their political power.  Since cultural 
nationalism does not affect these leaders’ power, they do not have a strong tendency to 
support it.’235
In this context, as in Chechnya, ethnic nationalism has been used sometimes to gain power when 
regional lines reflected these divisions, whereas simply cultural nationalism (outside of political 
boundaries) was not sufficient.  This could be one argument whereby the rise of Chechen 
nationalism in their own republic did not expand to a larger North Caucasian arena.
Also, Gorenburg finds that:
‘[...Jresults show a strong tendency among intellectuals in most republics to support 
regional separatism.  Students and members of the political elite also tend to support 
regional separatism in most republics.  There is an extremely strong correlation between
234 Mikhailov, Valentin, ‘Chechnya and Tatarstan: Differences in Search of an Explanation,’ Chechnya: From Past 
to Present, (ed.) Richard Sakwa, Anthem Press, London, 2005, p. 57.
235 Gorenburg, Dmitry, ‘Nationalism for the Masses: Popular Support for Nationalism in Russia’s Ethnic Republics,’ 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No.  1, January 2001, p.  102. (pp. 73-104)
115level of education and support for separatism, with higher education predicting greater 
separatist tendencies in 14 of the 18 cases.’236
Further:
‘[...Jresults show that support for cultural nationalism is most pronounced among 
intellectuals, rural inhabitants and migrants from rural to urban areas.  Belonging to the 
intellectual group increases a respondent’s language index scored by 2.3%, while being a 
migrant increases it by 8.8%.  Women and communists are particularly likely to express 
opposition to cultural nationalism.’237
Where these conclusions parallel study of Russian public opinion, it is interesting in that, 
concerning a debate about ethnic divisions in Russian society, how much difference there is 
between priorities of public opinion within ethnicities and the priorities of general Russian public 
opinion.  As will be shown, in comparing such studies, little analysis can be drawn, other than to 
say that regional separatism is a distinct issue in ethnic republics; whereas considerations of such 
issues in the ethnic Russian mindset represent a more-relatively foreign concept.  Most probably 
it is because of a carryover from the traditional imperial mindset that, in data used for this 
chapter, such concerns of ethnicity have little bearing on the Russian mind outside the 
boundaries of certain security issues and stereotypes.
In relation to the degree to which the Russian state has attempted a policy on nationalities in 
order to address the ethnicity question, results have not been positive.  This can be seen from the 
situation and oppression of Chechens covered in this thesis, however individual rights for 
minorities have been a professed goal of general policy.  This has represented a substantial
236 Ibid, p. 92.
237 Ibid, p. 101.
116advance in Russian society.  Referring to the 1992 Federation Treaty, Tamara Reslar describes 
this significance as:
‘[...]the treaty called for the recognition of the human rights of all citizens, regardless of 
their nationality or where they live, as well as the right of peoples to self-determination. 
However, it stressed that the rights and liberties of individuals-a new emphasis in 
Russia’s politics-are paramount.’238
As in the past, however, ethnic policy on this question has fallen behind the idealistic words of 
any treaty.  The Chechen war, as outlined in this thesis, is endemic with a general lack of 
equality or ‘self-determination’ as suggested by most of Russia’s treatises and constitutions.
In generalized polling data, very little data is found to be available concerning what any one 
ethnic section of Russian society thinks about Chechens or of the Chechen war, as very few 
surveys ask the question, ‘What is your ethnicity?’  Most survey data found concerning Russian 
society is therefore in the ‘rossiiane’ context and not in that of the ‘russkie.’  In the absence of 
polling data as referred to by Mikhailov and in agreement with research for this thesis, instead 
this section will seek to examine the ethnic divide in the context of how Chechens have been 
viewed by Russian society during the time periods studied.
Mary Holland finds that, in the second war in Chechnya:
238 Reslar, Tamara J., ‘Dilemmas of Democratisation: Safeguarding Minorities in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No.  1, January 1997, p. 95.  (pp. 89-106)
117‘[...]although Chechens have long encountered racial discrimination and harassment in 
Russia, since the resumption of armed conflict in 1999, racial discrimination has evolved 
into a state-sponsored, large-scale coordinated campaign.’239
While this statement is slightly extreme on policy, especially on the ‘large-scale coordinated’ 
section based on ‘racist’ statements and records by Russian officials and also the Western- 
oriented NGO reports she uses to document this ‘discrimination,’ some analysis should be 
examined on this point.  The question of, to what extent is Chechen discrimination an artificially 
created concept by the state in the second war, will be debated in the next chapter on the media 
but the reality of discrimination is the point of this section.
Furthermore, it must be said that this topic has already been extensively explored by the work of 
John Russell in his substantive article, ‘Mujahedeen, Mafia, Madmen: Russian Perceptions of 
Chechens During the Wars in Chechnya, 1994-96 and 1999-2001.’  Russell focuses his 
discussion on the ‘demonisation’ of Chechens in Russian public opinion.
He finds that the dehumanization of Chechens as a people by Russian media and elites combined 
with the ‘slightly ridiculous posturing, megalomania and illusions of grandeur’ among ‘leading 
Chechen protagonists’ has created an atmosphere where compromise is increasingly difficult, if 
not impossible in the second war.  In reference to the first war, Russell finds that the Chechen 
rebels were able to essentially communicate their message better, thereby:
‘[...]there was a growing understanding among the Russian public that Chechens 
perceived their struggle as one of national liberation.’240
239 Holland, Mary, ‘Chechnya’s Internally Displaced and the Role of Russia’s Non-Governmental Organizations,’ 
Journal of  Refugee Studies, Vol.  17, No. 3, 2004, p. 337. (pp. 334-346)
118Any ethnic divide was overcome therefore in the first war by the actions and pronouncements of 
Chechen insurgents and their external supporters, effectively forcing open communication, 
whereas in the second war, the Chechen ‘mindset’ has not broken through, and utilizing a 
smarter public relations campaign, Putin has been able to dilute any impact of Chechen PR. 
Further, due to a somewhat more successful institution of a pro-Russian government in 
Chechnya, Putin has been able to partially break the clear paradigms of an ethnic divide within 
the Chechen conflict.
Russell explains this divide specifically on the basis of the American September 11 attacks in his 
article, Terrorists, Bandits, Spooks and Thieves: Russian Demonisation of the Chechens Before 
and Since 9/11.'  Russell points out the diversion between the romanticism placed on the 
Chechens by Western sources, who marvel at the 'perception of the freedom loving, savage yet 
brave and honourable Chechens,'241 and Russian public opinion, which keeps in mind the 
hostility of Chechens to Russian rule.  If any romanticism did exist in Russian public opinion, 
Russell found that it easily gave way a harsher view in the post-Soviet era.
Any existing good will in Russian public opinion on the ethnic divide therefore gave way to a 
progressively darker stereotype of Chechens, in an era where:
'[...]the Chechen mafia, established in the major Russian cities, was well placed to 
exploit the opportunities afforded by the post-Soviet transition to a market economy.'242
240 Russell, John, ‘Mujahedeen, Mafia, Madmen: Russian Perceptions of Chechens During the Wars in Chechnya, 
1994-96 and  1999-2001,’ Russia After Communism, (eds.) Rick Fawn and Stephen White, Frank Cass Publishers, 
London and Portland OR, 2002, pp. 76-80. (pp. 73-96)
241 Russell, John,  ‘Terrorists, Bandits, Spooks and Thieves: Russian Demonisation of the Chechens Before and 
After 9/11,’ Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No.  1, 2005, p.  102. (pp.  101-  116)
242 Ibid, p.  104.
119On Yeltsin’s attempt at turning this ethnic divide into support for the war, Russell finds that most 
of the Russian population accepted this only as ‘hollow rhetoric,’ using public opinion polling to 
demonstrate this statement.  In contrast to the Yeltsin era, taking acknowledgement of this 
portrayal, Russell finds that this element found traction in Russian public opinion after the 
bombings in Russia in 1999.
This thesis, in further study of this issue, finds this to be essentially true.  Research suggests that 
the 1999 explosions in Russia’s apartment blocks brought the conflict in Chechnya ‘home’ for 
many Russians.  The extension of the first war into places such as Budyonnovsk was not enough 
to make the danger of the conflict sufficiently ‘immediate’ for the Russian public as a broad 
security threat.  Especially given the fact that at the time, many Russians did not perceive the 
situation in Chechnya as being an ‘on-going’ conflict, the apartment bombings seemed to destroy 
completely any potential sympathy for Chechen rebels available in 1999.
<
On the subject of the 11  September 2001 attacks, Russell emphasizes how Putin was able to 
further establish this ‘immediacy’ of the conflict.  Much as the American president Bush used 
the attacks to pursue a more extensive foreign policy, Putin used this event to further his own 
interests in what fewer questioned was now Russia’s internal policy: a pro-Russian victory in the 
Chechen conflict.  Putin’s successful demonisation of the Chechens on his own basis was further 
cemented.  Nevertheless, Russell demonstrates that, to an extent, Putin’s Chechnya policy, his 
rise to power on that issue and his augmentation of his portrayal of the conflict based on current 
events was a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Therefore, on the Chechen war as an ethnic issue, even if the situation was not necessarily what 
Putin said it was in the beginning, then circumstances brought Putin’s portrayal into reality after 
the fact.  Outside the realm of this thesis, Putin’s future policies of ‘Chechenisation’ of the
120conflict leading to support for the Kadyrovs was perhaps some representation of the 
unacceptable nature of long-term ‘demonisation’ of Chechens as an ethnic group.
Unsurprisingly, data studied for the purposes of this thesis seem to confirm that especially with 
the onset of the second war, Russian regard for Chechens as an ethnic group has lessened 
noticeably, as seen from the graph below:
(Graph  l):243
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Not unsurprisingly in these surveys each taken two years apart, the ethnic divide seems to be a 
central focus on which Russian public opinion has variance if you consider the issue of the 
Chechen war.
243 Question: in  general what is your attitude towards the Chechens?’ Possible answers as in Chart  1. VTsIOM, 
Monitoring of  Economic and Social Changes in Russia, Series  1998-11, 2000-11, 2002-11, Surveys taken of 2409, 
2402 and 2106 respondents respectively, http://sofist.socpol.ru.
121In a similar survey conducted in 2000 by the Institute for Multi-Disciplinary Social Studies 
(Russian Academy of Sciences), 61% of respondents said that they felt “antipathy” towards 
Chechens versus 16% who said that they felt “sympathy.”  A further 22% said that the question 
was difficult to answer.244
Comparatively, in the first war, even in surveys conducted before and after the Budyonnovsk 
crisis, Russian public opinion seemed to be trending less towards a clear negative attitude 
towards Chechens or even non-Russians in general.
In surveys conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation four days before the Budyonnovsk 
crisis, 23% of those polled believed that the problems of Russia were due to ‘non-Russian’ 
(nerusskie) people.  A majority 60% thought that the problems of Russia were due to ‘Russians’ 
(russkie).  This did not change as much as expected after the assault on the hospital and ensuing 
crisis; three weeks afterwards, 26% blamed Russia’s problems on ‘non-Russian’ people while 
50% still believed that such problems were the fault o f‘Russians.’245
An earlier question from a survey conducted by FOM in April  1995 had asked as to what 
nationalities that respondents believe were responsible for criminality.  A majority (56%) said 
that they did not associate criminality with nationality while 26% blamed people living in the 
Caucasus.  Although this might seem a large percentage blaming the Caucasians, it is rather
244 Question: ‘To what extent do you feel sympathy or antipathy towards the people of different nationalities? -  the 
Chechens’  Possible answers:  1) I experience sympathy 2) I experience antipathy 3) Difficult to answer 4) Refuse to 
answer.  1948 respondents nationwide, originally there were 2054 respondents, but 5% refused to answer, and they 
are removed in the statistics given above, http://sofist.socpol.ru.
245 Exact question not given.  Data from Public Opinion Foundation, July 1995,  1369 respondents, 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnva/chechenian/ofl 9952803.
122small relative to the 66% in the above graph reflecting data from 1998 to 2002 that associated 
Chechens with irritation, hostility, mistrust and fear.246
While acknowledging here the lack of a clear comparison, it is obvious that during the first war, 
the Russian public had not yet found its own place in the world, and still largely was dealing 
with de-imperialization and the decision as to what ‘Russia’ would be.  By the time of the 
ongoing second war in Chechnya, Russian public opinion had agreed with the strong state as 
proclaimed by Putin, and therefore had found a platform for itself from which to begin to 
potentially blame non-Russians for the problems of Russia.
Nevertheless, my own research has found that Chechens as an ethnic group received also a 
certain level of fairness.  Through many of the interviews conducted for this thesis,247 1  often 
found a tolerance of, and magnanimity towards, the Chechen conflict some might find 
surprising.  Ethnic Russian people, I generally found, thought the conflict was against terrorism 
and disorder in the abstract sense.  They saw Putin as a strong leader, and they liked this 
characteristic.  Asked about any damage to their freedoms, they often were more interested in the 
freedom to live life and make money, which could be considered fair in consideration of the 
history of Russia.
In May of 2006, one friend of mine, Vladimir, when asked about the ethnic-Chechen Russian 
army officer who lived next door to him, vouched for the officer’s loyalty to Russia in the same 
conversation that he voiced his own support for the war.  When asked to comment on the 
possibility that there existed a stereotype that Russians in any way could be generally racist 
towards Chechens, he could only laugh and swear that no such thing was true.
246 Question: ‘As you believe, what representatives of nationalities more often than others do bad acts or crimes?’ 
Possible answers:  1) I do not consider that bad acts or crimes should be connected to a nationality 2) inhabitants of 
the Caucasus 3) Inhabitants of Central Asia 4) Russians 5) Ukrainians 6) Jews 7) Other nationalities 8) Difficult to 
answer. April 1995, 1370 respondents, http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/nation/caucasian/ofl 9951507.
247 Interviews conducted during multiple research visits to Russia between 2001  and 2006 for this purpose.
123Another interview with an army officer I met near metro station Universitet in Moscow found 
many of the same characteristics.  This officer, a major, told about how he had just returned from 
having a tour of duty in Chechnya.  After giving me a picture of himself with a Russian 
Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC), he went on to almost boast about the massive numbers of 
Chechens that he had massacred.  Jokingly, he started comparing the smell of burning bodies to 
the smells of other foods, such as (predictably) chicken.  In his stories, he told me he was looking 
forward to his return to Chechnya.  When asked however what his opinion of Chechens in 
general was, he was generally quite philosophical, stating that they more or less seemed ok. 
While it must be said that he was far from being without his own racial stereotyping, I was 
surprised at how he saw his enemies as not ‘Chechens’ but as ‘terrorists.’
The older people I interviewed were generally more ‘anti-Chechen’ than the younger age groups. 
I was in Moscow during the Nord-Ost incident, and by and large, it was the older babushkas that 
were most willing to call the hostage-takers ‘Chechens,’ as opposed to ‘the terrorists.’ This is the 
case despite the fact that, at least initially, few knew the nationalities of any of the people inside, 
either hostages or hostage-takers.
To summarize, as detailed by Russell, Russian public opinion did perceive Yeltsin’s use of the 
ethnic card as ‘hollow rhetoric.’  From the events of 1999 however, the ethnic divide gained a 
measure of perceived truth as Russians blamed Chechens as a nationality for terrorist acts. 
Although as said before it is probably not as clear as the wide, ‘state-sponsored,’ notion that 
Mary Holland suggested, this change is perhaps aided by some media policies of the Putin 
administration, as to be covered in chapter four.
124The Gender Divide
In the context of this section, the centre of attention will be on the status and voice of women and 
how they compare to the opinions of men.  As in many countries, viewpoints of women in 
Russia are given an undeserved somewhat-lesser status traditionally accorded their gender. 
Although there were efforts in the Soviet era to have gender equality in various areas, many of 
the fruits of these policies (if they were ever successful in the first place) have receded in the 
post-Soviet era, and so at present Russian women are many times given unequal standing and 
voice.
In the post-Soviet era, as detailed by Vladimir Shlapentokh, gender equality has regressed 
substantially.  ‘80% of the unemployed are women’ and ‘sexual harassment of women [at their 
work] by their superiors is the norm.’248  Ultimately, Shlapentokh finds that gender equality has 
gone in the opposite direction from the West in the last 30 years.
Nevertheless, on frequent occasions and for obvious reasons, women have frequently been the 
most vocal opponents of both Chechen wars.  In what is Russia’s civil society, mothers of 
soldiers sent to Chechnya are often the sources of much opposition to the conflict, and indeed 
are, according to James Richter, one of the most active forces in all Russian civil society.249 
Female journalists such as Anna Politkovskaya have risked their lives to collect information on 
the war and then write articles and books on the issue.  Yet, does this reflect out on what sources 
we have of examining Russian public opinion and the Chechen war?  This section seeks to 
further explore this topic.
248 Shlapentokh, Vladimir, ‘Social Inequality in Post-Communist Russia: The Attitudes of the Political Elite and the 
Masses (1991-1998)’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 7,  1999, p.  1174. (pp.  1167-1178)
249 Richter, James, ‘Promoting Civil Society? Democracy Assistance and Russian Women’s Organizations,’ 
Problems of  Post-Communism, Vol. 49, No.  1, January-February 2002, pp. 30-41.
125Amy Caiazza, in her book on gender and civil society in contemporary Russia, finds that women 
in Russia have a unique platform from which to attempt to influence military policy.  She writes 
that:
‘In fact, through a comparison of a men’s group (ARA) [Antimilitarist Radical 
Association] and a women’s group (CSM) [Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers], it is argued 
that CSM’s success was largely attributable to its ability to exploit a crucial resource that 
men did not have: a gender identity that could inspire and justify collective political 
activism.’250
Further to this, Caiazza finds that women’s groups such as the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers 
have an advantage over men’s groups.  The Committee can for instance use their status as 
mothers to go to further extremes in opposition (while being non-violent) as compared to men’s 
groups who focus on such abstract ideals as anti-militarism.  These extremes could include ‘the
9 < i
onslaught of mothers to Chechnya and to Russian military bases’ to ‘claim their sons.’
Exactly on this point, the Committee’s ‘most dramatic efforts to influence policy occurred as part 
of its opposition to the war in Chechnya.’252
Indeed, in separate FOM polling from the first war found for this thesis, 75% of respondents 
approved of the actions of the Russian mothers in claiming their sons.253
There is another angle however to this argument.  The Committee was to an extent a unique 
group in attempting to influence military policy.  Other women’s groups based on more feminist
250 Caiazza, Amy B., Mothers and Soldiers: Gender. Citizenship and Civil Society in Contemporary Russia. 
Routledge, New York and London, 2002, p.  117.
251 Ibid, p.  127.
252 Ibid, p.  133.
253 Question: ‘Do you approve of the actions of the mothers of Russian soldiers who aspire to take away their sons 
from the sections which are at war in Chechnya?’ Possible answers:  1) Yes 2) No 3) Difficult to answer, Public 
Opinion Foundation, January 1995,  1353 respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/az/%C2/Chechnva/armv  Chechnya  /ofl 9950404.
126ideals did not have as much persuasive power.  As Caiazza finds, the Committee had more 
impact because they were mothers, and not only because they were women.254  This is shown 
further by the Committee’s ineffectual protest actions at the beginning of the second war.255 
Russian political leaders were able to better argue the necessity of continued conflict in 
Chechnya in 1999 and 2000, thereby to a degree blunting some of the impact of the Mothers’ 
group.
Russian culture was extremely sympathetic to collective action by mothers, but only when the 
war was by nature unpopular. This is the case especially in analysis of sympathy for women as a 
general rule.
In the first war, there are a number of reports on Russian public opinion that shows a distinct 
difference in opinion on the war between men and women.  For instance, a poll by Public 
Opinion Foundation found that women were less harsh on soldiers refusing to follow orders in 
Chechnya than men.  While 53% of overall respondents in January of 1995 viewed positively the 
refusal of some officers and soldiers in the first war to follow some orders, 24% viewed this 
negatively.  However, men were far more likely to view the refusal to follow orders negatively 
than women, 35% to 14%.256
At least in some ways initially, this is the case also in the second war.  However as demonstrated 
below, the gender divide has evened out slightly except in some crisis situations. Data on the 
second war is more extensive, and so therefore, more details can be examined within the second 
conflict time period.
254 Caiazza, Amy B., Mothers and Soldiers: Gender. Citizenship and Civil Society in Contemporary Russia, p.  128.
255 Ibid, p.  141.
256 Question: ‘Some Russian military, private soldiers as well as generals, have refused to carry out orders during the 
military operation in Chechnya. How do you estimate this behaviour?’ Possible answers:  1) Positively 2) Negatively 
3) Difficult to answer.  FOM, January 1995, 1367 respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnva/ofl 9950504.
127In VTsIOM studies of the beginning of the second war in their Express series, data is broken 
down according to gender, and that makes the results rather useful in this section.  VTsIOM 
terms as doyes or ‘golubei’ those who respond to questions as to what should be done next in 
Chechnya with the answer, ‘immediately terminate all war actions and begin negotiations with 
Chechen leaders.’  Likewise, VTsIOM considers those who answer after a second question 
suggesting the possibility of major casualties with the response, ‘terminate war actions and 
negotiate only if continuing the war effort will lead to a major loss of federal troops’ as being 
weak hawks, or ‘slabykh iastrebov.’257
Data is from there broken down into what cleavages respond with these answers.  Those who 
answer with these responses are, in these surveys, decidedly in the minority; those who say the 
war should continue at all costs have a sizable lead on these two groups, but to breakdown into 
who has specifically these answers according to gender is repeatedly quite interesting on its own.
Analysis at this point will not focus on those who support the war in all circumstances, but 
instead on those who oppose the war in all circumstances and those who support the war only up 
to a point where considerable resources will have been perceived to be lost.  Since those who 
supported the war versus those who opposed have already been examined in chapter two,
257 Data from the following two graphs reflect responses to a group of questions asked of respondents in sequence. 
The ‘overall’ line represents 100% and the other lines represent the percentage of the overall proportion of weak 
hawks formed by males and females.  Question 1: ‘Do you think the offensive operation of Federal troops in 
Chechnya should continue or peace negotiations with the leaders of Chechnya should start?’  Possible answers:  1) 
Continue the approach of Federal troops 2) Enter into negotiations with Chechen leadership 3) Difficult to answer. 
The data in Graph 3 reflects those who answered with number 2 from this question.  Those who answered with 
Answers 1  or 3 were asked a second question.  Follow-up question: ‘And if the troops continue to suffer heavy 
losses in the offensive operation, do you think that the offensive operation should nevertheless continue in 
Chechnya, or in this case it would be necessary to start peace talks with the leaders in Chechnya?’  Possible 
answers:  1) Continue the approach of Federal troops 2) Enter into negotiations with Chechen leadership 3) Difficult 
to answer.  The data in Graph 2 reflects those who answered with Answer 2 in the follow-up question.  The 
implication is that those who answered with answer 1, to continue the war operation no matter the cost, are 
considered ‘strong hawks’ as opposed to the ‘weak hawks’ as designated.  In this survey data, respondents were also 
separated by gender.  VTsIOM surveys are on average of 1600 respondents with fewer answering the follow-up 
question.  Data from: VTsIOM Express Polls 1999-16,1999-21, 2000-3, 2000-4, 2000-9. 2000-13, 2000-15, 2000- 
16, 2000-18, 2000-21, 2000-22. http://sofist.socpolsvJ.  See also: Monitoring obchestvennogo mneniia, VTsIOM, 
No. 6, Vol. 50, Noiabr’-Dekabr’ 2000, p. 49, table 2.
128examination here will concentrate on differences in those who at some point oppose the war. 
Graph two here first examines those so-called ‘weak hawks,’ or those who say that there is a 
point where their support would end for the war.
(Graph 2):
Overall ’Weak Hawks' 
Female Weak Hawks
Male Weak Hawks
As shown by their generally higher percentages in relation to the male percentages of ‘weak 
hawks,’ this graph shows that many times, even if they agree to operations in Chechnya, then if 
there are major casualties, then often women are the first to agree to negotiations.  Also data here 
shows that the periods of time when the overall percentage goes up tends to correspond with a
129closing of the gap between male and female percentages.  This is with the exception of the 
5.2000 to 7.2000 time period where the overall percentage increases alongside a widening gap 
dominated by the percentage of female weak hawks.
(Graph 3):
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Compared to the previous graph, as can be seen from this graph, women make up the majority of 
respondents considering themselves to be ‘doves’ at the beginning of the war, with the overall 
percentage o f‘doves’ rising in relation to the rising number of male ‘doves.’  The female 
dominance of the ‘dove’ response therefore drops.  Women were most likely to prefer
130negotiations, especially in the first few months of conflict.  Over time, with the rise of more 
‘male doves,’ this variance evens out slightly.
In this polling data, we also find that while percentages of weak ‘hawks’ remain stagnant, anti­
war opposition, as represented by ‘dove’ respondents, rises steadily in relation to the male vote 
tending to defect from ‘stronger’ pro-war positions to join the female ‘dove’ quotient.
Surveys in March 2001 show some differentiation in considerations of trust in institutions 
between men and women:
(Graph 4):258
258 ‘Doverie i nedoverie k institutam v marte 2001 g.’ 2400 respondents, VTsIOM, Monitoring obchchestvennogo 
mneniia, VCIOM Press Ltd., Moskva, 2001, Vol. 3, No. 53, Mai-Iiun’ 2001, p. 9.
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From the graph above, we can see that male and female trust ratings do not differentiate from 
overall trust rating markedly.  Women slightly trust the President more than males.  Males tend 
to trust the army slightly more and the organs of state security noticeably more.  On the other 
side, males do not trust all three markedly more than women.  In all categories other than trust in 
the President, women weigh down the average.
On the basis that to not trust any of the three is the more radical of the two possible answers, this 
data could show that males are slightly more politically radical and generally willing to take an 
opposition point-of-view than women.  Paradoxically, males are also slightly more willing to 
voice trust in both the security organs and the army, but not the President.  Along these lines,
132these figures suggest to us that possibly women are slightly more politically even-handed than 
men in Russian political society.
When focusing on the Chechen war however, as seen from previous data, this tendency is 
probably inconsequential in recognition of the Soldiers Mothers Group, Russian civil society as 
it was and other public opinion analyzed.  Within the war context, data seen here shows a level 
of ‘trust’ for the President (and to a lesser extent, the army and security organs) among both 
males and females that underpins the support for the conflict among both sections of society.
In a survey taken specifically of women in Russia in late December 2001 and early January 
2002, respondents did not rate the continuing war in Chechnya particularly high in regard to 
what they feared the most:
(Data Set l):259
What is it that you fear most of all? (Multiple  answers accepted)  Percentages
1. Losing my or my relatives’ health  58
2. Staying without means of existence  44
3. War in connection of the lack of stability  in the  world or possible acts  31
of terror
4.  My child becoming a drug addict 30
5.  Lack of perspectives for the children 28
6.  Fears to lose job 26
7.  Surge of prices for housing and communal services 25
8.  Impossibility to get by himself/herself or to provide a good education 25
259 Question: ‘What is it that your fear most of all?’ Possible answers as in Data Sheet.  Institute for Inter- 
Disciplinary Social Studies (Russian Academy of Sciences),  1406 respondents, http://sofist.socpol.ru.
133to children
9. Vague prospects for the future  22
10. Loneliness  19
11. Criminality  16
12. Hard-heartedness, the loss of the sense of mutual  aid in people’s  16
relationships
13. Protraction of the military operation in Chechnya  15
14. The loved one’s infidelity  14
15. Impossibility to get medical help even in sharp necessity  14
16. My relative becoming an alcoholic  11
17. Being unable to create or preserve a family  11
18. Old age  9
19. Violence of someone close to you  3
20.1 have no such fears  3
Interesting however is that while the continuing Chechen war came in 13th, war in terms of the 
danger of terrorism came in 3rd.  Among women in general in rating the second war, the conflict 
is obviously less of an issue.  When correlated with data showing generalized support for 
President Putin taken of the general population in chapter two (See Graph 9, Chapter Two), and 
also data showing a rise in people stating that they possessed a ‘medium’ stand of material living 
(See Graph 10, Chapter Two)  , these above ratings are unsurprising.
The gender divide in Russian public opinion was therefore a fairly strong cleavage up to and 
including the beginning of the second Chechen war.  Over time however, this divide lessened 
somewhat as the situation has progressed, as males join females in the more dovish responses,
260 Also corresponding in this time period with a drop in the overall percentage of the general population saying their 
material position is ‘bad.’but could also, of course, still be a strong cleavage in regard to forthcoming events, such as the 
Beslan massacre and others.
The Age Divide
As in other democratic societies, the younger adult age groups of the Russian population have 
the highest levels of both the energy and the capability to support or oppose government policies, 
but also sometimes the highest levels of discontent with social life.  Compounding this, Russia 
has also the experience of having its society descend from the more confining structures of the 
Communist era, which was the source of much youth angst in the late-Soviet period. (One of the 
youth’s favourite rock bands, the popular 1980s Russian rock group named Kino led by the 
deceased singer-songwriter Victor Tsoi, was indicative of this.)
As covered by Donna Bahry and Lucan Way, Soviet doctrine and society presupposed that 
citizens naturally were inclined to participate in politics.  Democracy generally assumes the 
opposite: that other societal activities decrease the desire of individuals in political 
involvement.261  The transition from Soviet Communism to Russian ‘democracy’ has allowed in 
effect for the door to swing in the opposite direction.  In the absence of governmental ly- 
supported policy idealization and demanded political participation, Russian citizens have been 
given the freedom to not participate at all.
When allowed this freedom, in contrast to the Soviet era when democracy was insisted upon, the 
younger Russian generation has generally been less politically active, while older generations 
have continued heavy participation as was taught in the Soviet era.  Lack of youth involvement 
in civil society and politics paradoxically parallel the effects on young Russian adults regarding
261 Bahry, Donna and Lucan Way, ‘Citizen Activism in the Russian Transition,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.  10, No. 4, 
1994, p. 333. (pp. 330-366)
135issues such as the Chechen war and the military draft, which has continued from Soviet times. 
Given Russia’s recent authoritarian past, this is perhaps even more relevant than in other 
democratic countries where unpopular wars have been (and are currently) prosecuted.
Bahry and Way find a direct correlation in studies conducted in 1992 between year of birth, 
voting, support for free speech and approval of transition to market economy.  They are able to 
graph the effect that the older a Russian citizen is, the more likely they are to vote, but at the 
same time less likely to protest and support market transition or free speech.262
Further to this, Natalia Zorkaia and Nadia Diuk find that:
‘Young people are more likely to adhere strongly to values of individualism, personal 
initiative, and independence.’263
This is while at the same time:
‘[...]the most alarming trait of poorly adapted young people is their clearly expressed and 
aggressive nationalism; their acute suspicion or hostility towards “strangers,” 
“foreigners,” and “visitors”; and their increased susceptibility to militaristic rhetoric.’264
As found in the research for this thesis, these trends in some ways continue, while, however, 
following the overall general popularity indicators of specifically the Chechen issue.  Further, a 
number of sources indicate this reasonable equity, but also some differences in age variation 
relative to support for the Chechen war.
262 Bahry, Donna and Lucan Way, ‘Citizen Activism in the Russian Transition,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.  10, No. 4, 
1994, p. 354. (pp. 330-366)
263 Zorkaia, Natalia, and Nadia M. Diuk, ‘Values and Attitudes of Young Russians,’ Russian Social Science Review, 
Vol. 45, No. 5, Sept.-Oct. 2004, p. 5. (pp. 4 -  27)
264 Ibid, p. 5.
136In surveys conducted by VTsIOM and the Centre for the Study of Public Policy in the New 
Russia Borometer IX series, a number of age-based evaluations can be made for the period of 
time of 14-18 April 2000 involving the beginning of the second Chechen war.
The first questions enquired as to what levels o f‘blame’ that Russians considered several groups 
to warrant for the conflict.  While the older generations had increasingly high levels of response 
that Middle Eastern terrorists had ‘a lot’ of blame for the conflict, higher levels of younger 
people had the view that such terrorists had only ‘some’ blame for the conflict, thereby choosing 
to spread the blame to other sources.
All age groups (18-29, 30-59 and 60+) blamed the Chechens themselves about equally with both 
‘a lot’ and ‘some blame’ responses for the conflict in Chechnya.265  Also, all age groups either 
partially or fully supported the actions of the Russian government in Chechnya about equally, 
although a slightly, possibly irrelevant, higher percentage of 60+ respondents fully supported 
Russian actions in Chechnya (39% of 60+ versus 36% of 18-29 and 30-59).266
All age groups about equally wanted themselves or close relatives to not go to Chechnya if only 
volunteers were called, although percentages predictably corresponded to age in health questions 
relative to capability (30% of 60+ respondents felt themselves unable to go based on health or
267 other reasons compared to lower levels or younger age groups).  Statistically equal
265 Question: ‘How much would you say each of the following is to be blamed for the conflict in Chechnya? a) 
Extremists from Middle Eastern Countries b) FSB/KGB plot c) USA d) Chechens. Possible answers:  1) A lot 2) 
Some 3) Not much 4) Not at all.  14-18 April 2000,  1600 respondents, Data from: Rose, Richard, ‘Russia Elects a 
President: New Russia Barometer IX,’ Studies in Public Policy Number 330, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland, 2000, p. 40.
266 Question: ‘What is your attitude to the actions of the Russian government in Chechnya?’ Possible answers:  1) 
Fully support 2) Support to some degree 3) Many criticisms 4) Definitely oppose. Same universe for survey. Data 
from: Rose, Richard, ‘Russia Elects a President: New Russia Barometer IX,’ Studies in Public Policy Number 330, 
Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland, 2000, p. 41.
267 Question: ‘If only volunteers were sent to conflict areas, would you be willing to go yourself or see your 
husband, son, brother or other close relative, go to Chechnya to fight the bandits and terrorists?’ Possible answers:
137percentages across age groups believed that Chechnya would ultimately be a part of Russia in a 
final outcome.268
A slightly higher percentage of the 18-29 age group believed that Chechnya north of the Terek 
River would be part of Russia (10% of 18-29, 5% and 6% of 30-59 and 60+ respectively).  This 
perhaps represents the rise in intensity in the post-Soviet era of the bogeyman of Chechens in 
collective thought as the archetypal fighting mountain man with whom you would not want to 
fight on their own turf.  Also, perhaps this result represents a willingness to redraw long-held 
borders that is not as easily shared by the older generations.  All age groups about equally 
respond that they believe that the fighting will continue without end or that the fighting will 
extend across the North Caucasus.
On the question of their opinion about the possible separation of Chechnya from Russia, the 18- 
29 age groups seems, in April of 2000, slightly less enthusiastic about the new war in Chechnya 
and less bothered by the eventuality of Chechen independence, as seen from the graph below:
(Graph 5):269
1) Yes 2) No 3) Couldn’t go because of health, other reasons. Same universe for survey. Data from: Rose, Richard, 
‘Russia Elects a President: New Russia Barometer IX,’ Studies in Public Policy Number 330, Centre for the Study 
of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland, 2000, p. 41.
268 Question: ‘What do you think will be the eventual outcome of the conflict in Chechnya?’ Possible answers:  1)
All of Chechnya will be part of Russia 2) Chechnya north of the Terek [will be] part of Russia 3) Fighting continues 
with enormous losses on both sides 4) Protracted fighting will spread to other parts of the North Caucasus. Same 
survey universe for survey. Same universe for survey. Data from: Rose, Richard, ‘Russia Elects a President: New 
Russia Barometer IX,’ Studies in Public Policy Number 330, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland, 2000, p. 41.
269 Question: ‘What do you think of the possible separation of Chechnya from Russia?’ Possible answers as in graph 
1. Same universe for survey. Data from: Rose, Richard, ‘Russia Elects a President: New Russia Barometer IX,’ 
Studies in Public Policy Number 330, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 
Scotland, 2000, p. 41.
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Yet, even among 18-29 year olds (those most likely to be doing the actual fighting) there is still a 
relatively high level of indifference and a high percentage of war supporters.
When directly reviewing data on specifically who is opposed to war and to what degree, results 
are more strongly inconclusive.  Looking at questions dealing with the breakdown of people who 
agreed with the previously discussed ‘dove’ and ‘weak hawk’ stratifications in the same surveys 
as detailed in the section on the gender divide, conclusions according to age are far from clear.
As seen from the chart below, between late November  1999 and late October 2000, there seems 
to be no correlation between age and the rising number of respondents with ‘dove’ responses. 
Only those 40 to 54 years of age seem to correlate with the final months rise in number of 
‘doves.’270
270 Data from the following two graphs reflect responses to a group of questions asked of respondents in sequence. 
The ‘overall’ line represents  100% and the other lines represent sections of the ‘overall’  line.  Question  1:  ‘Do you 
think the offensive operation of Federal troops in Chechnya should continue or peace negotiations with the leaders 
of Chechnya should start?’  Possible answers:  1) Continue the approach of Federal troops 2) Enter into negotiations 
with Chechen leadership 3) Difficult to answer. The data in Graph 6 reflects those who answered with number 2 
from this question.  Those who answered with Answers  1   or 3 were asked a second question.  Follow-up question: 
‘And if the troops continue to suffer heavy losses in the offensive operation, do you think that the offensive 
operation should nevertheless continue in Chechnya, or in this case it would be necessary to start peace talks with 
the leaders in Chechnya?’  Possible answers:  1) Continue the approach of Federal troops 2) Enter into negotiations 
with Chechen leadership 3) Difficult to answer.  The data in Graph 7 reflects those who answered with Answer 2 in 
the follow-up question.  The implication is that those who answered with answer 1, to continue the war operation no 
matter the cost, are considered ‘strong hawks’ as opposed to the ‘weak hawks’ as designated.  In this survey data, 
respondents were also separated according to age groups  18-24, 25-39, 40-54 and 55 and older. VTsIOM, surveys
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When considering those who the ‘weak hawks,’ those who agree that Federal troops should be 
pulled out of Chechnya if they suffered heavy casualties, statistics are even more inconclusive. 
There seems to be little if any connection between age and the percentage of those with this 
response to the prevalent two questions.
(Graph 7):
are on average of 1600 respondents with fewer answering the follow-up question.  Data from: VTsIOM Express 
Polls  1999-16,1999-21, 2000-3, 2000-4, 2000-9. 2000-13, 2000-15, 2000-16, 2000-18, 2000-21, 2000-22. 
http://sofist.socpol.ru/.  See also: VTsIOM, Monitoring obchshestvennogo mneniia, VCIOM Press Ltd., No. 6, Vol. 
50, Moskva, Noiabr-Dekabr 2000, p. 49, table 2.
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On the age divide, research for this thesis finds that, although some traditional trends continue 
from the Soviet era in terms of likely voters and other points, there is little cause for believing 
that age is a factor for inference on whether or not they support particularly the second Chechen 
war.
On the issue of trust ratings for institutions from March 2001, some observations can be made on 
this divide also:
141(Graph 8):271
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In every category except for organs of state security, the 50 and older age group ‘trusts’ more. 
Surprisingly however, except for the army, the under-29 group generally has more trust in two 
segments.  On the opposite side, not surprisingly the army is the institution that people under-29 
most do not trust.  On the other hand, those over 30 lead the way in saying they do not trust the 
security services.
A number of conclusions can be made from these findings.  While Putin might be from the 
security services and while in this era his Presidency is far from being unpopular, a substantial
271  ‘Doverie i nedoverie k institutam v marte 2001  g.’ 2400 respondents, VTsIOM, Monitoring obchestvennogo 
mneniia, VCIOM Press Ltd., 2001, Vol. 3, No. 53, Moskva, Mai-Iiun’ 2001, p. 9.
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142number especially from the under-49 age groups might remember that the security services are 
not necessarily to be trusted.  In many cases in March 2001, they reflect the largest percentages 
of distrust.  Similarly, and not surprisingly, people under-29 seem to have the least trust in the 
army, while those older tend to trust it relatively more.  Overall however, those who say that they 
trust each institution far outnumber those who profess no trust.  None of the three institutions 
seem particularly in danger in view of this data.  Reflecting these findings on the issue of the 
second Chechen war, there seems little danger of immediate public opposition for the three 
institutions most in contact with operational policy, as long as those institutions choose to 
themselves continue that strategy.
Source material is found to be limited for examination, such as relative detailed breakdowns of 
general polling information from the first war, and so it is unknown whether age has been a 
major factor outside of the general public mood in a comparative aspect between the two wars. 
Available data demonstrates that, as seen above, particular age groups do not substantially break 
from general public opinion in regard for the second war, given that younger age groups do have 
a slight disposition for more peaceful responses.  In the cases in which they do break, there 
seems to be an unpredictable pattern.
The Rural/Urban Divide
Another potential divide over opinion on the Chechen war is between rural and city dwellers.  In 
surveys conducted near the end of the first conflict, but just before the Presidential election 
ending in Yeltsin’s victory, some understanding can be found on this.
A survey of rural dwellers conducted by VTsIOM between the 22nd of April and the 12th of 
May 1996 shows that 18% say that the war must be carried on resolutely until enemies are
143destroyed, 24% said that negotiations should begin and 40% said that Russian troops should 
disengage from contact with the Chechens and then an agreement should be reached (essentially 
the call for surrender).272
Further to this, in all-Russia VTsIOM Express polling data conducted the same time that tended 
to focus on the major cities (although some rural inhabitants were also included), 48% believed 
that Russian troops should first withdraw.  35% thought that order should be restored in 
Chechnya and then start to negotiate and withdraw.273
Except for a slightly higher percentage by urban inhabitants overall advocating early withdrawal, 
purely on the basis of this polling data, there does not seem a tangible difference in consideration 
of the wars in Chechnya based on purely the Rural/Urban divide.
For a useful comparison, however, on the bigger political question of Yeltsin’s re-election as 
President in 1996, the Rural/Urban divide is one of the cases where this cleavage was 
particularly relevant.  The rural sections of Russia have been the most sympathetic to the 
conservative Communist party and have had the least contact with the media.  In February of 
1996, VTsIOM polling data showed that Yeltsin was trailing Zyuganov by sizable margins in 
large towns, small towns and in the countryside.  Given Yeltsin’s media campaign in support of 
re-election, by June, just before the election, Zyuganov remained in the lead only amongst 
respondents in the countryside.
272 Question: ‘How should, in your opinion, the Chechen crisis be solved today?’ Possible answers:  1) It is 
necessary to conduct resolute action to destroy insurgents 2) It is necessary to offer Chechens negotiations 3) It is 
necessary to disengage Russian armies from the Chechen republic and make an agreement 4) Difficult to answer.
VTsIOM, Rural (SP- 1996-37),  1923 respondents, 22.04.1996 -  12.05.1996, http://sofist.socpol.ru.
273 Question: ‘What is more right in your mind concerning the policy in Chechnya?’ Possible answers:  1) Russian 
troops should be withdrawn as soon as possible and then decide 2) Order must be restored in the Chechen Republic, 
and then negotiations. VTsIOM, VCIOM Express 1996-9,  1599 respondents, 26.04.1996 - 05.05.1996, 
http://sofist.socpol.ru.
144In large cities in February 1996, Zyuganov led Yeltsin by nine percentage points, 21% to 12%. 
By June 1996, this would be much the opposite, with Yeltsin leading by 18 percentage points, 
40% to 22%.  Similarly, in February 1996, Zyuganov led Yeltsin in small towns by an even 
greater margin of 15 percentage points, 26% to 11%.  Again however, this would be the opposite 
by June 1996, with Yeltsin leading Zyuganov by 16 percentage points, 38% to 23%.
Only in the countryside did Zyuganov maintain any lead in this time period, and not by a great 
margin.  In February, Zyuganov led Yeltsin by 18 percentage points, 27% to 9%.  By June 1996, 
this lead shrank to four points, 35% to 31 %.274  When taking the Chechen war factor in 
consideration, it seems that the issue of the conflict was somewhat neutral in a greater 
determination of why Yeltsin won the 1996 election.
When Yeltsin made the economy and who best could run the country into an issue as stated in 
the second chapter, then Russian public opinion was faced with choosing a President based on 
themes larger than the Chechen war, despite whatever it might think about the viability of the 
war.  This is also perhaps in contrast to perceptions by the Yeltsin administration, as suggested in 
chapter two, that the Chechen war needed to be settled in some way in order to gain Yeltsin’s re- 
election.
As with the breakdowns used to provide analysis of the gender and age divides, the second war 
can be examined using extensive data sets from 1999 and 2000 VTsIOM Express polling data.275
274
Gudkov, Lev, Presidentskie vvborv 1996 soda i obshestvennoe mnenie. VTsIOM, Moskva,  1996, p. 54.
275 Data from the following two graphs reflect responses to a group of questions asked of respondents in sequence. 
The ‘overall’ line represents 100% and the other lines represent sections of the ‘overall’ line.  Question  1: ‘Do you 
think the offensive operation of Federal troops in Chechnya should continue or peace negotiations with the leaders 
of Chechnya should start?’  Possible answers:  1) Continue the approach of Federal troops 2) Enter into negotiations 
with Chechen leadership 3) Difficult to answer. The data in Graph 9 reflects those who answered with number 2 
from this question.  Those who answered with Answers 1  or 3 were asked a second question.  Follow-up question: 
‘And if the troops continue to suffer heavy losses in the offensive operation, do you think that the offensive 
operation should nevertheless continue in Chechnya, or in this case it would be necessary to start peace talks with 
the leaders in Chechnya?’  Possible answers:  1) Continue the approach of Federal troops 2) Enter into negotiations 
with Chechen leadership 3) Difficult to answer.  The data in Graph 10 reflects those who answered with Answer 2 in
145Additional knowledge can be gained when ‘dove’ and ‘weak hawk’ voting responses are 
separated out according to city size (large cities, small cities and villages).
Again, as was the case with the age divide, there does not seem to be a direct relationship 
between those who have the most dovish response to the first question and their residence in a 
large city, small town, or the countryside:
(Graph 9):
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Follow-up question.  The implication is that those who answered with answer 1, to continue the war operation no 
matter the cost, are considered ‘strong hawks’ as opposed to the ‘weak hawks’ as designated.  In this survey data, 
respondents were also separated according to residence in large towns, small towns, or the countryside. VTsIOM, 
surveys are on average of 1600 respondents with fewer answering the follow-up question.  Data from: VTsIOM 
Express Polls  1999-16,1999-21, 2000-3, 2000-4, 2000-9. 2000-13, 2000-15, 2000-16, 2000-18, 2000-21, 2000-22. 
http://sofist.socpol.ru/.  See also: Monitoring obchestvennogo mneniia, VTsIOM, No. 6, Vol. 50, Noiabr-Dekabr 
2000, p. 49, table 2.
146In the first year of the second Chechen war, as the percentage of doves spiked, relative 
percentages of all three sections of residency locations remained somewhat the same, except for 
a growth in doves in the small towns parallel to the overall increase and relative to a decrease in 
the opposing two percentages in the April to May.2000 time period.  Although not sufficient to 
conclusively state, as the overall ‘dove’ percentage rose, so did the ‘small town’ response 
percentage relative to a decrease in the ‘large town’ division, perhaps showing that the small 
town doves response could be a determining factor.  This would be the case when the number of 
doves in small towns increase, and thereby agree with doves in the large towns.
In similar data however, there does not seem to be a correlation between residency location and 
the percentage of overall ‘weak hawks’ as seen below:
(Graph 10):
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As seen above, the divisions of weak hawks are all over the place compare to the more or less 
stagnant percentage of overall weak hawks.  After a year of data, the overall percentage 
remained virtually unchanged in this case, while locations parallel spiked and decreased almost 
incoherently.
As a continuing side note, back on the issue of comparisons between data on the Chechen war 
and data on presidential elections, according to FOM polling data during Putin’s first presidential 
election cycle in 2000, Zyuganov and his communist party persisted in having trends of greater
148public support in rural areas than in urban areas (usually being the only locales where the 
Zyuganov/Communists were leading).276
777
Further polling data from the period of the second war  shows that the Chechen war was far 
from being considered the most important problem facing Russian society, as seen from the 
following data set:
(Data Set 2: reflecting overall data):
1  .Growth of prices  70
2.The poor, impoverishment of majority of the population  60
3.Growth in number of criminals  43
4.Unemployment  34
5.Crisis in economy, recession of production in industry and 
agriculture  32
6.Growth in narcotics  31
7.Lack of access to medical services  30
8. Sharp division of rich and poor, injustice of the divisions in
income  28
9.Crisis of morals, culture, morality  26
9.Lack of access to education  26
276 Data according to residence type, FOM polling data,  15 March 2000: 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/policv/president2/presidential  elections/prezidentskie  vbor  -
2000/elect  domicile/tOOlOl 1. 24 March 2000: 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/policv/president2/presidential  elections/prezidentskie  vbor  - 
2000/elect  domicile/tOOl 112. and others.
277 Question: ‘Which of these problems of our society demand more from you, and you consider most important?’ 
Possible answers as in data sets (Multiple answers could be given).  2107 respondents: broken down for analysis by 
Moscow and St. Petersburg (195), large cities (408), medium cities (427), small cities (528) and rural/villages (549). 
VTsIOM, Monitoring obchestvennogo mneniia, VCIOM Press Ltd., Moscow, 2002, Vol. 5, No. 61, Sentiabr’- 
Oktiabr 2002, p. 81.
14911 .Corruption, bribery  23
12. Worsening composition of environment  18
13.War actions in Chechnya  17
14.Threat of explosions and other terrorist attacks in the place
where you live  15
14.  Weakness, Helplessness of state power  15
16.Delay in payment of salary, pension, aid  11
17.Growth in nationalism, worsening international relations  9
18.Conflicts in leadership of the country  3
19.Limits in citizens' rights, democratic freedoms (Freedom of 
speech, press)  2
19.Difficult to answer  2
21 .Other  1
When data is subdivided into respondents from the villages/countryside, results show very little 
difference to overall results in so far as the ratings given the importance of the Chechen war:
(Data Set 3: reflecting countryside data):
1  .Growth of prices  76
2.The poor, impoverishment of majority of the population  64
3.Unemployment  44
3.Growth in number of criminals  44
5.Crisis in economy, recession of production in industry and 
agriculture  34
1506.Lack of access to medical services  32
7.Sharp division of rich and poor, injustice of the divisions in 
income  29
8.Growth in narcotics  28
9.Corruption, bribery  22
10.Crisis of morals, culture, morality  21
10.Lack of access to education  21
12. Worsening composition of environment  14
12.War actions in Chechnya  14
12.Threat of explosions and other terrorist attacks in the place
where you live  14
15.Delay in payment of salary, pension, aid  13
16. Weakness, Helplessness of state power  10
17.Growth in nationalism, worsening international relations  7
18.Difficult to answer  4
19.Conflicts in leadership of the country  3
20.Other  1
21.Limits in citizens' rights, democratic freedoms (Freedom of 
speech, press)  >0
For residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg, results are not markedly different in ranking, 
however in percentage, the Chechen war is held as being of slightly greater importance, with 
20% as compared to 14% in the villages surveyed:
(Data Set 4: reflecting Moscow/St. Petersburg data):
151I .Growth of prices  59
2.The poor, impoverishment of majority of the population  56
3.Growth in number of criminals  40
4.Crisis in economy, recession of production in industry and 
agriculture  35
4.Crisis of morals, culture, morality  35
6.Lack of access to medical services  33
7.Corruption, bribery  31 
8.Sharp division of rich and poor, injustice of the divisions in
income  29
9.Worsening composition of environment  28
10.Growth in narcotics  27
II .Unemployment  23 
12.Threat of explosions and other terrorist attacks in the place
where you live  20
12.  War actions in Chechnya  20
14.Lack of access to education  18
15.Growth in nationalism, worsening international relations  18
16. Weakness, Helplessness of state power  16
17.Conflicts in leadership of the country  4
18.Delay in payment of salary, pension, aid  4
19.Limits in citizens' rights, democratic freedoms (Freedom of 
speech, press)  3
20.Other  2
21 .Difficult to answer  >0
152This comparison does not bear out however when looking at data collected from other major 
cities:
(Data Set 5: reflecting other major cities data):
I .Growth in prices  67
2.The poor, impoverishment of majority of the population  60
3.Growth in number of criminals  43
4.Growth in narcotics  37
5.Crisis in economy, recession of production in industry and 
agriculture  34
6.Lack of access to education  33 
7.Sharp division of rich and poor, injustice of the divisions in
income  32
8.Lack of access to medical services  31
9.Unemployment  30
10.Crisis of morals, culture, morality  28
II .Corruption, bribery  25
12. Weakness, Helplessness of state power  21
13. Worsening composition of environment  18
14.Threat of explosions and other terrorist attacks in the place
where you live  12
14.  War actions in Chechnya  12
16.Growth in nationalism, worsening international relations  7
17.Conflicts in leadership of the country  2
15318.Delay in payment  of salary, pension, aid  2
19.Limits in citizens' rights, democratic freedoms (Freedom of 
speech, press)  1
20.Other  1
21 .Difficult to answer  1
From the above data sets, there is a higher level of consideration in actual percentages given to 
the Chechen wars in Moscow and St. Petersburg as opposed to other large cities and the villages. 
This perhaps can be attributed to a higher level of importance given to political situations such as 
the Chechen wars in those two cities than in other parts of Russia.  Particularly:
‘Moscow is not only generally held to be the leader of Russian regions, but also exhibits 
many negative tendencies and problems characteristic of Russian society as a whole...’278
A real connection to ranking in relation to other problems is not seen however.  In all the cases, 
war actions in Chechnya are ranked between 12th and 14th in comparison to other issues.  As 
compared to this, growth in prices, an economic issue, is the most important in all sections, 
ranking 1st in all data here.
Based on the findings in this section, there is no clear link between considerations of the wars in 
Chechnya along a Rural/Urban divide.  Any conclusion based on data reviewed would be purely 
speculative in looking at a potential cleavage along these lines outside of a certain conservative 
bias, as shown by some past tendency for Communist support in rural locales.
278 Alexandrov, Oleg, ‘Moscow: Center and Periphery,’ Russian Regions and Regionalism, (eds.) Graeme B. Herd 
and Anne Aldis, RoutledgeCurzon, London and New York, 2003, p. 259 (pp. 246-264)
154The Regional Divide
On the question of the regional divide, perhaps no other cleavage in study of Russian public 
opinion on the Chechen wars could theoretically have as much deviation as on this topic.  While 
on the basis of resources, it is true that the Chechen wars have depleted national reserves and 
manpower from all sections of Russia, it is also true that the ongoing conflict has affected 
southern Russia differently than other parts of the country.  Russian public opinion must be 
presumed to have deviated somewhere along these lines.
Nevertheless, because very little primary data source material separates response according to 
enough precise regions, and a lot of material is associated closer to the rural/urban divide, then 
for the purposes of this thesis not much can be said absolutely about this particular divide.  Yet, 
for the sake of being thorough, this section will seek to examine what is known about this 
cleavage.
There are a number of sub-divides on this issue.  Some parts of Russia have generally looked to 
Europe more as an example to follow in such considerations of morality and war.  Other parts of 
Russia ‘feel’ more distant from the conflict in Chechnya, and therefore less involved in the daily 
perils of the situation.  It is logical to assume that a Russian citizen living nearby the war zone 
must have a different perspective from a citizen living in St. Petersburg or a citizen of 
Vladivostok living no less than eight times zones away.
A number of polls published by Izvestiia in late 1994 would demonstrate this.  In a survey of 
Russians in St. Petersburg, 37% were in favour of the Russian Army continuing to use ‘forcible 
methods’ in the Chechen war, while 51% opposed this idea.  On the other hand, in Stavropol and
155Krasnodar (two southern Russian cities extremely close to the conflict), public opinion was 
substantially different.  In those two cities:
~ )* 7 Q
‘[...Jthe majority support the use of force and express readiness to help the Army.’
This divide is in some ways entirely understandable.  If fighting is nearby, in a neighbouring 
region, it has a greater impact on the individual’s life and, therefore, deeper uncertainty about 
security and a much wider suspicion of those neighbours (as a group).  Uncertainty about 
security leads to greater fear involved in everyday life.  Perhaps, as the argument goes in Beslan 
years later, one’s children are not safe from guerillas or terrorists (or whatever one might choose 
to call them) even at school.  Those seeking to expand the war into all of the Northern Caucasus 
could easily choose this route to make the war more difficult for federal troops in the area.
Also impacting on this are the economic aspects of living near a conflict zone.  The wars in 
Chechnya have created a tide of refugees from the area, although the Russian government has 
sought to contain this issue as much as possible.  Especially in the second war, through the use of 
the infamous filtration camps, the Russian government has sought to limit the economic impact 
of refugees on the rest of the country.  This has met with varying degrees of success.  Regions 
near to Chechnya have borne the brunt of this problem.  As suggesting from the poll numbers 
above, if not on the security issue then on the economic and social issues, inhabitants of the 
southern regions close to the northern Caucasus had a strong incentive to support the imposition 
of order, even when the rest of the country seemed to be predisposed to wanting peace.
Proximity to the war zone is of course a significant factor in this analysis but not the only model 
for examination.  Parallel to the ethnic divide, the Russian Federation includes a number of
279  ‘Boi proigran na pole obshestvenoi brani,’ Izvestiia, No. 247 (24354), 24 Dekabr’  1994, p. 4, All quotes and data 
concerning the surveys taken by Izvestiia in the previous two paragraphs originated from this article.
156subjects and ‘republics’ who have had their own thoughts of independence, some closer to 
Chechnya and some farther away that have also on occasion sympathized to a degree with the 
idea of Chechen independence.
Other sections of the Russian Federation thought about independence after the Soviet Union fell. 
Only Chechnya however attempted this path, while the others signed deals that have debatably 
degraded over time.  These region-centre agreements have been eroded even more especially in 
the era of Putin and in his attempt to add another layer above the level of the 88 Russian Federal 
subjects.  Amongst other things, re-imposition of the state has really meant the effort to re- 
centralize the state, giving Putin some degree of control as President where Yeltsin had, partially 
through his Chechen policy, presupposed a push of the regions away from the centre.280
If the Chechen conflicts have had any possible positive effect for Moscow however, it is that 
over the long term the Chechen conflict has shown that a single Russian region cannot stand 
against the centre.  In order to have regional independence, if ever possible, then other regions 
must join the secession effort.  Otherwise, Chechnya would become a harbinger of the future for 
those considering lone separation.
Also of importance is the relationship of regionalism to the military.  It is probably true that in 
the first war, as Dr. Pavel K. Baev argues, while the military had undoubtedly a complex identity 
and culture in the regional consideration:
‘[.. .]the very fact that the army had little choice but to follow the order of the 
commander-in-chief to go to war further reinforced its ‘presidential’ identity.’281
280 Sakwa, Richard, Russian Politics and Society. 2nd ed., Routledge, London and New York,  1996, p. 209.
281 Baev, Pavel K., ‘Military Aspects of Regionalism,’ Russian Regions and Regionalism, (eds.) Graeme B. Herd 
and Anne Aldis, RoutledgeCurzon, London and New York, 2003, p.  123 (pp.  120-137)
157Secondly, Baev discusses the dichotomy wherein, while the almost constant rotation of military 
units in the conflict reinforced the unity of the military in relation to the conflict, at the same 
time the failure of Yeltsin’s justification of war led to a further weakening of authority between 
the regions and the centre.282
Baev goes on to further examine the attempts of Putin in light of his new administration and the 
second Chechen war to add a new level of regional control in the form of policies for the Federal 
District framework of 2000.  The relationship between civil/military regionalism, public opinion 
and the second Chechen war would be an interesting subject for examination.  While if data was 
found for such analysis, then a more complete divide could be examined on the basis of a 
civilian/military divide within Russian society.  Such data has not been seen however, if it should 
exist at all, and therefore will not be discussed in this chapter.
These are all issues of importance that should be kept in mind in any discussion of the regional 
divide.  While this section has sought not to cherry pick any particular city or region and 
addressed that data to any wider region (i.e. to say that polling data from Vladivostok is 
representative of the Russian Far East or another example of that nature), there is an 
acknowledgement that such a possibility perhaps has some truth, albeit not attempted here.
The Political Divide
On the political divide, perhaps more can be established than on the previous section concerning 
regionalization.  Looking first at political membership, As Cynthia Buckley and Regina Smyth 
write in their chapter entitled, ‘The Ties That Bind:’
282 Ibid, p. 124.
158‘The patterns of substantive significance are even more striking.  In contrast with regional 
effects, which tend to be relatively weak, membership in the KPRF, the Agrarians, and 
the DVR (Democratic Choice of Russia Party) shows very strong effects on the positions 
of individual members.  Thus, across this bundle of issues, party organizations represent a 
clear choice that can be communicated to voters in electoral campaigns.  This tendency 
toward national party organizations could provide a strong centripetal mechanism linking 
political elites, activists, and ultimately voters together across regions.’283
This section will seek to elaborate on these differences based on acknowledged political activity 
as can be related to our understanding of public opinion and the Chechen wars.
Politically, there have been a number of turns in support and opposition for the Chechen war in 
Russian public opinion.  Beyond the simplifications of political left and right as somewhat
JO  A
dismissed by some such as Timothy Colton  , there exists the generalization that those 
regarding themselves as liberal or democratic were generally more opposed to the first war, 
while elements o f‘conservative’ Russian society (i.e. particularly Communist supporters, 
heavily represented in the older populations as covered in the section on the age divide) were 
more passive on this issue.  All of this was in the context of, as Sarah Oates analyzes using 
VTsIOM polling data in relation to the first Chechen war:
‘[...]it is clear that there has been a sharp decline in interest in Westernized, liberal values 
since the heady days of the creation of the new Russian state in late 1991 ,’285
283 Buckley, Cynthia and Regina Smyth, ‘The Ties That Bind: The Importance of Region in the Construction of 
Social and Political Citizenship,’ The Fragmented Space of the Russian Federation, (eds.) Blair A. Ruble, Jodi 
Koehn, and Nancy E. Popson, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Washington DC, 2001, p. 111.
284 See Colton, Timothy, Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA and London, 2001.
285 Oates, Sarah, Television. Democracy and Elections in Russia. Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p. 53.
159In the second war, this state of affairs has changed substantially.  Albeit while again declining 
over time, Putin and his administration has managed to rally the voices of the conservative 
elements of Russian political actors in favour of his Chechen policy, and even to gather a little 
support, at least initially, from some liberal and pro-democratic politicians.
Reflecting his centrist stance (that as yet no other politicians has been able to noticeably break), 
Putin in any case has been able to claim support from all sides during the second war in 
Chechnya.  Data collected in chapter two necessarily includes the relative levels of support for 
the Yeltsin and Putin administration in references to the two wars.  Beyond this, emphasis on a 
political divide is somewhat difficult.
Traditionally thought of as conservative, the Communist party has taken few stands on the issue, 
having tolerated, with little choice in the matter, the Yeltsin administration policy in the first war 
and then having supported the Putin administration in the second war again out of a sense of 
necessity if for no other reason.  This has occurred within a political society, opposed to this 
political ‘conservatism’ as standing for nostalgia of the Soviet era, where parties have existed 
with few clear lines of division, of distinction between political liberalism and centrism, and 
sometimes of fascist tendencies.  Elitism and personalities have continued to dominate rather 
than grassroots support in the party sphere.
However, some conclusions can be found on debate with this issue.
Data produced by FOM in their surveys of early December 1995 find some correlations between 
those for and against the war in Chechnya in relation to parties that respondents were closest to, 
as seen from the following graph:
160(Graph  11):286
(*No reason is given in the data for the absence of information for ‘opponents’ in the case of LDPR and ‘supporters’ 
for APR.)
Supporters vs. Opponents
□ Supporters 
H Opponents
Parties
Clearly the most progressive parties had the largest percentages of opponents, led by Yavlinsky’s 
‘Yabloko’ party and, in a parallel to the gender divide, the ‘Women of Russia’ party.  This is also 
in connection with other earlier FOM polling data of June  1995 showing that overall, a plurality 
of 37% would only vote for someone in the Duma who was against the war, and a decreasing 
number saying that they were neutral on the conflict in elections (19%, versus 25% in December
286 Question:  ‘The party closest to you in your own position, what would you like to see in the Duma?’  Possible 
answers include ‘for’ and ‘against’ the introduction of troops in Chechnya in which more than one answer could be 
given.  2 December  1995, FOM,  1519 respondents. 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnva/truck  war/ofl 9954902.
1611994).  If anything, as shown from chapter two, this move against the war continued in the 
interim time period between the surveys.
In comparison, in polling data taken at roughly the same point of the second war (around a year 
after the beginning, the Chechen war as a ‘problem’ was reviewed.  Data found to be interesting 
on this issue include polling by VTsIOM in January 2001 at a time when, as detailed in chapter 
two, support for the Chechen war was still relatively high, but at the same time, some dissent 
could begin to be seen against Putin’s policies.  This data came also in relation to the 
Parliamentary elections of December 1999 and the Presidential elections of 2000.
(Graph 12):288
287 Question: ‘If for you the attitude of deputies to the State Duma on the Chechen war is important, for who would 
you vote for in future elections?’ Possible answers:  1) The attitude of Duma deputies on the Chechen war is not 
important for me 2) I will vote for supporters of the war. 3) I will vote for opponents of the war 4) I do not accept 
participants in the elections 5) Difficult to answer.  Surveys conducted by FOM, December 1994:  1353 respondents, 
and June 1995:  1368 respondents.  http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnva/truck_war/ofl9952509.
288 Question: ‘Which of these problems of our society demand more from you, and you consider most important?’ 
Possible answers (Respondents could pick more than one):  1) Difficulty with drinking products, trade in necessities 
2) Growth in prices 3) Unemployment 4) Crisis in the economy 5) Growth in criminality 6) Morality crisis 7) 
Worsening environment 8) Terrorism 9) Aggravation in national relations 10) Division between rich and poor 11) 
Threats from fascism and extremism 12) Corruption 13) Weakening state power 14) Conflict in leadership  15) 
Withholding of aid, pension, etc.  16) War actions in Chechnya 17) Other 18) Difficult to answer. 2410 respondents 
separated into professed voting blocks for December 1999 Parliamentary elections. VTsIOM, Monitoring 
obchshestvennogo mneniia, VTsIOM, No. 2, Vol. 52, Mart-Aprel’ 2001, p. 74.
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Parties
As seen, those who supported the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko (Yavlinsky’s party) 
most considered the Chechen war to be a problem for Russian society.  Those who supported 
Putin’s Unity Block were above average in considering the war to be a problem, while all other 
major parties seem to be roughly average.  Since the SPS and ‘Yabloko’ were considered the 
most progressive parties in support of reform, it seems that, predictably, those most politically 
active also consider the Chechen war as a problem for society.  Those who did not accept any 
party from the elections seem also not to see the Chechen war as a problem; perhaps they were 
also the most rebellious of the survey group.  Respondents who were not able to participate were 
relatively worried about the war.  If they were not able to participate in the election, they might 
have thought themselves to have a lack of a ‘voice’ in this issue as well.
There is another point to note in discussion of this divide.  Sirke Makinen studied the claims and 
reasoning of the four Russian political parties-of-power between  1999-2001.  Her conclusions 
should be noted herein.  Makinen examined the claims, reasoning, and argument types of
163politicians heading: Nash Dom -  Rossiia, Otechestvo, Edinstvo, and Yabloko.  She found that, 
while party leaders differentiated substantially on the first war in Chechnya, for the second war, 
all parties argue for the ‘integrity, unity, [and] wholeness of the Russian Federation.’
Further:
‘During the second Chechen war the main threat to integrity (and to security and 
constitutional order) was no longer ‘pure’ Chechen separatism; the fight against terrorism 
was almost unanimously seen as the key factor safeguarding the integrity of the 
Federation.’290
Unique for Yabloko, however, ‘the end does not justify the means.  That is to say that 
Yabloko are most willing to call for a political solution, as opposed to a military solution.
This has relevance in the context of this thesis in reinforcing the image of Yabloko as a more 
progressive party.  As found in data above (Graphs 11 and 12), both the people and the 
politicians behind particularly Yabloko also saw the Chechen war as a ‘problem.’  In 
comparison, people who followed parties closer in policy to the Kremlin (and including Unity 
itself) tended to accept the Chechen war, and to in effect dismiss it as a military problem and not 
a problem of society.
Next we should look at the data concerning whom respondents voted for in the Presidential 
election of 2000 and compare them to their responses on consideration of the Chechen war as a 
‘problem.’
289 Makinen, Sirke, ‘Russia’s Integrity: Russian Parties of Power and the Yabloko Association on Russo-Chechen 
Relations, 1999-2001,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 8, Dec. 2004, p.  1181-2. (pp.  1157-1 189)
290 Ibid, p.  1182.
291 Ibid, p.  1183.
164(Graph  13):292
(♦results from survey from January 2001)
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Presidential candidate
There seems to be a relationship between the war issue and those who professed to support Putin 
and those who supported the Communist candidate Zyuganov.  Apparently, fewer of those who
292 Question:  ‘Which of these problems of our society demand more from you, and you consider most important?’ 
Possible answers (Respondents could pick more than one):  1) Difficulty with drinking products, trade in necessities 
2) Growth in prices 3) Unemployment 4) Crisis in the economy 5) Growth in criminality 6) Morality crisis 7) 
Worsening environment 8) Terrorism 9) Aggravation in national relations  10) Division between rich and poor  11) 
Threats from fascism and extremism  12) Corruption  13) Weakening state power  14) Conflict in leadership  15) 
Withholding of aid, pension, etc.  16) War actions in Chechnya  17) Other  18) Difficult to answer. 2410 respondents 
separated into professed voting blocks for Presidential candidates in 2000 election. VTsIOM, Monitoring 
obshchestvennogo mneniie, No. 2, Vol. 52, Mart-Aprel’ 2001, p. 74.
165professed to vote for Zyuganov thought that the Chechen war was a problem.  Those who voted 
for Tuleev or Yavlinsky however thought that the Chechen war was more of a problem than 
Putin’s supporters.  Because especially Yavlinsky is commonly seen as the biggest supporter of 
open democracy and reform in Russia, then this seems to be in line with the previous assertion 
that those who are more politically active tended to say that the Chechen war was a problem.
A similar question asked a year later (without Tuleev as an option) yielded results showing an 
evening out of those who considered the Chechen war to be a “problem,” with both Putin and 
Zyuganov supporters considering the conflict according to that term.  (It must also be noted that 
in both graphs 13 and 14, Putin supporters represented the vast majority of respondents, as 
opposed to Yavlinsky who had a diminishing number of supporters.  In Graph 14, only 39 people 
out of 2106 professed support for him.)
(Graph 14):293
(♦results from survey from January 2002)
293 Question: ‘Which of these problems of our society demand more from you, and you consider most important?’ 
Graph reflects answer 19:  War actions in Chechnya. 2106 respondents separated into professed voting blocks for 
Presidential candidates in 2000 election. VTsIOM, Monitoring obchshestvennogo mneniia, No. 2, Vol. 58, Moskva, 
Mart-Aprel’ 2002, p. 84.
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In both wars, as can be seen above, it'must be noted that the Communists remained close to the 
government line in both conflicts.  Yavlinsky and his ‘Yabloko’ party has in both instances been 
the first opponents of conflict (although in the final graph, Yavlinsky supporters seemed to lose 
interest in the war), while parties supporting Yeltsin and Putin have always provided the baseline 
of support depending on the relationship to the administration.  This is in line with other data in 
this thesis showing that those who consider the Chechen war to be an important problem also 
support Putin.
Based on past research and on these statistics, if recognition of the Chechen issue as a ‘problem’ 
equates to the acknowledgement of it as a political dilemma, then it is therefore fairly reliable to 
assert that there is a difference here regarding the two wars in Chechnya.  Particularly in the 
second war, those who were more politically active often regarded the Chechen war as more
167important, and those respondents who made this identification tended to support the government 
political line more.  This is as opposed to the first war, where liberal elements and those who 
were most politically active tended more strongly to oppose the government line, and therefore 
the war, as shown from previous data following support for the Yabloko party.  Little evidence 
has been found during the conduct of research for this thesis to significantly countermand this 
analysis.
The Class Divide
The question of class, given Russia’s communist past, seemingly has never been too far from the 
surface of political society.  In the post-Soviet era, this division still exists somewhat as it did in 
the Soviet era, albeit on a different scale.  Whereas there used to be simply the elite/party 
hierarchy and then everyone else, now there is a more diverse class division. On one side there 
are still the workers and small-scale sellers who usually have little beyond a paltry wage and 
some lessening hope of a pension and health care.  On the other side, there are the intellectuals, 
large business owners, tycoons and standard level businessmen, who have education and 
opportunities to become rich (if they have not already), live overseas and own British football 
teams.
What can we learn about this cleavage to give a better understanding of Russian public opinion 
and the Chechen wars?
Again, looking at our extensive VTsIOM Express data concerning those who in late 1999 and in 
2000 expressed oppositional opinions to the use of Federal troops in Chechnya, we can discover 
some matters of interest.294
294 Data from the following two graphs reflect responses to a group of questions asked of respondents in sequence. 
The ‘overall’ line represents 100% and the other lines represent sections of the ‘overall’ line.  Question 1: ‘Do you
168Available survey data separates respondents into six groups: Managers, Specialists, Employees, 
Qualified Workers, Students and Pensioners.  For purposes of this examination, managers, 
specialists and qualified workers will be graphed into a higher class, while employees, students 
and pensioners will be grouped into a lower class (No data unfortunately accompanies this for 
unskilled workers or the unemployed).  While this distinction is by no means universal, it does 
suggest a basis on externally proven skill and wealth that might allow for some analysis to be 
made.
As seen from the following graph, it seems that qualified workers have a higher trend towards 
the strongest response for removing Federal troops from the war.
(Graph 15):
think the offensive operation of Federal troops in Chechnya should continue or peace negotiations with the leaders 
of Chechnya should start?’  Possible answers:  1) Continue the approach of Federal troops 2) Enter into negotiations 
with Chechen leadership 3) Difficult to answer. The data in Graphs 15 and 16 reflects those who answered with 
number 2 from this question.  Those who answered with Answers 1  or 3 were asked a second question.  Follow-up 
question: ‘And if the troops continue to suffer heavy losses in the offensive operation, do you think that the 
offensive operation should nevertheless continue in Chechnya, or in this case it would be necessary to start peace 
talks with the leaders in Chechnya?’  Possible answers:  1) Continue the approach of Federal troops 2) Enter into 
negotiations with Chechen leadership 3) Difficult to answer.  The data in Graphs 17 and  18 reflects those who 
answered with Answer 2 in Follow-up question.  The implication is that those who answered with answer 1, to 
continue the war operation no matter the cost, are considered ‘strong hawks’ as opposed to the ‘weak hawks’ as 
designated.  In this survey data, respondents were also separated according to background:  1) Managers 2) 
Specialists 3) Employees 4) Qualified Workers 5) Students 6) Pensioners. VTsIOM, surveys are on average of 1600 
respondents with fewer answering the follow-up question.  Data from: VTsIOM Express Polls  1999-16,1999-21, 
2000-3, 2000-4, 2000-9. 2000-13, 2000-16, 2000-18, 2000-21, 2000-22. http://sofist.socDol.ru/.  See also: VTsIOM, 
Monitoring obchshestvennogo mneniia, VCIOM Press Ltd., No. 6, Vol. 50, Moskva, Noiabr-Dekabr 2000, p. 49, 
table 2.
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Likewise, as in the following graph, pensioners seem to have a large ‘dove’ response:
(Graph  16):
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In the ‘weak hawk’ category, those who would pull troops out only if they suffered casualties, 
while initially supporting the operation, qualified workers, and to a lesser extent managers, tend 
to follow general public opinion in this regard. Specialists, on the other hand, seem to be 
skyrocketing in this category:
(Graph 17):
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In the lower class segments, students and employees seem to have a relative correlation to 
averages in overall public opinion.  Pensioners tend to make up a higher percentage of the weak 
hawks than overall public opinion.
(Graph  18):
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So what do these graphs tell us?  The conclusions tell us that pensioners typically tend to have a 
louder voice in survey data on what was considered a minority viewpoint than other segments. 
Also, it is interesting how qualified workers make up large percentages of the ‘dove’ response. 
Presumably, qualified workers are better educated, make more money, and so are better able to 
make a ‘qualified’ judgement on the war issue.  Other connections are not so obvious.  Data 
referred to has a typical ‘difficult to answer’ response of around  10% overall which could skew 
some percentages off track.
173Again using data collected from the end of the period of the second war295 studied for this thesis, 
there are some findings that can be made.  Looking strictly at respondents with higher, middle, 
and lower incomes, the following data is relevant for the lower income brackets:
(Data Set 6: lower income bracket):
I .Growth of prices  82
2.The poor, impoverishment of majority of the population  67
3.Unemployment  47
4.Growth in number of criminals  42 
5.Sharp division of rich and poor, injustice of the divisions in
income  33
6.Crisis in economy, recession of production in industry and 
agriculture  30
6.Lack of access to education  30
8.Growth in narcotics  29
9.Lack of access to medical services  28
10.Crisis of morals, culture, morality  18
II .Corruption, bribery  17
12. Worsening composition of environment  15
12.Threat of explosions and other terrorist attacks in the place
where you live  15
14.  War actions in Chechnya  14
295 Question: ‘Which of these problems of our society demand more from you, and you consider most important?’ 
Possible answers as in data sets (Multiple answers could be given).  2107 respondents: broken down for analysis 
according to higher (383), middle (1227) and lower (340) income groups.  VTsIOM, Monitoring obchshestvennogo 
mneniia, VCIOM Press Ltd., Vol. 5, No. 61, Moskva, Sentiabr’- Oktiabr 2002, p. 81.
17415.Delay in payment of salary, pension, aid  13
16. Weakness, Helplessness of state power  9
17.Growth in nationalism, worsening international relations  5
18.Difficult to answer  3
19.Conflicts in leadership of the country  1
19,Other  1
21.Limits in citizens' rights, democratic freedoms (Freedom of 
speech, press)  >0
While this is the case for respondents with a middle income:
(Data Set 7: middle income bracket):
1  .Growth of prices  72
2.The poor, impoverishment of majority of the population  61
3.Growth in number of criminals  42
4.Lack of access to medical services  35
5.Crisis in economy, recession of production in industry and 
agriculture  32 
6.Sharp division of rich and poor, injustice of the divisions in
income  31
7.Unemployment  30
8.Growth in narcotics  29
9.Crisis of morals, culture, morality  28
10.Lack of access to education  25
17511 .Corruption, bribery  22
12. War actions in Chechnya  17
13. Weakness, Helplessness of state power  15
14. Worsening composition of environment  14 
M.Threat of explosions and other terrorist attacks in the place
where you live  14
16.Delay in payment of salary, pension, aid  11
17.Growth in nationalism, worsening international relations  10
18.Conflicts in leadership of the country  2
19.0ther  1
19.Limits in citizens' rights, democratic freedoms (Freedom of 
speech, press)  1
19.Difficult to answer  1
And this is the case for those respondents in the higher brackets:
(Data Set 8: higher income bracket):
1  .Growth of prices  5 8
2.The poor, impoverishment of majority of the population  55
3.Growth in number of criminals  47
4.Growth in narcotics  37
5.Unemployment  32
6.Crisis in economy, recession of production in industry and 
agriculture  31
1766.Corruption, bribery  31
8.Crisis of morals, culture, morality  30
9.Worsening composition of environment  27
10.Lack of access to medical services  21
10.Lack of access to education  21
12.Sharp division of rich and poor, injustice of the divisions in
income  19
13. Weakness, Helplessness of state power  17
14.Threat of explosions and other terrorist attacks in the place
where you live  17
15. War actions in Chechnya  15
16.Growth in nationalism, worsening international relations  12
17.Delay in payment of salary, pension, aid  6
18.Conflicts in leadership of the country  5
19.Limits in citizens' rights, democratic freedoms (Freedom of 
speech, press)  2
20.Other  1
21 .Difficult to answer  >0
As can be seen, along income brackets, there is no clear distinction in opinion either according to 
rank or percentage.  Growth on prices, poverty of the population and criminality rank one, two, 
three, except in the lower income bracket where unemployment became the third-ranked 
concern, i.e. more than criminality.  Outside the realm of this thesis, perhaps this shows that 
those in the middle and highest income brackets have the least concern for their place in those 
brackets.  Those in the lowest income brackets have the least job security.
177Along these lines is the presupposition that those who are educated probably occupy the middle 
and highest income brackets, and worry the least about job security.  However, as said before, 
from the data here, there is little correlation to regard for the Chechen war as a problem.
When asked according to what “class” in which respondents put themselves instead of according 
to stated income, results are slightly different:
(Graph  19):296
Self-ranking
Continuing war in Chechnya
□ All
■  Lower class
□  Lower-middle class
□  Medium-middle class
■ Higher-middle 
class/Upper class
□  Difficult to answer
Clearly, people who considered themselves to be lower class also regarded the Chechen war less 
of a consideration.  Interestingly, those in the highest class also shared this position.  The same 
holds true when also asking the question as to the existence of money as a problem for 
respondents.
296 Question: ‘Which of these problems of our society demand more from you, and you consider most important?’ 
Possible answers as in graph.  2107 respondents: broken down for analysis according to statement of class: Lower 
class (303), Lower-Middle class (598), Medium-Middle class (934), and Higher-Middle Class/Upper class (108), 
also ‘Difficult to answer’ (165).  VTsIOM, Monitoring obchshestvennogo mneniia, VCIOM Press Ltd., Vol. 5, No. 
61, Moskva, Sentiabr’- Oktiabr 2002, p. 86.
178(Graph 20):297
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Those who say that they have money clearly consider the Chechen war more of an issue than 
those who do not.
This divide also encompasses a divide between the common man and elites in the Russian 
political system.
In November 2000, ROMIR polling of what those that the polling agency terms to be ‘elite,’ 
encompassing 650 people representing executive and legislature bodies of the Russian 
Federation, the business structures and the state enterprises, sciences and the mass media, 
produced interesting results.  The highest percentage, 28% find that corruption is the biggest 
problem of safety in Russia.  23% find that economic problems are most important.  Following 
that, the next highest answers are: the unstable political situation in Russia (21%), NATO (17%),
297 Question: ‘Which of these problems of our society demand more from you, and you consider most important?’ 
2107 respondents: broken down for analysis according to statement of money demand: 460, 848, 660, and  133 
respondents respectively.  VTsIOM, Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniie, VCIOM Press Ltd., Moscow, 2002, 
Vol. 5, No. 61, Sentiabr’- Oktiabr 2002, p. 86.
179Islamic fundamentalism (16%), International terrorism (15%), the break between the centre and 
the regions (15%), and the lack of ideology (14%).  Although the disintegration of the state is a
■^QO
possible choice, only a token number choose this option.  This data shows that, much as in the 
data previously mentioned concerning all income brackets, the elite are also primarily occupied 
with economic matters, although some attention predictably is paid to the dangers of instability 
and religious fanaticism.
Further polling of this elite division by ROMIR specifically on the subject of Chechnya reveals 
further results.  63% supported the continuance of the use of force, while 30% favoured attempts 
at a peace settlement.  8% did not know.  In a separate question, 92% believed ‘absolutely’ that 
Chechnya should remain a subject of the Russian Federation.  Only 5% believed that other 
options were possible, while 3% did not know.299  In many ways, these results reflect data 
concerning the overall population as examined in other chapters of this thesis.  Elite response 
seems to be in line with overall public opinion in this respect.
Nevertheless, from the overall collection of information reviewed for this section, we find that 
there is no clear connection between class or income and even a consideration of the Chechen 
war as a problem, outside of data in which the respondents’ own position in society is requested. 
Data researched mainly covers the second Chechen war, but yet something can be learned from 
this study.  We find that in the context of the second war, no group significantly departs from 
overall opinion along such a cleavage.  While some minor points could potentially be made, if 
the Chechen war has support in general society, then it can be inferred with a degree of accuracy 
that Russian society across class boundaries will also support the war.  The possible exception is
298 ROMIR, ‘Elita ob osnovnykh ugrozakh bezopasnosti Rossii,’ November 2000, Survey of 650 elites (people 
representing executive and legislature bodies of the Russian Federation, the business structures and the state 
enterprises, sciences and the mass media) in 7 cities, Web site:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010306204858/www.romir.ru/socpolit/vvps/12  2000/russia-threat.htm.
299 ROMIR, ‘Elita o krizise v Chechne,’ November 2000, Survey of 650 elites (people representing executive and 
legislature bodies of the Russian Federation, the business structures and the state enterprises, sciences and the mass 
media) in 7 cities, Web site: http://www.romir.ru/socpolit/actual/l 2  2000/chechnva.htm.
180that the relative percentages of pensioners to ‘dove’ and ‘weak hawk’ categories shown in the 
graphs are quite interesting, although seemingly not to be borne out as a genuine cleavage in 
reference other data and to analysis in the age and political divides.
As shown above also, more respondents who have a positive attitude towards their own life tend 
to consider the Chechen war to be a problem.  On the other hand, if they have a negative attitude 
about their social class or their need for money (except for the pensioners case stated above), 
then they consider the conflict as less of an issue.
The Religious Divide
Within Russia and within the Russo-Chechen conflict, there is no doubt a substantial divide 
based on religion.  Russian Christian Orthodoxy coming from the north and northwest and 
expanding Islam from the south has a long history of competition for followers in the Caucasus. 
Particularly in the northern Caucasus including Chechnya, Islam has a long history leading up 
until today.300
Within much of the rest of the Russian Federation, there is of course the prevalence of Russian 
Orthodox Christianity.  Following the post-Soviet era, having endured ‘religion-as-opium-for- 
the-masses’ obsessively secular Communist ideology, there are indications that in Russian 
society, the relevance of religion is growing.  As written by Igor Dubov:
‘In the last fifteen years, the influence of religion on the life of Russian citizens has 
noticeably grown.  Churches, mosques, and houses of prayer are being restored and 
opened; religious holidays are widely celebrated; and church services are broadcast on
300 See: Dimaeva, ‘Islam v sovremennoi chechenskoi respublike,’ Issledovanniiapoprikladnoi i neotlozhnoi 
ethnologii, Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk: Institute etnologii i antropologii, No. 159, Moskva, 2002.
181television.  Large numbers of Russian citizens have performed the rite of baptism; and
A 1
more and more marriages are solemnized with a religious ceremony.’
However, in the research for this thesis, there has been a lack of data separating respondents on 
the issue of the Chechen war along these dimensions.  This is also in agreement with Dubov’s 
work:
‘At the same time, we must note that there is hardly any reliable information on the 
parameters used to measure the masses awareness of religion.  Experts’ periodic 
statements on what voters think of politicians’ religious affiliation and commitment are as 
a rule, not supported by empirical data.  This is caused by the absence of polls aimed at 
studying in-depth shifts in the religious consciousness of Russian citizens, rather than 
unwillingness to use the results of public opinion polls.’
Along these lines, there is little data from research for this thesis and from the few polls that 
Dubov does note that can shed some light on this possible cleavage in Russian public opinion 
and the Chechen wars.  In research for this thesis, few surveys have been found to ask, alongside 
the usual questions as discussed before dealing with gender, age, budget, class, education and so 
forth, about the religion of the respondent.  Therefore, given this lack of original primary sources 
on this issue, little comment will be made on this cleavage in this chapter.
As this thesis deals with Russian public opinion, albeit meaning ‘Russian’ in the civic sense and 
not the religious/ethnic sense (outside of the previous ethnic ‘divide’ section), there is 
undoubtedly undocumented possibilities here concerning this cleavage, however there is not
301 Dubov, Igor G., ‘Level of Religious Commitment and the Influence of Religious Precepts on Russian Citizens’ 
Attitudes Toward Political Leaders,’ Russian Social Science Review, Vol. 44, No. 6, Nov-Dee 2003, p. 82. (pp. 82- 
107)
302 Ibid, p. 83.
182enough data spreading across regional lines as yet found on this subject to make any conclusions 
based on this cleavage.
There is one last point covered by Dubov which must be covered, however:
‘It is clear [...] that many fewer Tatars in Russia as a whole sympathize with Muslim 
candidates than is true in Tatarstan.  Tatars who live outside Tatarstan are also more 
willing than those who live in Tatarstan to say that they will support an Orthodox 
Christian candidate.  In a similar way, Russians who live in Tatarstan are considerably 
less inclined to support an Orthodox Christian candidate than those who live outside 
Tatarstan and are, accordingly, much more loyal to Muslim politicians.’303
This perhaps demonstrates that any possible religious cleavage is less important than the regional 
cleavage where solidarity with tradition prevails, although, in the context of the religious nature 
of the Chechen conflict as to be discussed next, the impact of this on weighting cleavages is 
uncertain at best.
It must be mentioned that in the context of the Chechen struggle itself, the supposed Islamisation 
of the conflict has been studied previously.  One such article discussing this point was written by 
Julie Wilhelmsen, in which she ultimately finds that:
‘[...]increasingly radical Chechen warlords in alliance with international Islamist forces 
on the one hand and hard and uncompromising Russian policies on the other have 
worked in tandem to trap the moderates in the Chechen separatist movement.’304
303 Ibid, p.  100.
304 Wilhelmsen, Julie, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement,’ 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No.  1, January 2005, p. 36. (pp. 35-59)
183Wilhelmsen argues against any portrayal of the Chechen conflict as a general fundamentalist 
holy war, instead pointing out that:
‘The internal impetus towards Islamisation of the Chechen separatist movement did not 
come from the Chechen population in general but rather from a group of warlords and 
politicians who acquired prominent positions in Chechnya because of the war.’305
Furthermore, Elise Giuliano finds in another article that, as a people, Russian Muslims have little 
connection between themselves even as any type of  potential congruent force:
‘Although some Russian Muslims (including the radical Wahhabis) seem to define their 
identity in terms of opposition to the Russian central state, most Muslims in Russia do 
not share political goals or attitudes with Muslims living beyond the borders of their own 
republics.  Nor have Muslims mobilized as coherent political blocs within their own 
republics.  The fact that there seems to be little common political interest among Russia’s 
Muslims and little political mobilization along Islamic lines suggests that the “infection” 
of Islam that President Putin spoke of, spreading from the Caucasus up the Volga River 
to destroy the integrity of the Russian Federation, is as implausible an outcomes as 
Russia’s leaders suddenly shedding their fear of Islam.’306
These arguments are found within the context of this thesis to be true.  In fact, as covered in the 
previous section on ethnic divisions, there has been found to be little support for any kind of 
cultural nationalism or separatism in the general population.  Instead, most separatist movements 
were radicalized based on political reasoning.  Support for the Chechen separatist movement 
however has come to base itself on Islam for financial reasons (because of support from outside
i0S Ibid, p. 37.
306 Giuliano, Elise, ‘Islamic Identity and Political Mobilization in Russia: Chechnya and Dagestan Compared,’ 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.  11, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 215-216. (pp.  195-220)
184internationalist religious influences) where the rebellion was at one time primarily focused on 
political principles.  This is not to say they did not want the freedom to practice their own 
culture, of course they did, but there is little evidence to show that they wanted separatism based 
on purely locally-based cultural grounds (if, it must be added, that was ever even possible).
Conclusions
In this chapter, eight cleavages have been discussed to varying degrees of effectiveness on the 
subject of conflicts in Chechnya, as well as their each group’s relationships to Russian public 
opinion.
Some cleavages have been found to be more revealing in data than others in Russian public 
opinion on the Chechen war issue.  In level of political activity, data on the gender divide has 
been found to be quite important.  More generally, the ethnic and age divides as issues have been 
found to have a substantial bearing on understanding opinion on Chechen policy.
As opposed to this, class and especially the rural/urban divide have been found to be less 
important in examination of this issue.  As shown in corresponding sections, there is little 
substantive difference in data focusing on these divides.  It is however necessary to note that 
those who think that they are affluent or in the middle classes tend to think more about the 
Chechen war.
More difficult to gauge have been the political, regional and religious divides.  For discerning 
new conclusions, sufficient data for independent analysis has not yet been found.
185Ultimately, support (or lack thereof) for the Chechen war has been relative to changing opinions 
in sections of society.  Opinion has been difficult to correlate overall as shown by polling data, 
and study of exactly who does and does not support the war adds a new level of understanding to 
academia in relation to the topic of this thesis.
A summary is hereby in order to conclude this chapter:
•  Ethnic Divide:
As befitting an ongoing war partially over the ethnic divide, research for this thesis finds that the 
ethnic divide primarily still exists on the basis of a ‘minorities vs. the centre’ concept.  On a 
societal level, although there is not enough data to further sub-divide study (Northern Ossetians 
vs. Chechens; Cossacks vs. Chechens; etc.), as demonstrated there is an ethnic tendency inherent 
for the war in Chechnya relative to the imperial centre (Russians) and the separatist movement 
(Chechens).  In a more general sense, this extends in regard to the people of the North Caucasus 
(Russians vs. the North Caucasian ethnicities).
•  Gender Divide:
There is a clear basis for a gender divide in Russian public opinion.  Females are more likely to 
be against the war initially (see Graph 3), and the overall percentage of peace support rises when 
males join females in this respect. Results are indeterminate in regard to those who turn against 
the war in the case of heavy casualties (see Graph 2, the ‘weak hawks’), although on at least one 
occasion the total percentage of so-called ‘soft supporters’ has risen in relation to a rising 
percentage of males in this category (the so-called ‘closing the gap’ question discussed in that
186section).  Furthermore, research by the author and by others has found that women are more 
likely to be against the war if they are mothers whose sons are involved in the conflict.
Particularly surrounding such groups as the Soldiers Mothers Groups and, at one time the 
politically active ‘Women of Russia’ party, women lead the way.
•  Age Divide:
There is some basis for an age divide in Russian public opinion.  Research has found some 
interesting conclusions within this cleavage.  For instance, people in the middle age group (see 
final surveys of Graph 6) tend to be the determining factor in age-based examinations.  At least 
in that data, for instance, the overall percentage of doves (those strongly against the war) does 
not rise in mid-2000 until the percentage of those 40 to 54 years old become involved as ‘doves.’
•  Rural/Urban Divide:
Despite extensive research, no connection has been conclusively found between support, 
opposition, or even interest in the war as a problem.  Rural or urban residency seems to not be a 
significant factor on its own in a determination of Russian public opinion and the Chechen war. 
In the context of data for the second war, residents in Moscow and St. Petersburg, while not 
necessarily ranking the Chechen war higher as a ‘problem,’ do have higher real percentages of 
people concerned about the war.  In this way, the rural/urban divide seems to have an impact 
within overall Russian public opinion.
•  Regional Divide:
187Due to lack of breakdowns in data according to precise region, no new conclusions can be found 
in regard to this cleavage beyond what points others have already determined.
•  Political Divide:
The political divide is found to be a significant factor in assessing Russian public opinion and the 
Chechen wars.  Unsurprisingly, those who support reformist and progressive parties also 
associate the Chechen war as a problem of Russian society.  Research finds that those in support 
of the more conservative parties of Russian politics typically regard the conflict in Chechnya as 
less a problem.  As stated by this and research by others however, there is a divergence in 
determining how to go forward, with most parties only agreeing that the integrity of the Russian 
Federation must be upheld.
•  Class Divide:
The class divide is found to not be a significant factor in regard to the Chechen war, except by 
those who ‘choose’ their own classes.  Research finds that all income groups generally rank 
Chechen war actions about equally, although there is some percentile differentiation.
•  Religious Divide:
Due to lack of precise data according to religion, no conclusions can be found in regard to this 
cleavage.
Having analyzed these eight divides, what does this tell us about Russian public opinion and the 
Chechen war?  Enough is discovered to find that, while some deviations exist in Russian public
188opinion according to these cleavages, Russian society overall is remarkably accepting and 
unified in respect to the Chechen war, and especially to policies of the Putin administration and 
government on that issue.  Research does not conclusively illustrate clear divisions in Russian 
public opinion on this matter.
To a determinable degree, one minor overall conclusion can be made.  Ultimately opposition to 
the war seems to begin at the point in which a middle-aged politically active Russian male 
decides to end support for the administration and oppose the war to a higher degree, perhaps 
prompted by the potential of groups representing the Soldiers Mothers that bring the war ‘home’ 
to a more ‘striking’ degree.  This is an expression of the overall volatility of Russian public 
opinion in general.  Beyond this extremely limited statement, on-going events, the media and the 
sensitivity of the administration to public opinion (as to be explored in the next chapter) are the 
only determinates to over time affect support for war in Chechnya.
In overall analysis, judging from the results of study in this chapter (as well as from the results of 
chapter two), one enduring conclusion is that the dominance of the elite in Russian political 
society (at least within the time periods being studied) was alive and well in relation to ‘general’ 
public opinion, and to the cleavages therein, on the Chechen war issue.
189Jason Vaughn 
Chapter Four
The Question of Media Manipulation in Russian Public Opinion on the Chechen Wars 
Introduction
The previous chapter examined cleavages in Russian public opinion and the Chechen wars.  This 
chapter focuses on the media in relation to Russian elites, actors in Russian government and 
general public opinion on the Chechen wars.  The ‘question’ of media manipulation will be 
found to not really be a question at all; particularly in the second Chechen war, the Russian 
government has perceived Russian public opinion as a threat to forceful policy, and has further 
perceived the media as a target representing the ‘amplifier’ of that threat.
The issues to be researched are:
•  To what extent the Russian elites and the Russian government have tried to influence the 
perception of the Chechen wars in Russian public opinion.
•  How has the Russian government tried, within the context of the two Russian presidential 
administrations, to portray each of the Chechen wars during the time periods studied?
•  What is the role of the media in Russian political society?
First, to begin, there is a separation here that has continued throughout the chapters of this thesis. 
As stated previously in this thesis and as mentioned briefly above, military operations in 
Chechnya have been conducted under two separate Russian presidential administrations.  As
190covered in chapter two, the first war was undoubtedly less popular than the second war in 
Chechnya, at least in the time period studied in this thesis.
Some reasons for this difference in popular support include, as to be alleged in this chapter, the 
failure of the Russian government before the first war to prepare adequately Russian public 
opinion for the amount of pressure involved in a major protracted military conflict.  Also, during 
the conflict, the Russian government under Yeltsin failed to justify the war and to maintain 
further a realistically believable public relations campaign to make the grim pictures seen in the 
Russian media seem remotely justified.  The managed portrayal of the Chechen war sought by 
the Yeltsin administration, built without careful planning, fell like a house of cards before the 
hard truths presented by reporters investigating the conflict and in the face of the Chechens’ own 
portrayal of the conflict.
From a review of Russian governmental actions in the PR sphere for the second war, figures in 
the Russian government at the time apparently saw this ‘weakness’ in the case of the first 
Chechen war and decided that, should another conflict take place, these mistakes should and 
would be rectified.  Blame was at that point placed on the media.
Before and during the second war, this chapter will argue that the Putin administration stepped 
up efforts to ‘manage’ Russian public opinion through a focussed policy encompassing many 
facets to restrain the media.  While the government and military’s efforts have indeed been 
slightly more efficient in conducting the conflict, Putin wanted also to limit the risks in regard to 
even the possibility of stirring opposition in Russian public opinion.  These policies did not 
address the likelihood of damaging freedoms and the future of democracy in Russia, and indeed 
this study finds both to have taken place.
191Freedom House has documented this trend against media freedom, as Steven Fish charts in his 
book, Democracy Derailed in Russia.307  However, this chapter seeks to take a fresh look at this 
on the Chechen war issue.
To some extent to be further examined, this has led to authoritarianism in Russia.  The state has 
sought to what degree it can to allow only its overall viewpoint on the Chechen war to be 
presented.  Some examples of this, to be explored further throughout this chapter, include 
policies to only allow reporters closely following the guidelines of the state to be able to report 
on the war from first-hand accounting.  Some reporters, such as the soon-to-be-discussed Anna 
Politkovskaya, have had to fear for their lives in order to present a contradictory viewpoint to the 
state’s view.  Indeed, outside the purview of this paper, Politkovskaya was murdered under 
suspicious circumstances in her own apartment block in 2006.
Media ownership and the financial positions of various actors in the Russian political sphere 
have also come into play on this question.  In the immediate post-Soviet era, there was a new 
openness that was not possible before.  Independence of the media expanded the realms of 
journalism and information distribution in general society to an unprecedented degree.
However, where some wished for contemporary Western-styled freedom of the press without 
government guidance, many times there seemed like a type of anarchy to other observers that 
should not be tolerated.
Yet, it is also a fact that in these years, the Russian government has been aided by the status of 
the economy.  Given that there are few businesses, collected into conglomerates, which are 
capable of buying advertisements but are also independent of government influence, operating 
costs have over the years caused Russian media outlets to have to seek funding from wherever
307 Fish, M. Steven, Democracy Derailed in Russia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2005, 
p. 75.possible, including the more biased governmental and business organizations.  Therefore, 
Russian politicians and business leaders have begun to eat away at the exceptional (or chaotic, 
depending on your point of view) journalistic autonomy present during the immediate post- 
Soviet period.
Andrew Wilson, in his book Virtual Politics, refers back to the use of dramaturgiia in Russian 
society to explain the reasoning behind many on-going policies:
‘Conspiracies, parties, tendencies and ‘isms’ -  some phantom, some real -  were 
constantly paraded as the justification, the dramaturgiia (dramatic art, the moving spirit 
of a drama), for moving events.’
This has relevance in examining the attempted portrayal of each Chechen war by the Russian 
presidential administrations conducting them.  Also, Wilson focuses on how the idea of 
dramaturgiia is especially important in Russian elections cycles, where more is demanded of 
‘political technologists’ (those who attempt to portray a specific media design for a policy or 
politician) than simply to make them appealing to the public.  In the post-Soviet era, he finds that 
such technologists must also:
‘[...Jdisguise the preservation of the old structures of power and their fusion with ‘new’ 
business opportunities, creating a giant state holding company, a permanent revolving 
door for melding political and economic power.’309
308 Wilson, Andrew, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. Yale University Press, New 
Haven and London, 2005, p. 7.
309 Ibid, p. 49.On this level of politics as theatre, Wilson further finds that dramaturgiia must adapt to changing 
circumstances to be successful, using the unity of the United Russia party and their 2001  fusion 
with Fatherland All-Russia as one example.  Another example is how:
‘Unity’s 1999 [parliamentary] campaign had skilfully presented the party as both a new 
virtual power and a virtual opposition.’310
This portrayal of Russian post-Soviet politics as a moving charade will be useful to consider as 
this chapter progresses.  Somewhat opposing this however is to notice how the media also has 
quantitatively widened its scope relative to the government’s desired perception in society. 
Expansion in media sources is at this point useful to consider.
The number of newspapers in Russia grew substantially before and during the time periods 
studied.  In 1998, there were over 1,000 more titles in circulation than in 1980, but with less than 
one quarter the circulation.311   As discussed by Stephen Lovell:
‘Newspapers and journals were confronted by a rapidly changing and diversifying 
audience on whose support their continued existence suddenly depended.  Most 
publications, moreover, lacked the know-how and means to conduct sophisticated 
audience research.  As a result, many had closed or been on the brink of extinction. 
Nevertheless, the situation in the mid-1990s was not catastrophic, as some commentators 
have implied.  The Moscow reading public was able to support a remarkable number of 
daily and weekly newspapers.  But the importance of post-Soviet newspapers extended 
well beyond the major cities.  Many commentators were struck by the growing demand
310 Ibid, p. 108.
311 Rantanen, Terhi, The Global and the National. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham MD and Boulder CO, 2002, p. 
31.
194for the local press, which was cheaper than its national counterpart and focused more 
closely on people’s real social concerns.’312
Television outlets also became a tradable commodity in this ongoing game between the 
government and the media during both wars.  As the economy improved in late Soviet times and 
into the post-Soviet era, the basis for television as the primary medium for information 
distribution became stronger.
The influence of television seemed quite powerful, as written by Sarah Oates:
‘Trained in the Soviet period to approach media sources with cautious scepticism, 
Russian viewers show a great deal of insight into the attempts to manipulate their 
opinion.  By the same token, they cannot avoid being influenced, particularly by the 
powerful state-run television on Channel 1.’
As pertaining to the competition of newspapers against television and radio, as found by N. I. 
Lapin, those who read the newspaper ‘every day’ fell from 54% in  1990 to 17% in 2002, while 
those who watched television rose from 50% in 1990 to 53% in 2002.  Those who listened to 
radio every day also rose from 40% in 1990 to 48% in 2002.314
There were also many indications that the internet was becoming stronger as an alternative 
source of information.  Despite ROMIR polling in July 2000 that revealed statistics as stating 
that 99% of Russian citizens had no home internet access, only 4% have internet at work, and
312 Lovell, Stephen, The Russian Reading Revolution. Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2000, p. 151.
313 Oates, Sarah, Television. Democracy and Elections in Russia. Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p. 127.
314 Lapin, N.I., ‘How the Citizens of Russia Feel and What They Are Striving For,’ Russian Social Science Review, 
Vol. 45, No. 6, Nov.-Dee. 2004, p.  17. (pp. 4-21)
195that only single digit percentages use electronic mail on any regular basis, there was significant 
evidence that the internet was growing as a source of information.315
Having the virtue of the state being almost unable to regulate it, the fact that the number of 
internet users in Russia rose from 406 thousand people in 1996 to 2.5 million people in 1999316 
was surely a warning sign for any elements of the Russian government wishing to have at least 
the nominal capacity to censor news.  The increasing modernization of Russia strongly suggests 
that the number of internet users will increase as infrastructure improves.  Although still not 
amounting to even a respectable level of competition against other sources of information for 
Russians, especially outside major cities, this form of communication became a strong factor in 
the information war for public opinion during the second Chechen conflict.  Eventually, a variety 
of web sites would become the sole methods of information dissemination for the Chechen side
1   I  T
in Russia, outside of the propaganda of various supportive groups in foreign countries.
315 ROMIR, ‘Rossiiane i internet,’ Web site:
http://web.archive.org/web/200Q 1018221716/www.romir.ru/market/internet/07  2000/internet.htrn. This polling was 
conducted in July 2000 of a nationally representative sample of 2000 Russians in 40 federal entities.
316 Rantanen, Terhi,  The Global and the National, p. 36.
3,7 See http://www.kavkazcenter.com for one example of the Chechen side. Up-to-date as of 20 March 2005.
See also: on the Russian side:
www.Chechnva.ru
www.antiterror.ru
www.infocentre.ru
www.kavkaz.ru
On the Chechen side:
www.kavkaz.org
www.qoqaz.net
www.amina.com
www.ichkeria.com
www.chechentimes.com
Thomas, Timothy L., ‘Russian and Chechen ‘Information War’ Tactics,’  The Second Chechen War, (ed.) Anne 
Aldis, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Occasional Paper No. 40,
Sandhurst, September 2000, p.  123.
196Other sources agree in finding that internet sites continued to grow in popularity, particularly 
after mid-2000318.  According to Europemedia in 2001:
‘Internet users in Russia have grown 2.6 fold in the last two years with ongoing quarterly 
growth of between 7 and 10 percent.’319
Nevertheless, there is a significant percentage of Russians, especially outside the cities, who still 
do not have access to basic services, much less internet connections, hence this source of media 
is still of some limited value in spreading information.
The level of access to media shapes the environment in which many of the surveys, polls, and 
elections discussed in this thesis take place.  As to be discussed, in the case of many Russian 
media outlets, the situation in these time periods was unstable at best, and at worst, they were 
perpetually vulnerable at the financial level.  Since this is the environment, resulting effects on 
any debate of Russian public opinion in relation to the war in Chechnya cannot and should not be 
overlooked.
First, this chapter will discuss manipulation during the first war, examining the government’s 
position and then examining the media’s response.  After this, the issue of manipulation during 
the second war will be discussed, again concerning the government’s position and then the 
media’s resulting situation.  Thirdly, a comparison of the two wars in the context of the previous 
sections will be conducted.  Lastly, the effects of all this on Russian democracy will be analysed 
briefly followed by some final conclusions.
318 Bovt, Georgi, ‘The Russian Press and Civil Society,’ Civil Society and the Search for Justice in Russia,  (eds.) 
Christopher Marsh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Lexington Books, Lanham MD, 2002, p. 96.
319 ‘Internet use enjoys steady growth in Russia,’ Europemedia. 08 August 2001. 
http://www.nua.ie/survevs/index.cgi?f=VS&art  id=905357060&rel=true.This chapter will ultimately find that the ‘honeymoon’ granted the media during the 1990s 
resulting from the chaos inherent to the fall of the Soviet Union has ended.  In its place is a 
government less interested in principles of democracy and more interested in order, which as 
previously covered, has not been an unpopular concept in Russian public opinion.
Media Manipulation in the First War
This section finds that there was an attempt at manipulation of public opinion, but policies were 
largely inefficient and ineffective, and in some cases derisory.  Failures in initiating and 
conducting the war were apparent, and demonstrated often the negligence of Russian leaders, 
perhaps most in particular, President Boris Yeltsin himself.
•  The government position
Past experiences with media policy (and lack thereof) leading up to the first war influenced 
directly the government’s initial position on the media for the conflict.
The introduction of independent media in the late-1980s and early 1990s forced Soviet, and then 
Russian, state-owned media to have to back down from ‘false official versions of events,’ 
thereby ensuring that the government had to work harder to promote itself to the Russian people. 
If the government was to fully realize this, for the first time, the ‘democratic’ Russian state had 
to have a real media policy, internally and externally.  In this regard, on the effort of the first 
Chechen war, the Russian government failed.
320 Belin, Laura, ‘Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media,’ Contemporary Russian Politics: A 
Reader, (ed.) Archie Brown, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, p. 321.As explained by David Wedgwood Benn, and while noting ‘evidence of bias’ during the 1993 
Constitution crisis, Russian media was in prime position by the beginning of the Chechen war:
‘Yet barely a year later—during the Chechen crisis—the Russian media looked far more 
robust.  The government now faced a problem not unlike that faced by the United States 
government during the Vietnam war.  It was unable to impose a news blackout and was 
constantly confronted by journalists who refused to accept the official version of 
events.’321
From the time of Benn’s writing (published in May 1996), life looked attractive for a media 
future in post-Soviet Russia:
‘Yet it may fairly be said that the Russian media in the 1990s have been more diverse, 
more outspoken and more influential than at any previous time in the country’s history. 
If this incipient freedom really does become an irreversible process, it will be one of the 
major events of the 20th century.’322
When dealing with the Chechen wars, Russia had to have a policy on independent journalism, 
which is something it did not really have to deal with in previous wars, namely Afghanistan of 
the Soviet era.  Not realizing this truth before and during the first Chechen war, the Russian 
government had no workable media policy, outside of the apparent hope that the government 
would be listened to; that, in effect, it would be obeyed without consistent demonstrative threat 
or sanction for violations of rules.  In the first war, this in reality meant that journalists were able 
to move all around Chechnya in a chaotic atmosphere, crossing battle lines at will or through
321 Benn, David Wedgwood, ‘The Russian Media in Post-Soviet Conditions,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 3, 
May 1996, p. 473. (pp. 471-479)
322 Ibid, p. 477.
199bribery.  Frequently, as will be covered, the threat was minimal of a journalist being jailed by the 
Russian government and therefore often an empty threat.
The government had an uneven position in respect to what media policy they did have.  In the 
first few days of the first Chechen war, reporters did come under fire or have their equipment 
confiscated.  However, these early obstacles ended soon after, since it was due more to units 
of the Russian army being inexperienced when dealing with the media, rather than a Russian 
government policy to shoot at the media or to steal the media’s working materials.
The government did however assign an agency to deal with the media.  The Russian Government 
Press Centre based in Moscow was in charge of distributing the Russian government’s political 
‘spin’ on the escalating war.  In turn, some reporters began to question the basis of the Press 
Centre’s proclamations as being incorrect at best, mendacious at worse.
One example of this was as early as 24 December 1994, such public statements on civilian 
bombing proved to be a fabrication when reporters for Izvestiia not only told in their newspaper 
about how Russian planes regularly bombed the civilian sectors of Grozny, but also produced 
pictures and eyewitness testimony to prove this allegation.324  As in this case, reporters 
sometimes made light of the Press Centre’s declarations, to the point where few would listen to 
that agency any more.
Such a press centre did little to affect reportage.  When dissidents like Sergei Kovalev spoke out 
against the war, and remarked upon the ‘lies of information about Chechnia,’ newspapers were 
quick to print their opinions.325
323  See ‘Presse ne daiut rabotat,’ Nezavisimaia gazeta, No. 242 (918), 20 Dekabr’  1994, p. 2.
324  Iakov, Valerii, ‘Press-centre pravitel’stva Rossii izhet!,’ Izvestiia, No. 247 (24354), 24 Dekabr’  1994, p. 4.
325 Treguboa, Elena, ‘Sergei Kovelev, ‘Dudaev ne zachshaiut bandformirovaniia, a narod,’ Segodnia, No. 243 (350), 
21 Dekabr’  1994.For a further example on this basis, in a June 1995 article on the Budyonnovsk crisis, 
Kommersant-Daily reporter Maksim Sokolov talks quite openly about what it was like trying to 
attend a news conference near the hospital itself, even at one point talking about a popular 
anecdote told by the fighters involved.  The government position in this article is discussed, but 
had no position of dominance in relation to other views expressed.326
As to be discussed in the next section, some journalists even travelled with and conducted 
interviews with Chechen units in the field.  These journalists suffered little from their stances 
upon their return to Russia.
•  The media position
The media had during the first war a substantial amount of freedom to report on the war in 
Chechnya.  Relatively speaking, especially in comparison to the second war, news agencies had 
also a high degree of independence.
In this question, however, even the definition of independence is a relative term.
First, one must also further articulate here on what exactly it means to be ‘independent.’ 
Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, many media sources attempted to maintain 
themselves through ‘self-managing editorial collectives.’  These operations attempted to 
maintain true independence through advertising and sales, without asking for sponsorship from 
anyone, including Vladimir Gusinsky’s MOST group and Boris Berezovsky’s hefty financial 
resources.  One by one (especially the newspapers), these operations failed to generate enough
326 Solkolov, Maksim, ‘Press-konferentsiia v palate nomer 6,’ Kommersant-Daily, No.  Ill,  17 June 1995, p. 21.
327 Thomas, T.L., ‘Manipulating the Mass Consciousness,’  The Second Chechen War, (ed.) A L Aldis, Conflict 
Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, June 2000, p. 326.
201earnings to remain at that level of independence.  Many of these media outlets surrendered to 
Gusinsky and Berezovsky after going completely bankrupt.
Nevertheless, based on the shifting of alliances with the Kremlin and the oligarchs, and based 
heavily on who actually paid the bills, there continued to be a degree of independence for 
Russian media even after much of it fell to Gusinsky and Berezovsky.
‘In comparison to party consolidation or the development of civil society, Russia enjoyed 
greater success in developing an independent media in the 1990s, a critical component 
for a liberal democracy.’328
Especially under the aegis of Gusinsky, who was less close to the Kremlin than Berezovsky 
(with the exception of Gusinsky’s agreement to side with the Yeltsin team for the 1996 
Presidential campaign), some independence in the media continued to exist.  Particularly NTV 
remained almost completely independent in regard to the first Chechen war.
In her new (2006) book entitled, Television. Democracy and Elections in Russia, by Sarah Oates, 
she has this to say in regard to the first Chechen war and NTV:
‘NTV built a formidable reputation quickly with its coverage of the first war in Chechnya 
(1994-6).  While state-controlled stations such as ORT were claiming Russian victories, 
NTV broadcast the darker side of the war as untrained recruits died needlessly.  Even 
more painful for the Russian authorities was the fact that NTV was unwilling to frame the 
Russian army as noble saviors of the Chechen people, making it clear that there were 
harrowingly brutal acts against soldiers and civilians on both sides.’
328 McFaul, Michael, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution. Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY and London, p. 323.
329 Oates, Sarah, Television. Democracy and Elections in Russia. Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p. 15.
202Such remained the case until the beginning of the 1996 Yeltsin presidential campaign with the 
breach of any pretence of media integrity when their owners and the media itself decided to 
become political actors to fight against the supposed ‘greater’ evil of Gennadi Zyuganov.
At the time, Leon Aron went so far as to argue that during the first war, Russian mass media had 
a direct effect on Yeltsin administration personnel policy:
‘It is largely because the Russian mass media so vociferously, almost militantly, staked 
out and defended its autonomy from the government’s “line” that, following another 
spectacular military failure, pressure from the Duma and public opinion forced the 
President to fire two of the leading proponents of the war: the Minister of Internal Affairs 
and the head of the Federal Security Service.  This dismissal of top national security 
officials in response to public outrage is an event for which few, if any, precedents can be 
found in Russian, let alone Soviet, history.’330
Aron’s statement is a substantial jump that is difficult to prove, but the basis has merit and 
should be explored further.
As to be discussed, the new levels of structural control during the second war are also notable 
given the degree to which NTV embarked on aggressive coverage of the first Chechen war.  It 
was an NTV journalist named Yelena Masyuk who interviewed Chechen commander (and 
architect of the June 1995 Budyonnovsk raid) Shamil Basaev.  Such was the backlash to this 
development that, for this interview of a prominent enemy commander, Masyuk suffered a 
criminal prosecution in July 1995 (this was dropped in September 1995).  The prosecution itself
330 Aron, Leon, ‘Russia Between Revolution and Democracy,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.  11, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 2005, 
p. 308. (pp. 305-339)made little difference in the long run.  (This prosecution, as well as her frequent kidnapping
^  1
experiences have made Masyuk quite well known.)
During the first war, journalists took advantage of their relative freedom, even accepting the 
courteous help of the Chechen fighters on occasion:
‘In the first war, for example, Russian journalists would fly into Daghestan's 
Makhachkala airport and get free taxi rides into Chechnya. The Chechens would pay for 
the taxi ride once the journalist arrived at his or her destination, give interviews, and 
remunerate the journalists for articles.’
Television and radio also started to cover the war in detail:
‘Then too, in its explicitness and anti-government animus, Russian media coverage of the 
[first] Chechen war, including coverage by state-owned television stations, is without 
parallel for any country at war, save, perhaps, that of the United States during the 
Vietnam War.  Although some members of the government would have liked to curb the 
media, not a single newspaper or television channel was censored, much less closed 
down, and not a single public opponent of the war was harassed, much less arrested or 
harmed.’333
From the beginning of the conflict, Russian reporters and news teams were allowed to travel 
freely throughout the war zone, more through the lack of policy direction on media given to the
331 Hockstader, Lee, ‘Journalists Become Chechnya’s Latest Victims,’  Washington Post, 27 May 1997, p. A10, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/exussr/mav/27/rusioum.htm.
332 Thomas, Timothy L.-Foreign Military Studies Office, ‘Information Warfare in the Second (1999-Present) 
Chechen War: Motivator for Military Reform?,’ Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, Frank Cass Publishers, Fort 
Leavenworth KS, 2003, http://fmso.leavenworth.armv.mil/documents/iwchechen.htm.
333 Aron, Leon, ‘Russia Between Revolution and Democracy,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.  11, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 2005, 
p. 307-8. (pp. 305-339)
204army from Moscow than any other reason.  Since the Russian military and government had no 
clear official line for dealing with these ‘intruders,’ then the Russian Army simply allowed them 
to go where they wanted to go and report what they wanted to report.
As Sarah Oates wrote, there was some level of respect for journalists during the first war:
‘Although some journalists died in the violence of the first Chechen war, there was 
respect for the international normal safe passage for war correspondents (to a degree) 
from both the Russian and Chechen forces between 1994 and 1996.’334
Overall the media were able to work with little hindrance, given that they had money or vodka or 
other gifts for bribery purposes.
These reporters were on the front lines of many battles, including the massive Russian New 
Year’s Day 1995 Grozny disaster, where they were in Grozny with the Chechens and reporting 
on what they had witnessed.  When the Russian army had their massive catastrophe in the city, 
Russian reporters quickly wrote extremely critical accounts of the battle, which then appeared in 
major Russian newspapers only a few days later.  In their articles, they told of the poor training 
and tactics of the Russian soldiers, and how they were frequently shot in large numbers in the 
streets at the hands of bearded Chechen fighters.
‘[...] however, the worst losses are still being taken by the Army,  That is why planes 
carrying dead and wounded soldiers of the Army, which ‘has finished its work,’ leave 
Severny Airport (in Grozny) for Mozdok every day.’
334 Oates, Sarah, Television. Democracy and Elections in Russia. Routledge, p.  15.
335 Leontyev, Mikhail, ‘Chechenskii front,’ Segodnia, No.20 (378), 2 Feb.  1995, p. 3.
205One particular reporter, working again for Izvestiia, summed up the situation in Chechnya for the 
Russian public in the clearest terms possible:
‘A clear thinking observer, reflecting on the reasons for the federal authorities’ defeats in 
Chechnya, should reject the obviously stupid official arguments justifying the ineffective, 
to put it mildly, actions of the Russian Army in establishing constitutional order.’
As the war continued, newspapers reported on some of the on-going problems associated with 
conflicts of this nature.  For example, in reflecting on what it calls the ‘Chechen Syndrome,’ 
Segodnia covered the social issues of rehabilitation of the soldiers and officers serving as 
internal troops for the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Chechen war:
‘Problems of the social and psychiatric rehabilitation of soldiers, officers, and ensigns in 
the Internal army of the MVD-RF, having service in Chechnia, are impossible to decide 
on [based on] the present scanty finances, considers deputy commander, Lieutenant 
General Stanislav Kavun.’
Also in response to developments such as the Kizylar raid of January 1996, some media sources 
were not hesitant to state the local anti-Moscow position using sensationalistic language.  As 
Izvestiia published at the time, Dzhokhar Dudaev had, ‘through his fight-to-the-death kinsman,’ 
started ‘stirring hostility towards Moscow in the (Dagestan) republic.’338
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Nikolai Borbiiga, Arkadii Zheludkov, ‘Voenniie I Boeviki,’ Izvestiia, 6 Jan. 1995, EastView, 
http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=3180537.
337 Kostrov, Leonid, ‘Novyi vrag VV - «Chechenskii sindrom »,’ Segodnia, No. 81 (439), 4 May 1995, p. 6.
338 Gritchin, Nikolai, ‘V Dagestan vse gromche zvuchat antirossiiskie lozungi,’ Izvestiia, Issue 009, 17 Jan.  1996, 
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206Military tactics were commonly reported in media as the war continued.  As evident from an 
article from May 1995, Segodnia openly details how Russia installs a fresh troop division into 
Chechnya on the second page of the newspaper.339
Segodnia often also published quotes of the inhabitants of Grozny.  According to that newspaper, 
one such inhabitant said:
‘I am no Dudaevka [Dudaev supporter], but Russian soldiers built much against 
themselves.  In the town, there are two problems.
Until now, Russian OMON took young Chechens in broad daylight.  People were lost 
without trace, and [it was] especially strange, when it becomes dark.  Second problem is 
men in the hospital are not allowed to receive treatment for wounds.’340
In the Putin era, such interviews from inhabitants of Grozny will be found to be fewer than in 
this era.  In fact, in regard to all media coverage soon after the beginning of the second war:
‘The provision of news in Russia began to change in 2000 as persecution of the 
independent news company and of  journalists on independent newspapers began; this 
was accompanied by the creation of new state-owned television companies, newspapers, 
agencies and websites.  Government bureaucracies began routinely to bandy about a new 
concept, ‘unified news provision’, which, on closer inspection, proves to be none other 
than the familiar Soviet concept of propaganda.’341
339 Golotiuk, Yuri, ‘Rossii perebrasyvaet v Chechniu svezhie podrazdeleniia,’ Segodnia, No. 82 (440), 5 May 1995,
p. 2.
40 Suponina, Elena, ‘Voina prodolzhaetsa chechentsy nastroeny reshitel’no,’ Segodnia, No. 85 (443),  11 May 1995.
341 Panfilov, Oleg, ‘Rebirth of Russian Nationalism,’ Index on Censorship, Vol. 35, No. 1, Jan. 2006, p.  145. (pp. 
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207During the first war in Chechnya, however, there was not yet this level of state influence; media 
chose their alliance with the state.  In more ideological areas, media outlets sometimes gave in to 
governmental control almost easily.
Television sources were first in this respect.  For example, NTV’s president, Igor Malashenko 
became practically a team player of Yeltsin in March 1996 during the Yeltsin presidential re- 
election campaign for the distinctly non-independent reason of wanting to influence the election 
against Gennadi Zyuganov.  This was of course made in the belief that if Yeltsin lost, then 
Zyuganov would turn the clock back and take away all independence.  Addressing the topic 
directly, Yeltsin himself uses this justification in so many words in his book of memoirs, 
Midnight Diaries:
‘In principle this was a normal electoral process; the campaign met with all influential 
groups in society.  We would say to them:  ‘Do you want to survive?  If so, help us.  Do 
you want to continue your banking business?  Help us.  Do you want to have freedom of 
speech and private TV channels?  Help us.  Do you want freedom to create, freedom 
from censorship, freedom from Communist ideology in culture?  Help us.’ And so on.’342
In the face of the threat of Zyuganov, many of the media’s financial backers closed ranks and 
formulated a plan to keep Yeltsin as President.
Yeltsin needed the Russian oligarchs to win re-election in 1996 to counter his ‘almost-zero’343 
poll ratings.  Referring again to the ‘Davos Pact’ oligarchy group344, of which both Boris 
Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky were members, the media resources of these elite were 
pressed into service.  An alliance of Gusinky’s NTV and Berezovsky’s Channel One (ORT or
342 Yeltsin, Boris, Midnight Diaries. Phoenix, London, 2000, p. 28.
343 Hoffman, David E., The Oligarchs. BBS PublicAffairs, New York, 2002. p. 329.
344 Referred to in Chapter 2.Obshchestvennoye Rossiiskoye Televideniye) dominated the media in favour of Yeltsin.345  On 
television, Yeltsin connected Zyuganov with old Stalinist imagery, while Yeltsin appeared 
several times as being the reformist who would lead the country with vigour.
Yeltsin in turn could not refuse any aid and the opportunity to use his connections and the 
perquisites of his office to help his campaign.  After the war, many of these oligarchs received 
their rewards; Boris Berezovsky received the post of deputy secretary for the Security Council. 
This post also was in charge of the economic rebuilding of Chechnya, a position from which 
money was forthcoming.346  In the end, Yeltsin’s campaign would cost 700 million to a billion 
American dollars.347
Whether Yeltsin was right or wrong is arguable in regard to Zyuganov’s candidacy, but among 
many journalists, what Yeltsin was asking was considered logical.
Showing their agreement with this opposition to Zyuganov, many journalists (NTV and 
otherwise) became essentially political actors with little concern for weighted reporting:
‘[.. .JGusinsky’s NTV, bom in the crucible of the Chechen war the previous year, earned 
a reputation for standing up to the Kremlin.  Now, in a different situation, NTV shifted 
and went over to Yeltsin’s side.’348
Obviously, many journalists thought that if they sacrificed their integrity one time, then they 
would be able to ‘resume’ their independence.  In such a difficult financial and political 
environment as today’s Russia, however, this supposed ‘return’ to complete independence
345 McFaul, Michael, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution. Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY and London, p. 293.
346 Shevtsova, Lilia, Yeltsin’s Russia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, pp. 202 -  203.
™ Ibid, p.  191.
348 Hoffman, David E., The Oligarchs. BBS PublicAffairs, New York, 2002, pp. 346.
209proved to be elusive.  In consideration of the fact that this became representative of the media’s 
effect on public opinion and the war effort, it was difficult to overlook how media independence 
could be limited in support of not only a political re-election campaign but also the Chechen 
conflict.  Therefore, with media outlets continuing to depend more on pro-Kremlin financial 
support than ever before, the Yeltsin victory could have been considered little better than a 
Zyuganov victory.
•  Conclusions
Looking at trends in public opinion as found in chapter one, this section finds that the lack of a 
strong policy towards the press combined with a deficiency in support among the Russian public 
for a war in Chechnya were the two great contributing factors to press freedom during the war. 
Lack of sympathy for the reasoning and manner that Yeltsin used to invade Chechnya filtered 
into the media and into the oligarch elite.  Only when the oligarchs themselves felt threatened by 
the possibility of a Zyuganov presidency did they do anything to rehabilitate Yeltsin’s public 
image.
However, the media did have a unique position during the first war in Chechnya.  After the 
limitations on freedom of Soviet communism, the first Chechen war was the first major chance 
for the media to demonstrate its independence through the role of being a reliable observer in 
relation to the government.  Much coverage of the first Chechen war was an honour to this 
responsibility.  The Russian public received a thorough view of many aspects, albeit often with 
some sensationalistic elements, of this conflict in Chechnya.
The media however ultimately failed in this role as a fourth column.  By following the desires of 
their owners/oligarchs and openly supporting a Yeltsin victory in his re-election campaign, many
210elements of the media, while not necessarily endangering themselves personally or 
professionally in the short term, certainly created a precedent for those who would seek to limit 
their independence in the future.
Media Manipulation in the Second War
This chapter finds that policies of manipulation for the second Chechen war were effective, but 
also a more congenial domestic and international environment was instrumental in assisting this 
manipulation.  The government position must be explored in greater detail in this case as it 
expanded from the media policy existing during the first war.
Freedom of the press became an issue of importance as the relative anarchy of the Yeltsin years 
gave way to the idea of the re-institution of the state as professed by the Putin administration. 
Putin’s dual policies on internal consolidation had much effect in this area.  As outlined by 
Robert Sharlet in the context of what he calls ‘metalegal’:
‘Putin has relentlessly and consistently pursued two broadly linked themes: strengthening 
the state, and obeying the “dictatorship of law,” both of which express metalegal policies 
that affected the legal system of the Russian Federation.  The two policies represent 
Putin’s response to the dysfunctional state and legal process left by the Yeltsin 
administration. ’349
While media freedom was still a popular concept in theory, research finds that Russian public 
opinion has been somewhat loath to defend it.
349 Sharlet, Robert, ‘Putin and the Politics of Law in Russia,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.  17, No. 3, July-September 
2001, p. 201. (pp. 195-234)
211Media independence continued to be a stated desire of the Russian public.  July 2000 polling by 
ROMIR seemed to suggest that private media were strongly supported by the Russian populace. 
While 59% of respondents said that private media was positive and necessary for Russia, a 
significant percentage of (at least by Western terms) 29% said non-state media were 
‘harmful.’  Slightly over a quarter said they felt, to an extent, threatened by non-state media.
Partially, this was because non-state media was seen as a tool of the oligarchs.
‘State-owned news agencies have traditionally been seen as one of the bulwarks 
protecting “national interests” against the incursion of foreign news agencies.’351
Nevertheless, this shows that a clear majority thought that private ‘media’ (and not specifically 
television) was valuable to Russia.
Addition polling data from ROMIR surveys conducted between 30 September and 1  October 
2000 reflect only a slight tendency in Russian society (represented by a negligible 3% 
advantage) towards those who ‘often’ watch state television:352
(Graph 1):
350 ROMIR, ‘Dolzhny li sushchestvovat’ v Rossii negosudarstvennye sredstav massovoi informatsii’ This polling 
was conducted in July 2000 of a nationally representative sample of 2000 Russians in 40 federal entities. Website: 
http://web.archive.org/web/2000Q829185416/www.romir.ru/market/smi/07  2000/media.htm
351 Rantanen, Terhi, The Global and the National, p. 79.
352 ROMIR, ‘Rossiiane i televidenie,’ Survey of 1857 inhabitants of 10 Russian towns over 18. 30 September -  1  
October 2000, http://web.archive.org/web/20010124073100/www.romir.ru/socpolit/socio/10  2000/television.htm.
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(Graph 2):
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As can be seen from the above graphs, a lower percentage ‘often’ watches NTV than ORT and a 
higher percentage ‘never’ watches NTV.  In the same survey, 59% ‘entirely agree’ with the idea 
that the first channel ‘must’ be state controlled.  14% ‘somewhat agreed’ with this idea,  11% 
somewhat did not agree, and 8% entirely disagreed.
213Over the course of year 2001, data shows that trust in mass media however stays about the same. 
ROMIR polling at the end of year 2000 and 2001 finds that percentages remained the same in 
level of trust in the mass media.  In December 2000, 42% in some way trusted the mass media 
while 54% did not.  4% found this difficult to answer.  In December 2001, 41% ‘trusted’ the 
mass media while 52% refused to trust the media and 6% found it difficult to answer.353
Also, public opinion polling data in November of 2001 seemed to confirm the vulnerability of 
the more independent channels to the whims of the Russian government, reinforcing the balance 
in favour of government-owned or controlled stations such as ORT and Russia’s other official 
television station, RTR.  Only 27% said that the loss of the independent channel TV-6 would be 
a slight or very serious loss, versus 66% who said that it would not be a slight or very serious 
loss.  Numbers for traditionally independent NTV were slightly better at 34% saying it would be 
a slight or very serious loss with 61% saying the opposite.  For ORT and RTR, the results were 
42% to 50% in the ‘serious loss’ categories.354
For NTV and TV-6, these results revealed the vulnerability of the then-relatively independent 
stations in contrast to the government stations, where the highest positive response of the survey 
responded that it would be some degree of serious loss should they be closed.  In regard to TV-6, 
this vulnerability was easily exploited by those in a position to affect the station’s future, namely 
(but indirectly of course) Putin’s administration. This polling data shows that, for much of the 
Russian public, the most traditional governmental stations seemed to be the highest priority.
353 ROMIR, ‘Sotsial’no-politicheskaia zhizen’ Rossii v zerkale obshchestvennogo mneniia,’ Dekabr’ 2000 and 2001, 
Surveys of 2000 adult Russian respondents nation-wide, http://www.romir.ru/socpolit/socio/2002/02  2002/russia- 
life-ianuarv.htm.
354 Question: ‘What level of loss could be attributed to the closing of ORT, RTR, NTV, or TV-6?’ Possible answers: 
1) Very serious loss, 2) Slightly serious loss, 3) Not slightly serious loss, 4) not very serious loss, 5) Difficult to 
answer, 1600 respondents, Stated margin of error: 3.8%, VTsIOM, Press Release, 21 Nov. 2001, web site: 
http://www.wciom.ru
214All of these results show that a fairly large number of Russians do not consider the loss of any 
television channels to be the most serious disaster, and this is not surprising in view of the 
amount of cynicism concerning television broadcasts in general.  At the same time, while 
showing support for independent channels in principle, the non-governmental channels have the 
least amount of sympathy in regard to their continuation.
The Year 2000 would represent, as covered before, the end of NTV, but also the beginning of a 
semi-popular new network that covered more or less the entire Russian nation.  This was set up 
in the form of TV-6, supported by Boris Berezovsky, well-known oligarch who had a hand in 
destroying Gusinsky’s NTV, and eventually Gusinsky himself, thereby forcing Gusinsky into 
exile in Spain after his arrest.  At that point, Gusinsky found it difficult even to flee the 
country.355  Such was the culmination of the Kremlin’s battle against Gusinsky and his Media- 
MOST empire.  On tax-related charges, he had been arrested in late June 2000.  Ironically, much 
of Gusinsky’s fate became Berezovsky’s own, as the Russian government used much the same 
financial and legalistic framework to destroy TV-6, where many of NTV’s journalists had gone 
after NTV was driven into state hands.  Consequently, Berezovsky himself was also later forced 
into exile.
Other forms of media have not been able to adequately assume a role of providing alternative 
coverage to television:
‘News about events of any description in Russia is now strictly controlled by the
government: all the national television companies and radio stations are state-owned.
Only a small proportion of news sources, newspapers and the Internet are in a position to
355 ‘Gusinskogo ne vypustili za granitsu,’ Nezavisimaia gazeta, Issue 115, 24 Jun. 2000, EastView, 
http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=271965.
215deliver alternative news, and their influence on public opinion does not compare with that 
of radio or television.’356
While that was written in 2006, as to be discussed, the dominance of the Russian media began 
with the election of Putin, and the events stated above.
Furthermore, those newspapers that did take money from the state were almost uniformly 
adherent at that time to the central government, a specific political party (usually the Communist 
party, who rarely ever wanted to get on the bad side of Putin), or the local governor/government 
who did practically in unison want to stay on the good side of Putin.
‘In most regions, the press plays the role of official mouthpiece for the local political 
leadership.’357
One of the first documents that Putin signed as acting President eased procedures for distributing 
$150 million roubles to fund district newspapers.358  As even the newspaper article publishing 
this news piece acknowledges, no money would be given to a newspaper critical of the 
government.
Radio, on the other hand, did have objective coverage of the war on frequent occasion, and of 
course radio was a potential source of information for the Russian people.  However, for obvious 
reasons, the power of radio versus television fell in those years.  ‘National television reaches 98
356 Panfilov, Oleg, ‘Rebirth of Russian Nationalism,’ Index on Censorship, Vol. 35, No. 1, Jan. 2006, p. 145. (pp. 
142-8)
357 Slider, Darrell, ‘Politics in the Regions,’ Developments in Russian Politics, Edition 5. (eds.) Stephen White, Alex 
Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, p.  165.
358 ‘150 Millionov -  malim gazetam,’ Rossiiskaia gazeta, 13 Jan. 2000, EastView, 
http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id= 1807823.
216percent of the population; it is the only medium that directly reaches virtually the entire 
population.’359
Radio also had further problems with remaining independent.
‘The situation with radio is much the same.  The only independent news radio station is 
Moscow Echo, which is able to rebroadcast its programmes in 41 Russian cities.  This 
gives it a potential audience of 22,400,000, but obviously not all of them listen to the 
station’s programmes.  Probably, as in Moscow, only 8 per cent to 9 percent tune in.  The 
other independent radio stations (of which there are about 1,000) broadcast music and 
devote 3-6 minutes in the hour to news.  Foreign radio stations broadcasting in Russian -  
Radio Liberty, the BBC, Deutsche Welle -  continue to have a modest following.’360
The impact of radio transmission coverage is much less than the impact of pictures (or preferably 
television coverage) on the consciousness of those who listen.  It is of course true that the shock 
of television pictures is known to be more effective than radio in causing debate, and perhaps 
outrage, in public opinion.
•  The government position
Some background must now be explored in examining the government’s position on media for 
the second war.
One event on the world stage reinforced the view of the Russian government that perhaps more 
control of the mass media, and thereby attempt at control of public opinion, should be in order if
359 Rantanen, Terhi, The Global and the National, p. 35.
360 Panfilov, Oleg, ‘Rebirth of Russian Nationalism,’ Index on Censorship, Vol. 35, No.  1, Jan. 2006, p.  146. (pp. 
142-8)hostilities broke out again in Chechnya.  This world situation was the 1999 NATO war in 
Kosovo.  NATO’s, and many times the NATO governments’ tight control over the mass media 
and their scripted news conferences, complete with video, graphs, and pictures, led many in the 
Russian government to believe that such manipulation of public opinion would help Russia also 
in the case of Chechnya.  In effect:
‘the Russians studied the information campaign that NATO ran against the Serbs in the
campaign against Kosovo.’361
Openness in criticism of government policies and on the military tactical outlook of the Chechen 
front was seen as detrimental to the first post-Soviet Chechen war effort.  The later Putin 
administration, in planning, managing and overseeing the prosecution of a second war beginning 
in 1999, saw media freedom as a mistake of the first war, and has seemingly not hesitated to use 
what financial and political levers it possessed to counter this supposed threat.  This included, for 
possibly the first time, examining the handling of the media by Western powers in the 
prosecution of their own conflict efforts, such as the stated initiatives of public relations by the 
Western powers in Kosovo in 1999.  The patriotism of  journalists, of news agencies and of 
media company owners was questioned, and government policy began to focus on the relative 
subjugation of this sphere of influence on Russian society.
Some examples had been evident to Russia even before the first Chechen war, although 
seemingly only the loss of the first conflict could force the government to acknowledge these 
lessens.  This shows just how much Russia started learning how to have a media policy as it went 
along.  In the case of the second Chechen war, some media-related lessons of the American-led 
Gulf War of 1991 were finally ‘learned’ in Russia, as explained by Timothy Thomas:
361 Thomas, Timothy L., ‘Russian and Chechen ‘Information War’ Tactics,’  The Second Chechen War, Occasional 
Paper No. 40, (ed.) Anne Aldis, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, Sept. 2000, p. 123.
218‘During the past ten years, the Russian military has attentively studied the subject of 
information war (IW). The main catalyst for this interest was the successful use of IW by 
coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm. Russian military theorists watched 
coalition planes bomb Iraqi targets in real time with precision and understood that 
warfare had entered a new phase, one dominated by information-based equipment and 
resources. Two further motivators were the poor use of IW by the Russian armed forces 
during the first Russian-Chechen war (1994-1996), which contributed to the loss of 
Russian morale, and the successful use of IW by NATO during the conflict over 
Kosovo.’362
Thomas further presses this point:
‘There were several important military lessons that the Russian government and military 
learned from their first experience in Chechnya from 1994-1996. Perhaps none was more 
important to long term Russian success than the battle for public opinion.’
From these Western examples, and from their experience in the first Chechen war, the Russian 
government effectively did not put blame on itself or on the Russian military for their loss in 
Chechnya.  The government put the blame on the media, and the correction of this mistake began 
in the transition period between the two wars.  The state’s re-implementation of control over the 
media in 1999 and 2000, under the direction of the Russian Ministry of Communications and 
Media and under presidential aide Sergei Yastrzhembskii, was a notable characteristic of this 
transition between the Chechen wars:
362 Thomas, Timothy L.-Foreign Military Studies Office, ‘Information Warfare in the Second (1999-Present) 
Chechen War: Motivator for Military Reform?,’ Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, Frank Cass Publishers, Fort 
Leavenworth KS, 2003, http://fmso.leavenworth.armv.mil/documents/iwchechen.htm.
363 Ibid.
219‘The job of the political technologist is completely different from that of the spin doctor, 
although the former USSR has press secretaries who perform a similar role, such as 
Sergei Yastrzhembskii, who became notorious for the euphemism he used when 
journalists asked after Yeltsin’s health: ‘The President is working on documents.’ 
Yastrzhembskii’s skills earned him an expanded role as propaganda chief under Putin, 
when he again attracted notice for his stonewalling over Chechnya.  The art of the spin 
doctor is particular.  If the term is taken literally, he or she is not responsible for 
originating a given story, but intercepts and ‘spins’ it on its way into the public domain. 
By definition, although many spin doctors clearly plant stories of their own, their work is 
narrowly situated at the point where politics and media intersect.  The political 
technologists, on the other hand, apply whatever ‘technology’ they can to the 
construction of politics as a whole.  The manipulation of the media is central to their 
work, but by definition it extends beyond this -  to the construction of parties, the 
destruction of others, the framing of general campaign dynamics and the manipulation of 
results.’364
On the second war, of further importance are the official organs through which President Putin 
has approached the area of mass media influence and, indirectly, attempted public opinion 
manipulation.  Another chief of this area in the Russian government since even slightly before 
Putin’s time was Mikhail Lesin, later confirmed as Press (also sometimes referred to as Media) 
Minister.  On the stage of Russian politics, Lesin began as the virtual founder of VGTRK (the 
All-Russia State TV and Radio Company), created by state decree in 1999 as a state holding to 
control the vast majority of the state infrastructure of mass communications.
364 Wilson, Andrew, Virtual Politics. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2005, p. 49.
220After the formation of this near-empire in itself, Lesin became its chairman and it is largely from 
this holding that Putin got his start in the area of news service manipulation.  In turn, Putin 
cemented control under Lesin’s Press Ministry.365  The VGTRK, and later its offshoot, the 
Russian Television and Radio Network (RTRS), controlled much of the infrastructure, albeit in 
poor condition, of all of the Russian state media, including the nationwide broadcasting RTR, as 
well as some 68 centres of regional television, and more than 100 centres for TV and radio 
transmission.366
From outside appearances, the role of Lesin when compared to other democracies was one of 
overall press secretary.  A great many democracies, the United States and others, have a similar 
role in the structure of their administrations, under parliamentary or presidential governments. 
Usually, the role of this minister or secretary is to be the face of the administration; his or her job 
is to put the best possible pro-government spin on policies and budgets for raising public opinion 
and thereby influencing the process of passing the bill or budget through each particular 
government’s parliament or congress or whatever the case may be.  In the United States, the 
press secretary is merely a high-ranking speaker, who has little actual power in policy making.
Lesin was no simple press secretary, however.  He was one of Putin’s top officials in policy 
making and dealing with the media.  In referring to the NTV takeover:
365 Borodina, Arina, ‘Pervaia polosa. Govorit i pokazivaet Mikhail Lesin,’ Kommersant-daily, Issue 144, 14 Aug. 
2001, EastView, http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=3727918.
366 Belin, Laura, ‘Bias and Self-Censorship in the Media,’ Contemporary Russian Politics, (ed.) Archie Brown, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 327. See also, ‘The Presidential Administration and the Federal Government,’ 
RFL/RL, Russian Media Empires VI, p.  1.  www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumedia6/rumediaVI  1  .html.
221‘[...Jmoreover, a smoking gun can perhaps be seen in the comments of Mikhail Lesin, 
the Kremlin’s point man on the press and the media, who has said publicly that he feels 
that the media is more dangerous to the state than vice versa.’367
Lesin also had gained the ire of the media in response to his policies; in July 2000, the Russian 
Union of Journalists named him Press Freedom Enemy No. 1  (Putin was third).368
Only Lesin’s signature kept Vladimir Gusinsky out of prison (in exchange for a deal on NTV) 
after the raiding of Gusinsky’s Media-MOST offices in May 2000.  In comparison with the 
majority of other democracies, this role is unique and not a characteristic of any other 
government.  This position is moving to be more comparable to the role of press ministries in 
authoritarian governments, where propaganda, not public relations, is the key operation.
Parallels could be made between Lesin’s media structure and the propaganda department of the 
CPSU Central Committee in the Soviet era.
This is not to say that Lesin was any kind of media dictator, however; his influence was in 
directing, but not micromanaging the government line on the Chechen war.  Indeed:
‘There was no propaganda czar, however; instead, the government gave its propagandists 
and their private counterparts carte blanche in manipulating the nation’s image of itself as 
a superpower and in drawing the ‘correct’ picture of the counter-terrorist operation.’
367 Oliker, Olga and Tanya Charlick-Paley, Assessing Russia’s Decline: Trends and Implications for the United 
States and the U.S. Air Force. Rand Corporation, 2002, p. 42, 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1442/MR1442.ch4.pdf.
368 Coalson, Robert, ‘Lesin is Press Enemy No.l’ Moscow Times, 7 Jul. 2000, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/07/07/Q39.html.
369 Lipman, Masha and Michael McFaul, ‘Putin and the Media,’ Putin’s Russia, (ed.) Dale Herspring, Roman and 
Littlefield, Lanham MD, p. 71.
370 Trenin, Dmitri V. and Alexei V. Malashenko with Anatol Lieven, Russia’s Restless Frontier. Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2004, p.  146.
222Trenin, Malashenko and Lieven detail five ‘strategies for information management’ under
T7 i Lesin’s Press Ministry in the conduction of policy.  In relation to the war, the Russian
government no doubt expected them to be followed. These are:
(1)  ‘Limiting access to first-hand information.’
(2)  ‘Having the military itself prepare information with subsequent release for general use.’
(3)  ‘Excluding the showing of any of the horrors of war, including suffering soldiers and 
command blunders.’
(4)  ‘Emphasizing the savagery of the Chechens.’
(5)  ‘Creating a new [more honourable] image for the army.’
In the beginning of the war, these ‘guidelines’ had not yet become clear.  Connecting the 
Kremlin’s tone with the probability of new conflict in Chechnya, the mass media began to 
address the issue much the same way as they had during the first war.
Given that in these later years, Russian media outlets have become more dependent on 
governmental or business sources (after finally achieving some independence from the state), 
these changes have had a number of repercussions on the level of reportage in Chechnya.  As 
mentioned before, a harder line media policy imposed by the Russian government has also cut 
down on the amount of information distributed outside their purview.  Fewer front-line accounts 
then made it back to the Russian people or the international press than during the first war.
As well they should, television media sources became the majority target of Putin’s policy. 
Although other sources for information will also be referred to on occasion, it must be stated 
that, on this topic, television was frequently the first harbinger of the war on information.
371 Ibid. p. 146.
223Reasons for this will be discussed next, but principally, polls show that television has first place 
among information sources.
A poll taken in 2000 revealed that 70% of Russians watch television every day, versus 11% 
reading the national press, and 8% for the local press.  This is as opposed to 6% who said they 
never watched television, 30% who never read the national press, and 46% who never read the 
local press.372  For the most part, and not only in Russia, it is clear that television is easily the 
most pervasive and strident of mass media sources.
A more aggressive policy against television in the interests of Putin’s rise to power began in 
many ways with the 1999 parliamentary elections.  The formation of Unity in 1999 as a party to 
occupy the middle ground of Russian politics, supported by Putin, was instrumental in this 
question.  The fight between Unity and the Fatherland-All-Russia (OVR) alliance was 
‘extremely negative’373 in this time period.  Putin’s opponents Yuri Luzhkov (mayor of 
Moscow), Yevgeni Primakov (former Prime Minister), and their allies did not give up their 
earlier dominance so easily.  Yet, the perks of incumbency were overwhelming, and the media, 
and pro-Yeltsin oligarch Boris Berezovsky, were on Unity’s side.
‘With slavish coverage of ORT television, Berezovsky helped Putin get elected president 
for a four-year term on 27 March 2000.’374
Protecting the ‘existing Kremlin team’  from these outsiders was the biggest priority.  OVR 
was overwhelmed by these forces, and failed to break through.
372 Oates, Sarah, ‘Politics and the Media,’ Developments, p. 261.  Sourced from: Monitoring obchshestvennogo 
mneniia:  ekonomicheskie Isotrial’nyeperemeny, no. 4, 2000, p. 18.
373 Wyman, Matthew, ‘Elections and Voters,’ Developments in Russian Politics. Edition 5. (eds.) Stephen White, 
Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 67.
374 Hoffman, David E., The Oligarchs. Public Affairs, New York, 2002, p. 485.
224As covered in previous chapters, Russian public opinion, owing to the low amount of party 
support, loyalty, and affiliation inherent to the country, was certainly open to the introduction of 
a new movement representing the centre of Russian politics.  Analyst Elizabeth Teague of the 
Jamestown Foundation saw a conspiracy in all this, that Stepashin was essentially set up to fail, 
that the media war was a natural progression and that the rise of Putin was carefully designed by 
the ‘Family:’
‘The Family had already decided that the man to succeed Yeltsin should be Vladimir 
Putin, former head of the Federal Security Service and a man the Family felt they could 
trust. The idea that Yeltsin should take premature retirement was mooted as early as June. 
But, since the Family felt that the time was not yet ripe for Putin to enter the fray, 
Stepashin was appointed to fill the gap. The Kremlin's timing proved immaculate. A year 
ago, success looked almost unobtainable. On May 7, Putin— the Kremlin's favorite— was 
inaugurated as president.’
It is difficult and yet amazing to imagine such a carefully executed design coming to fruition in 
Russia of 1999, but it is nevertheless worth mentioning this theory here.
Predicting the actual election, in a poll of 1,278 people conducted during the first ten days of 
December by the reliable Institute for Comparative Social Research and reported on in Moscow 
Times, Unity was holding a tie with the Communists at 19%.  Fatherland-Russia held only 9.2% 
percent of the poll.377  This was despite the fact that, in the realm of public opinion, Unity was
375 Wyman, Matthew, ‘Elections and Voters,’ Developments in Russian Politics. Edition 5. (eds.) Stephen White, 
Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 66.
376 Teague, Elizabeth, ‘The Seven Labors of Gleb Pavlovsky,’ Prism, Vol. 6, Issue 5, 30 May 2000, 
http://www.iamestown.org/publications  details.php?volume  id=7&issue  id=433&article  id=3736.
377 http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol4/ed0420.html. As of 1  July 2004.
225only a few months old in contrast to the relative ‘tradition’ of the Communist party and the far 
younger (but still old compared to Unity) Fatherland All-Russia bloc.
This support for such a young party is due to chiefly three factors: the weakness of social support 
and loyalty mentioned by Russian public opinion for any given party, the onset of the Russian 
pro-Kremlin mass media against Fatherland-All Russia and the support for Unity by the image 
building new Prime Minister.  Also, that same poll showed more people trusted the Kremlin- 
sponsored378 ORT (45%) than the still-independent NTV (28%).  (Support for war, it must be 
added, was put at 64%, with that amount saying that they fully or rather supported the war.) 
ROMIR had similar polling results on assessing parties, but showing Unity even in the lead
^70
against the Communists (21.9% to 17.7%).  Reasons for this support can be seen in the 
tradition of Russian public opinion at the time.  It had been a long time since Russian public 
opinion had had a leader and a party overtly supported by that same leader that appeared to be 
strong and gave some small degree of hope in the strength of Russia.
An opinion piece in Izvestiia by the president of the Policy Foundation, Viacheslav Nikonov,
added a perspective on this parliamentary race.  Given new laws and restrictions on parties by
"10(\
the state  , but the lack of attention to similar laws banning state media political advertising, the 
election became more of a ‘battle between state-owned media and individual candidates and
. ■   ?  381 parties.
On the question of Putin’s progression, and final election, to the Presidency, further government 
influence of the media was in many ways apparent:
378 Owned by the state plus Berezovsky plus others.
379 Karush, Sarah, ‘MT Poll: Shoigu’s Bloc Is Soaring,’ Moscow Times, Issue 1859, 15 Dec.  1999, EastView, 
http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=236442.
380 Thereby disqualifying parties and candidates for the slightest of reasons.
381 Nikonov, Viacheslav, ‘Particularities aside, vote is
crucial, The Russia Journal, 4-10 December 1999, http://www.cdi.Org/russia/iohnson/3662.html##6.
226Moving on into the first months after the recommencement of the conflict, political 
commentators focussed on the new Prime Minister and the election of 2000.  At this time, 
between August and December 1999, Putin’s hold on being Prime Minister was far from being 
assured.  His control over the mass media was in hindsight strikingly an infant version of what it 
would come to be in 2002.  The famous host of the program Itogi on NTV, Yevgeni Kiselev, 
even dared to suggest that Putin was a member of Boris Yeltsin’s ‘family,’382 meaning that Putin 
might be more connected to Yeltsin’s corruption than was projected by many media sources.
According to Igor Malashenko, NTV dared to defy candidate Putin, even well after his ascent to 
acting President and after tanks and infantry began their assault on Chechnya.383
Militarily, this time the attack in Chechnya was from two sides, with one side led by General 
Vladimir Shamanov and the other side of the pincer movement led by General Gennadi Troshev. 
Later Shamanov became ‘Governor’ Shamanov of Ulianovsk.  In the second Chechen war, he 
was known for his excessive cruelty.  This new aggressive strategy painted a strong backdrop 
for the new Prime Minister that had risen to his position on the issue.
The sudden and unexpected retirement of President Boris Yeltsin on New Year’s Eve, thereby 
surrendering power to his new Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, acted as cement for the legacy of 
Yeltsin himself.  Because of Yeltsin’s open expressions of support for his successor, and also 
because he was still something of a mystery, Russian public opinion did not waver in support. 
Further to this:
382 Whitmore, Brian. ‘Prime Minister’s Popularity Rating Skyrockets,’ Moscow Times, Issue 1848, 30 November 
1999, EastView, http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=236189.
383 Terror 1999 website: http://eng.terror99.ru/issues/.
384 See Reynolds, Maura, ‘Russia’s ‘Cruel’ Soldier Comes Home,’ LA  Times, 20 January 2001, Prague Watchdog: 
http://www.watchdog.cz/index.php?show=000000-000008-000001-000028&lang=l  as of 30 June 2004.
227‘Yeltsin’s resignation, elevating Putin to the presidency before the election, gave the 
latter a huge advantage.’
Also, ‘Putin’s exceptionally high popularity in opinion polls at the time had put off many 
potential candidates’385 for the coming Presidential election.  It must be said that, for all of 
Yeltsin’s faults, his decisiveness on deciding on a successor and then following through on his 
decision, are somewhat impressive.
Another facet of the resignation was the fact that Putin could take less of a political gamble in 
relation to Chechnya if elections were held sooner rather than later.  There was less chance of the 
war flying out of control if this was the case.  During this period in time, the war in Chechnya 
had not yet gained the stability that it would develop in later years.
Despite the fact that a cloud of mystery held firm over Putin’s head, many elites were happy to 
see Yeltsin retire quietly and have a smooth but fast transition to a new administration, as 
opposed to the chaos that might ensure should there be an election where competitive forces vied 
for the Presidency.  Russia still has yet to have a truly competitive election and then a move to
*
power by the electoral victor.  The transition to Putin’s Presidency in the New Year 2000 put off 
this possibility for many years to come.  Indeed, as alleged by Daniel Treisman, in this period the 
‘Family’ moving into the Putin era was stronger than ever:
‘Two and a half years later [by 2002], however, the “family” remains stronger as ever.
The chief of staff Putin inherited from Yeltsin, Alesandr Voloshin, acts as the kingpin for 
this clique, and the prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, is seen as defending the clan’s 
economic interests.  It is true that the “family” now faces challenges from a newer, “St.
385 Previous two quotes from: Wyman, Matthew, ‘Elections and Voters,’ Developments in Russian Politics. Edition 
5* (eds.) Stephen White, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 71.Petersburg” clan— an odd combination of FSB officers and liberal economists from the 
northern city.  But the latter group has not wrenched control of the economic bureaucracy 
from the Muscovites.  Putin, rather than reducing the powers of such clans as promised, 
has maneuvered between them in a manner reminiscent of Yeltsin.’386
As no doubt was expected by Yeltsin and Putin, the media took the transition well.
‘In 1999-2000, a few attempts by some channels were made to support other candidates, 
but at the end, they all supported President Putin, at that time, Yeltsin’s nominated 
successor.’387
Despite some previously mentioned commentary by NTV in December, Putin was seen being 
outside the reputed Yeltsin ‘family’ and his portrayed image of a quiet active ‘fighting’ Prime 
Minister reflected this.  For instance, his well-publicised New Year’s Eve trip to Chechnya to 
hand out hunting knives to Russian field troops was a stunning counterpoint to Yeltsin’s tired
•>QO
presidential mannerisms.
In the realm of public opinion, with a little help and direction from Putin’s media policy, it 
quickly became unfashionable to speak about Yeltsin’s possible criminal behaviour.  Happy that 
the transition went well, Yeltsin himself recounts how happy he was when on 7 January 
following his resignation; he attended the Bolshoi theatre and was given a standing ovation.  He
T O Q
was able simply to disappear from the political scene as the proud ‘first president of Russia.’
386 Treisman, Daniel, ‘Russia Renewed?’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 6, Nov.-Dee. 2002, p. 60.  (pp. 58-72)
387 Rantanen, Terhi, The Global and the National, p. 34.
388 Truscott, Peter, Putin’s Progress. Simon and Schuster, London, 2004, pp.  120-121.
389 Yeltsin, Boris, Midnight Diaries. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 2000, pp. 370 - 371.
229It is also an issue in this chapter as to how Russian public opinion seems to have accepted the 
positive portrayal of the war shown by the Russian government, and that the government did not 
respect any bounds as to how far it could go to create this impression.  The information war 
therefore would be won whatever the costs.
In all wars waged by democratic countries, the government seeks to provide a good basis for 
initiating military action.  Also, rules set down by democratic governments support the ideal of 
operational secrecy and security regarding press coverage.  In most democratic countries, the 
media are never at risk from their own government, but do in fact ‘bridle at the bit,’ in wanting to 
get all information and go anywhere in order to attempt to get the full story from troops and 
commanders in the field.  There is a naturally oppositional relationship between the journalist 
who wants more independence, and the democratic government, which wants a more limited 
positive picture of events.
However, the Russian government took a more direct and serious approach in regard to the 
second Chechen war than previously.  In the Andrei Babitsky case, the Russian government and 
armed forces decided to scapegoat a single journalist and make an example out of him to warn 
away other journalists.  It is interesting to look at the events taking place, and the effects on 
Russian public perception and reception of information.
Another point is that Babitsky was far from being a hardcore rebellious journalist against the 
Russian Chechen initiative.  Most of his articles simply reported the facts of what was happening 
in the region.  For example, in an article for the Institute of War and Peace Reporting in October 
1999, Babitsky stated that:
230‘The war is not unpopular among the general public in Russia.  Familiar anti-Chechen 
fear and prejudice, plus the shock of the devastation caused by the city apartment bombs 
last month, leaves the clear majority of the Russian public ready to support a full-scale 
military assault.’390
No other part of the article seems any more ‘rebellious’ than this.  In fact, these words seem 
quite judicious and are indeed far from the anti-Russian traitorous angry journalist portrayed by 
the Putin administration.
Only a cursory glance needs to be taken at this situation.  Andrei Babitsky was a journalist for 
Radio Liberty risking his life in attempting to report on the war during the early stages of the 
conflict and then bringing the information out of Chechnya.  Given tight government restriction, 
and his venturing into places that the Russian army and government did not want him to be, the 
job was a highly dangerous one, even more than normal war coverage around the world, in view 
of the Russian government’s new second war restrictions and manipulation of mass media.
Attempting to bring out from Chechnya press coverage materials, Babitsky was picked up by the 
Russian army in January 2000 and taken to Chemokozovo filtration camp (one of several such 
‘filtration camps’).  There, his materials were taken and he was beaten.  According to the 
Russian government, because Babitsky was a person serving the Chechen rebels (due only to his 
coverage of the war, the Russian government had no demonstrable proof of this), Babitsky 
supposedly ‘agreed’ to be traded to the Chechen rebels in exchange for Russian Prisoners of 
Wars (POWs).  This by itself is a violation of the 1954 Geneva agreements on POWs, but 
nevertheless, after being ‘traded’ (no one has stated exactly what happened), Babitsky eventually
390 Babitsky, Andrei, ‘Total War - Or a Battle for Hearts and Minds?’ Institute of War and Peace Reporting, 15 
October 1999, pp 1-2.*5 Q   1
turned up in Makhachkala, Dagestan in March 2000 much the worse for wear.  Later, from 2-6 
October 2000 in Makhachkala, he was put on trial by Russian authorities and found guilty of 
using false documentation (but was amnestied because of a Duma resolution on the 55 
anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War.)
To this day, very few independent observers are sure of what exactly happened; only perhaps 
Putin and the FSB know the full story.  In the pessimistic point-of-view, it was not simply 
enough for the Russian government to put a journalist they did not like in a filtration camp, 
which can be considered from most reports as to be the next thing closest to a Stalinist or Nazi 
concentration camp  , but they also felt that they could trade him to the enemy because they 
believed, falsely or not, that such a journalist reporting stories that the government and army did 
not like was working for the enemy.  The details and morality of this event could produce a 
thesis in and of itself, but for our purposes, the only thing important is its relevance in 
examination of the role of the media and Russian public opinion during the second Chechen war.
Other journalists in Russia, NTV, and governments and various human rights groups around the 
world reacted with horror at such a developing situation.  The response from Putin and his 
government was one of dismissal.  One general even stated that he would trade ten Babitskys for 
one Russian soldier.394  They characterized Babitsky as working for the enemy, and on top of 
that, simply said that Babitsky had even ‘asked’ to be traded to the Chechen rebels.  Putin 
himself stated that tolerating Babitsky was ‘much more dangerous than firing a machine gun.’395
391 For one of many perspectives, see Pustintsev, Boris, ‘Russia’s Media: Back to the USSR?’ Citizen's Watch, 
Perspective, Vol.  10, No. 4, March-April 2000, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol 10/Pustintsev.html.
392 Izmailov, Viacheslav, ‘The Babitsky Trial: Rule of Law,’ Novaia gazeta, specific newspaper date not given, 
translated in Perspective, Vol. 9, No. 2, Nov.-Dee. 2000, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/voll 1/Izmailov.html.
393 Amnesty International, ‘Chechnya: Rape and torture of children in Chemokozovo “filtration camp,” 23 March 
2000, http://web.amnestv.org/librarv/Index/ENGEUR460192000?open&of=ENG-RUS.
394 Dardekin, Sergei, ‘A my za odnogo rossiiskogo otdali by desif marshalov Sergeevykh,’ Novye Izvestiia, Issue 
20, 5 Feb 2000, EastView, http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=3420322.
395 Truscott, Peter, Putin’s Progress. Simon and Schuster, London, 2004, p.  130.
232His view of Babitsky was that he was an enemy combatant, who was spreading disinformation 
for the enemy.
Some politicians did speak out, although to little effect in the long run.  Sergei Yushenkov,
“ lQ f.
Duma deputy for the Union of Right Forces referred to Babitsky in these terms:
‘It is clear that the authorities are giving an example of what the attitude toward 
journalists and freedom of the press in general will be if the press coverage doesn’t 
respond with what the government and the acting president want.’
Other politicians, like Gennadi Seleznev, the Speaker of the State Duma expressed a degree of 
sympathy for Babitsky.397  As a side note, in April 2003, Yushenkov was found murdered under
398 mysterious circumstances.
The argument of the Putin administration seemed to carry the day.  This portrayal of the 
Babitsky saga seemed to rub off on Russian public opinion too, thereby giving the impression 
that the Russian government was able to get away with almost anything.  Russian public opinion 
simply let much of the issue pass without raising much of an uproar.  Only about 300 people, 
half  journalists, showed up at a rally in his support.399
The point that the Russian government would simply hand over a Russian citizen to the enemy 
for any reason was lost on the vast majority of public opinion.  This was perhaps the greatest 
sign of the Russian government’s policy for attempting to manipulate Russian public opinion by
396 Lambroschini, Sophie, ‘Russia: Politicians, Media Criticize Government Over Babitsky,’ RFE/RL,  10 February 
2000
397 Lambroschini, Sophie, ‘Russia: Politicians, Media Criticize Government Over Babitsky,’ RFE/RL, 10 February 
2000.
398 ‘Yushenkov Murder Linked to Chechnya?’ Chechnya Weekly, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 4, Issue 8, 24 April 
2003, website: http://www.iamestown.org/publications_details.php7volume  id=13&issue  id=555&article  id=3945.
399 Yakov, Valery, ‘Sevodnia Babitskii, zavtra - ty,’ Novye Izvestiia, Issue 25,  12 February 2000, EastView, 
http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=3420577.
233use of the mass media, even perhaps on a scale that the early Pre-Putin proponents of the policy 
never could have imagined.
Babitsky’s treatment, and also the treatment of other journalists during the second war, is in 
marked contrast to how journalists were handled during the first Chechen war.  It is true that 
some journalists during the first war were arrested for doing the most extreme interviews with 
Chechen leaders, but rarely if ever were their prosecutions seriously followed up.  During the 
first war, journalists generally had not had to fear the Russian government more than the 
Chechen rebels.
From May 2000 onwards, Russia saw the final moves being made against the then last 
nationwide television network that was not under nominal government control or influence. 
NTV had been the source of much criticism of the war and of Putin, and had been the most 
objective in regard to journalistic cover of the second Chechen war.
‘The only television network that refused to follow the authorities’ new rules was 
Vladimir Gusinsky’s NTV.’400
A sequence of events during the period shortly after the election of Putin as President was set in 
motion that would basically rob NTV of its independent status from governmental ownership or 
influence.  This time period, which continued on into its final fall in 2001, signalled the end of 
this station that had the longest tradition of free television media in the country.
While the main issue of the attack on NTV was its free media stance, secondarily it was also 
connected to the attack on the independent variable that was its owner, ‘oligarch’ Vladimir
400 Trenin, Dmitri V. and Alexei V. Malashenko with Anatol Lieven, Russia’s Restless Frontier. Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2004, p.  146.Gusinsky, and stemmed partially from the low assessment in which oligarchs were already held 
in Russian public opinion.
Research from a paper from the winter of 1997 already explored the beginning of this issue.  As 
David Mason and Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson write in an article from Slavic Review in 
regard to surveys asking about whether it is okay for businessmen to make good profits because 
everyone eventually benefits:
‘On this question, as with many others, it seems that the early enthusiasm for capitalism, 
and especially for profits, had diminished somewhat five years into the transition.  It 
would be too much to say, however, that Russians were opposed to business profits; 
rather their orientation was more ambivalent.  One could argue, in fact, that the 1996 
responses were more sensible and realistic than the overwhelming support for business 
profits in 1991—support much higher than that of any of the capitalist countries in our 
sample in that year.’401
July 2000 ROMIR polling data indeed continued to reveal that business tycoons were in fact 
very vulnerable to attack from the Russian government.  In regard to the ‘crusade’ against 
Vladimir Gusinsky, of which the assault on NTV was a definitive part, the highest percentage, 
32%, thought that the ‘activities of the prosecutor’s office’ were ‘justified.’  28% thought that it 
was part of a new distribution of property, which, according to other polling data, was not an 
unpopular idea when considering Russia’s business tycoons.  Only 11% replied with the most
401 Mason, David S. and Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson, ‘Public Opinion and the 1996 Elections in Russia: 
Nostalgic and Statist, Yet Pro-Market and Pro-Yeltsin,’ Slavic Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, Winter 1997, p. 705. (pp. 
698-717)sceptical answer, that such a ‘crusade’ was the action of a new hard-liner regime.402  Attitudes 
like these made Gusinsky highly vulnerable in relation to the Kremlin.
Given NTV’s past, if the Russian government was looking to solidify its hold on public media 
and fulfil Putin’s campaign promise of reigning in the oligarchs, then it was a natural first target. 
The fact that NTV was the most objective in dealing with the new war in Chechnya sealed its 
fate.  NTV had built up debt with Gazprom for operating expenses, including the cost of 
launching a communications satellite for nation-wide transmission.403  This of course made NTV 
increasingly vulnerable.  NTV/Media-MOST had not been completely blind to its possible 
vulnerability.  Gazprom (allegedly at the Kremlin’s behest) called in the debt and NTV was in 
effect bankrupted.404  Evidently, Gusinsky had initially felt that he could weather the ‘storm’ and 
still have some leeway in dealing with the Putin administration, when he in fact could not.
One must say that it is common throughout the world for such private companies to take out 
loans and then have them called back in, for it is the right of the lender to ask for money back, in 
instalments or in total depending on what is agreed to.  However, out of all the companies in 
Russia that borrowed money, even from Gazprom itself, only NTV became the target of this 
change in financial loan status.  There are two possibilities: (1) it was a coincidence; (2) it was 
intentional.  In the end, it was probably intentional, looking at the circumstances of the loan 
recall, Gazprom’s ownership divide, and the desires of the Russian government at the time.
There was little question as to the influence of Putin over Gazprom.
402 ROMIR, ‘Othnoshenie rossiian k situatsii vokrug Vladimira Gusinskovo I drugikh oligarkhov,’ Survey taken 
nationally of 2000 respondents in 40 federal districts. Web site:
http://web.archive.org/web/20000829181615/www.romir.ru/socpolit/vvps/07  2000/gusinsky .htm
403 Fossato, Floriana and Anna Kachkaeva, ‘Russia: The Origins of a Media Empire,’ RFE/RL, Moscow, 13 March 
1998, http://www.rferl.Org/features/1998/03/F.RU.980313140126.asp.
404 Volkov, Vladimir and Stanislav Smolin, ‘The Kremlin assumes control over the NTV oppositional television 
station,’ World Socialist Website, 21 April 2001, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/apr2001/russ-a21.shtml.
See also: Hoffman, David E., The Oligarchs. Public Affairs, New York, 2002, pp. 482-483.
236‘President Putin has declared his intention to increase governmental influence over the 
company and has already taken steps to block the transfer of Gazprom’s assets to other 
subsidiaries or affiliated entities or the dilution of its holdings without board approval.’405
More specifically, Lilia Shevtsova of the Carnegie Foundation makes the case that not only did 
Gusinsky and his media forces attempt to oppose the new Kremlin hierarchy, but that Gusinsky 
himself tried to demand concessions from Putin in a direct or personal way.406  Nevertheless, 
whatever the motives might have been, Putin could simply say no to Gusinsky, for it was the 
media empire of Gusinsky and particularly NTV that Putin saw as the more direct potential 
threat.
Russian public opinion, reflecting their sympathy with the image of Russia and of its media as 
directed by Putin, was not hostile to these actions against NTV.  The end result was that Russia 
was less free afterwards than it was before.  Russian public opinion received a less unbiased 
view of the Chechen war from other more popular television stations, particularly those, as stated 
before, which were owned or connected to the government.
With the year 2001 fall of NTV into subservience to the Russian government, there appeared a 
stampede of Russia’s most independent television journalists, among them well-known anchor 
Yevgeni Kiselev, looking for new work.  They found a home in TV-6, which was an independent 
television station majority owned by Boris Berezovsky, who was managing to broadcast 
nationwide through another maze of dealings.407  Although it existed without the name and 
traditions of NTV (which was not so old itself) TV-6 was then able to offer a counterpoint to 
state-owned or state- indirectly owned television stations.
405 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The Investment Environment in the Russian 
Federation. OECD, 2001, p. 50.
406 Shevtsova, Lilia, Putin’s Russia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, p. 94.
407  Szabo, Gabor, ‘Russia’s Media Melee Enters New Round,’ The Russia Journal, 19-25 October 2001, No. 4, 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/iohnson/5501-4.cfm.In the first days of 2002, the Russian government made moves to shut down TV-6 through the 
use of financial laws.  In this case, LUKOil owned a minority interest against Boris Berezovsky 
who had two-thirds ownership.  Relative to its closeness to the Kremlin, LUKOil brought TV-6 
to the attention of authorities by saying that TV-6 possessed debts which were beyond its size 
(TV-6 had gone into debt for operational expenses).  This was only possible in the strange world 
of Russian law by applying a law that says that basically, to make a long story short, all assets 
must balance out debts over the long term.408  Of course it is an impossible law for most Russian 
businesses, which would all be instantly in violation if they took out a loan but did not have the 
corresponding value in hard currency or assets.  Nevertheless, a Russian judge ruled for LUKOil 
On a stranger note, the law was due to expire on 1  January 2002, but was still applied after this 
date.
However arcane, the primary purpose for including this account here is to examine how these 
dealings affect media independence in relation to Russian public opinion and the second 
Chechen war.  When commenting on the subject, usually informally, the Russian government 
portrayed TV-6 as merely a tool of Boris Berezovsky, who was the richest and best known of all 
of the oligarchs going back through the entire Yeltsin era.  This made Berezovsky another chief 
target in Putin’s push against unfavoured oligarchs.
There existed in this period for the first time the feeling that Putin was truly preparing to knock 
off oligarchs one by one, particularly if they became involved in Russian politics.  All the while, 
as perhaps Wall Street Journal Europe said it best, Putin ‘portrayed himself as a disinterested 
observer of obscure legal battles between private actors before an independent judiciary.’409 
Outside of the time periods covered in this thesis, Putin’s indirect approach towards possible
408‘Law and Pravda,’ Johnson’ s Russia List, 14 January 2002, http.7/www.cdi.org/russia/iohnson/6023-8.cfm.
409 Ibid.
238enemies has carried over past the time covered in this thesis with the arrest of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and the ensuing destruction of his oil company Yukos.
Returning to 2002, TV-6 was showing footage that the Russian government did not approve of.
In reference to the destruction of a school and hospital by Russian soldiers, Human Rights Watch 
notes that Russian TV-6 broadcasted footage of the aftermath of these events.410  This made it a 
threat, and in the eyes of the Russian government, an access road to the public that must be shut 
down.
In 2002, ROMIR asked Moscovites why they thought the closing of TV-6 took place.  26% 
thought it was simply an economic conflict between the owners.  20% thought it was a struggle 
between oligarchs.  16% thought it was a struggle of creative control, possibly involving 
Kiselyov personally.  4% blamed the government’s struggle against free speech and 9% found 
other reasons, while 26% had no answer.411   From this representative survey, at least in Moscow, 
public opinion seemed to not consider the government to be a threat to media freedom.
Later in 2002, in regard to press affairs, the Kremlin felt some direct modification to journalistic 
guidance from the state was necessary after the Nord-Ost theatre siege.  This is the case because 
some television shows, particularly from NTV (who briefly showed relatives of the hostages in 
the theatre), had annoyed the Kremlin over the course of the crisis.  The Press Ministry had 
sixteen recommendations for journalists covering such a situation, and all sixteen suggestions 
carried with them the threat of prosecution if they were not obeyed.
410 See ‘Russia/Chechnya,’ Human Rights Watch, Vol.  14, No. 2 (D), p. 39, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/russchech/chech02Q2.pdf
411 ROMIR, ‘Sotsial’no-politicheskaia zhen’ Rossii v zerkale obshchestvennovo mneniia,’ January 2002, Survey of 
500 adult Moscovites, http://www.romir.ru/socpolit/socio/2002/02  2002/russia-life-ianuarv.htm.
239All told, the sixteen ‘recommendations’ were clearly designed to ‘suggest’ to journalists that 
they should report only what the state asked them to report.  Filled with vague statements that 
could be modified to cover any free thought in a journalistic setting this represented nothing but 
more manipulation of Russia’s already manipulated press freedom.  Combined with this, offices 
of the weekly newspaper ‘ Versia ’ were stormed the night before articles questioning the raid 
were published.  Both of these actions by the Russian government represent yet more restriction 
on press freedom.412
Perhaps the most extensive point to make on the Russian government’s attempts to control the 
media can be seen in regard to the thought processes of those who actually try to report on 
Chechen events, or more broadly, in regard to Russian media as a whole.  As well summarized 
by the Russian editor Masha Lippman and the professor and Russia analyst Michael McFaul:
‘...another consequence of the campaign against Media-MOST, NTV, and TV-6 is self­
censorship.  Journalists and political commentators realize that there are real risks in 
going too far in criticizing the government.  Some have decided to quit their profession 
altogether.’413
Those who push forward, as did Andrei Babitsky and, in another example, Anna Politkovskaya, 
have met layers of obstacles to deter them.  In Babitsky’s case, this took the form of his 
unpredictable detainment and the trading of his person between two sides in a war zone and, in 
Politkovskaya’s case, frequent arrest and death threats leading to the necessity of her having to 
temporarily flee the country.  In 2006, this led, as many allege, to Politkovskaya’s death.
412 Zolotov Jr, Andrei, ‘Ministry Draft Guidelines for ‘Media,’ Moscow Times, 05 November 2002, Issue 2559, 
http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=4474594.
413 Lippman, Masha and Michael McFaul, ‘Putin and the Media,’ Putin’s Russia, (ed.) Dale R. Herspring, Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Oxford UK, 2003, p. 77.
240Yet, as especially in Politkovskaya’s case, some continued at the time to question authority and 
delve into Chechen war affairs.  An interview with her in 2003 has been published in which she 
asks whether Russian special services had a role in organizing the 2002 Dubrovka theatre 
siege.414  Always the daring journalist, even with Putin’s media intimidation, Politkovskaya was 
frequently the outspoken voice.  As far-fetched and interesting as the prospect of Russian secret 
service support of the incident sounds, one must be impressed by the fact that there is still 
someone around to ask the toughest questions.  For a detailed listing of the abuse of journalistic 
freedom by the Russian government, look no further than the group ‘Reporters sans Frontieres’ 
which, it must be said, has done an excellent job of trying to document the curbing of press 
freedom, both in Russia and worldwide.415
This is all despite the fact that many polls show that Russian public opinion clearly support 
‘freedom of the press.’  Nevertheless, a clear indifference exists to government manipulation of 
this ‘freedom.’416  There is one clear way to address this apparent inconsistency, and that is to 
examine the second Chechen war from the standpoint of saying that the ‘ends’ justifies the 
‘means’.  Success and the cohesiveness of the country, in effect, over-ride the examination of the 
actions used to arrive there.
From a Western point-of-view, this indifference by Russian public opinion would be considered 
to be somewhat immoral, but from the point-of-view of Russian public opinion, Russia’s actions 
should not be addressed from that Western standpoint, but only from the situation and 
environment inside Russia itself.  Also, the Russian government had no interest in provoking 
attention to its policies in Chechnya and endangering the carefully built public relations portrayal 
of the conflict that the administration built.
414 In English, Interview of Anna Politkovskaia by Human Rights Information, Press Release 413, 7 May 2003: 
http://eng.terror99.ru/publications/099.htm
415 Reporters sans Frontieres homepage:  http://www.rsf.fr.  More specifically in the Russian case: 
http://www.rsf.fr/article.php37id  article=4874
416 Lippman and McFaul. ‘Putin and the Media,’ Putin’s Russia, p. 78.
241•  The media position
During the intervening years between the two wars in Chechnya, Russian media made little 
attempt to ‘rehabilitate’ the idea of the Chechen bandit in the Russian ‘mindset.’  From the end 
of hostilities in the first war, few attempts were made by the mass media to accept Chechens, or 
north Caucasians in general, as being a part of Russian society.
In fact, there were continued attempts by media sources to discredit Chechens:
‘Particularly since the resumption of regular military operations in 1999, the Chechens 
have been portrayed in the media and by politicians as ‘treacherous’ and ‘savage’ 
enemies of Russia, who threaten its religious and cultural traditions.’417
It must be said that the conditions for a second war were made all the more possible in this pre- 
Putin era when the major media still had at least some independence without repression by state 
policy.
In response to Putin’s policies, many journalists have sought to still cover the war, but as 
discussed before, crackdowns on journalistic freedom in the second war have been significant. 
Also, this has forced the government’s viewpoint to permeate through Russian culture.  During 
the period studied, there have been few major interviews with Chechen field commanders during 
the second war, especially without legal implication for the conducting journalist.
417 Tolz, Vera, ‘Values and the Construction of a National Identity,’ Developments in Russian Politics 5. (eds.) 
Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 277.
242‘In 1995 the Russian government lost the propaganda war by default. This time it made 
every effort to control the media and ensure that its view of the war dominated public 
opinion. Russia won this information war from day one of the fighting and is still 
winning. The government and military control access to combatants and censor reporting 
that could undermine support for the war. Reports of Russian military successes have 
fueled support for military activities among the populace.’418
Corresponding to this point:
‘With few exceptions, Russian journalists have not complained about the media 
management, and instead have picked up much of the military's jargon, such as 
references to ‘working’ in the city instead of bombing or assaulting.’419
Again in the area of television, the beginning of the war prompted the three major Russian 
network channels to divide up coverage of the war as they had during the first war.  RTR 
(Channel Two, fully state-owned station) and Channel One OTR (51 percent state-owned) took a 
harder line, more governmental view of the situation in Chechnya, using the Russian 
government’s guidelines as such, and NTV had a more free, journalistic point-of-view of the 
war, willing to look at the war objectively and so on.  Of all the television channels, only these 
three extended to covering all of Russia.  As said before, this order of television journalism was 
created during the first war, but this state of affairs would not however endure the second time 
around.
418 Thomas, Timothy L., ‘Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned,’ Military Review, Foreign Military Studies 
Office, Fort Leavenworth KS, July-August 2000,
http://fTnso.leavenworth.armv.mil/fmsopubs/issues/groznv2000/groznv2000.htm.
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243Some discussion should be had on why, during much of the time period after the first Chechen 
war, NTV was not the most popular television station even though it was independent.  In fact, 
ORT was the most popular for news during much of this time period despite the fact that ORT 
was much more likely to toe the stated government line.  The best explanation for this is that 
‘viewers’ tastes change slowly, and they are inclined to their old viewing habits.’420  On the 
subject of news reportage, Sarah Oates attributes this conservative stance to the Soviet 
experience of many ordinary Russians, in that they are able to ‘filter’ out the important material 
and let the rest pass.
‘Ordinary Russians, in fact, seem relatively comfortable with the idea of the media as a
political player, rather than an unbiased watchdog or commentator on political life.’421
Obviously, it is different with the younger post-Soviet generation, but with the older crowd, this 
is a justifiable position with some merit.  The older mindset stood to benefit the Russian 
government in the 1999-present era on Chechnya.
Journalists responded to the threat of repression by seeking other means for reporting 
information, often by changing from media outlet to outlet.  As stated before, Russian television 
over the course of this war would become almost a bargaining chip of the government.  Such 
journalists who sought to fight to maintain their independence were driven from one place to the 
next as the Russian government turned its attention, but rarely in a direct way, on each 
successive independent channel that arose. Hence, between 1999 and 2002, this was the case for 
NTV and then its successor TV-6.  In both instances, it would be proven true that ‘the media’s
420 Rantanen, Terri, The Global and the National, p.  101.
421 Oates, ‘Politics and the Media,’ Developments, p. 266.
244precarious financial position facilitated the re-assertion of state power,’422 even more so than 
during the first conflict.
Interviews with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and Chechen spokesman Movladi Udugov 
have met with threats to the journalists involved that would have been unheard of with NTV’s 
coverage of the first war.  No longer will they be only legally prosecuted as in the first war with 
Yelena Masyuk (as mentioned previously), but in the second war, they will also be dealt with as 
traitors, as was the case with Babitsky and Politkovskaya, who have been shown to have 
experienced their own unique brutal punishments for their outspokenness during the second 
conflict.
Of course that in spite of Putin’s war on media, coverage was never completely silenced, and 
many Russians saw pictures and heard reports of the carnage on occasion.  It is undeniable that 
human casualties in this segment of the war were unbelievably atrocious.  Houses, farms, and 
anything dotting the landscape were bombed or put under artillery fire.  As covered previously 
from a strategic/tactical standpoint, civilians experienced the frequently indiscriminate use of 
heavy weapons.423  Much as happened during the first war, many Russian soldiers did not care 
what they were attacking as long as it was not their fellow Russian troops (which was not always 
a guaranteed fact).
Needless to say, this type of warfare caused a torrent of refugees to attempt to leave Chechnya, 
usually towards the east and Dagestan, or north towards Stavropol Krai.  Unlike during the first 
war, however, the Russian government made much more of an effort to seal off the region, 
professing the belief that Chechnya would be safe in a short amount of time and in order to
422 Belin, Laura, ‘The Russian Media in the 1990s,’ Russia After Communism, (eds.) Rick Fawn and Stephen White, 
Frank Cass, London, 2002, p. 154.
423 For an in-depth study of this tragedy, especially from eyewitness accounting, see Politkovskaya, Anna, A Dirty 
War. Harvill Press, London, 2001.
245prevent media sources from seeing a large amount of the rather gruesome treatment inflicted on 
these peoples.  The borders were frequently sealed, both for entrance and for exit, causing long 
lines of refugees to form on the border, going in both directions.424  Nevertheless, there were 
‘filtration’ camps built in surrounding areas, but these became holding areas for those who 
arrived first, then becoming forbidden areas once the Russian Army proclaimed an area ‘free of 
rebels.’  There are countless stories of people trapped at the border and in these refugee camps, 
many of them horrific and unnerving.425
Yet, the Russian media frequently chose not to transmit the full scope of this tragedy back to 
television sets throughout the country.  Journalists like Anna Politkovskaya continued to brave 
Putin’s information war, but had to deal with a Russian public not eager to hear the stories.426 
Counter to this:
‘[...]ffom August to October 1999, the vast majority of private as well as state-owned 
media devoted almost exclusively favourable or neutral coverage to the Russian military 
effort.’427
As suicide bombings became prominent in the Chechen war, so did their coverage by Russian 
media.  The week of 26 June 2000 to 2 July 2000 marked a particularly strong upsurge in this 
type of attack, capped by a single truck bombing over that weekend against a Russian dormitory 
that killed 37 highly trained Russian police in a large explosion.428  This was not the first, and it
424 Eismont, Maria, ‘In the Borderlands of Hell,’ Institute of War and Peace Reporting, p. 1. See: 
www.iwpr.net/index.pl7archive/cau/cau  199910  04  06  eng.txt.
425 Politkovskaya, Anna, A Dirty War. The Harvill Press, London, 2001.
426  See also: Politkovskaya, Anna, Vtorava Chechenskava. Zaharov, 2002.
427 Belin, Laura, ‘Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media,’ Contemporary Russian Politics: Reader, 
(ed.) Archie Brown, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, p. 336.
428 reported on by, among others, Strijbosch, Margareet, ‘New Deadly Tactics in Chechnya,’ Radio Netherlands, 4 
July 2000.
246was not the last, of many such attacks gaining prominence during this war.  Russian media 
sources reacted with horror to this, and further tragedies.429
The Russian government responded predictably, proclaiming that terrorism could not force a 
Russian withdrawal.  The mass media saw this event as connected to foreign intervention in the 
conflict and treated it as such, Russian public opinion agreed with the political direction that 
Putin supported.  VTsIOM data revealed that 54% said they viewed Putin’s performance 
positively, against 15% who said the opposite.430
In dealing with these state policies cutting down on their independence, media outlets either 
adhered to the state line or looked for new financial backing or, in the case of individual 
journalists, searched for new and more secure outlets for employment.  Little else could be done 
in the atmosphere of a moderately successful war as explained in chapter two.
•  Effective policy?
Some debate must be engaged in at this point in order to examine whether this heightened 
concentration of governmental restraint on the media in Russian society has been successful.
From the point-of view of Russian democracy, formal and informal policies on state control of 
media have been repressive, however in terms of perhaps ‘guiding’ Russian public opinion in a 
sympathetic environment where the public is not completely against the war, these policies have 
been effective.  Part of public relations in regard to a war such as this is to make sure the ‘silent 
majority’ of public opinion, which will not speak out against the war, is not unduly impacted by
429 Stulov, Oleg and Mura Muradov, ‘Iz chechenskikh kamikazdze formiruiut bataPoni,’ Kommersant-daily, Issue 
120, 5 July 2000, http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=3700562.
430 Chemega, Yuri, ‘Putin -  “Teflonovii President,” Kommersant-daily, Issue 122, 7 Jul. 2000, EastView, 
http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=3700778.
247the war’s effects or media accounts.  In this sphere, the Putin administration has done well.  As 
stated in chapter two, even though support in polling data is falling for the second war, most of 
the Russian public seems to be willing to allow the Putin administration to handle the matter.
Matters in respect to a successful Russian IW policy have not been helped in favour of the 
Chechen side by the Chechens either, as must be detailed briefly at this stage.
Warlordism in Chechnya by Chechen rebels extended also to attacking foreigners who were aid 
workers and journalists trying to cover the war for international news services.  Earlier in the 
conflict:
‘  victims included six foreign Red Cross workers and four Western telecom engineers 
(three Britons and one New Zealander), whose decapitated bodies were found beside the 
road in the breakaway republic.’431
International journalists were also periodically captured by Chechen forces and held for ransom, 
and were sometimes killed.  This became such a problem that many international news services 
ceased trying to cover the war, leaving only militarily permitted (and hence censored) news 
groups actually there to cover the conflict.  There is of course a large amount of disputable 
evidence in these kidnapping and murder cases, for in many of these circumstances, the truth will 
never be known, but the facts of the matter was that the Russian portrayal of the situation 
prevailed, and the view that Chechens were kidnapping and killing foreigners became 
widespread.  Once again, unlike in the first war, the Chechen side of the conflict failed to make a 
persuasive argument to counter Russian propaganda.
431 Truscott, Peter, Putin’s Progress. Simon and Schuster, London, 2004, p. 98.
248It has be mentioned also that, like during the first war, there were (and are) web sites that posted 
the Chechen point-of-view (Russian and English).  Many of the web sites started in the first war 
have never been completely shut down.  However, in the second war, these have seemed to 
attract less attention and to be merely vehicles for information read by those who study the war 
and not common sources of rallying support.432  Nevertheless, they are produced, albeit with less 
attendant publicity.
Points stated refer back to a number of mistakes.  There were ultimately three reasons why the 
Chechen side failed to disseminate effectively their version of events.
(1) There was a less unified Chechen insurgency, with the influx of political-radical Islam
(2) The dedication of a more ‘unified’ Russian leadership (at least at the top)
(3) a more stringent Russian media and information control
This is also not to say that the Russian public was less interested in news.  Incidents such as the 
fire in the Ostankino tower have also had an incidental effect on media coverage in this time 
period.  Polls taken by ROMIR (of 500 adult Muscovites) after the August 2000 fire in the 
Moscow transmission tower demonstrated that the resulting loss of news reporting was a 
significantly high priority in Russian public opinion.  This fire caused television broadcasting 
from the tower to be shut down, thereby depriving a great many Muscovites of television and 
people in the outlying regions who had no access to cable pay channels (like TNT, Stolitsa 
Channel, and NTV Plus).  88% responded that loss of television was a ‘loss’ or a ‘significant 
loss’ in their life.  Given a list of things (News, Movies, Analytical programs, Entertainment 
programs, etc.) that they would most miss from television (of which they could pick three 
answers), 73% of respondents said they would most miss the news, versus 39% who said they
432 www.kavkazcenter.com. March 2004.
249would miss movies most.433  The first vote by respondents obviously was for news, while the 
other two choices were divided heavily between the other answers.  This underscores once again 
the importance of television in the dissemination of news to the capital and biggest population 
centre of Russia.
Once again it must be said, on the important issue directly on the Chechen war, Putin’s grip on 
the media was not leak-proof.  For another example, in a remarkably open article published in 
Novye izvestiia in July 2002, disclosures by the Russian authorities are summarized.  Stating that 
such openness must be accidental:
‘[...]the fact remains that it was the first time the authorities had admitted so graphically 
that the war in Chechnya is being waged in a completely inept manner and is resulting in 
disastrous losses.’434
This article is reminiscent of articles from the first war, and if it had been printed a month later, it 
no doubt would have also mentioned this next point.
Many tragedies were in fact successfully ‘bypassed’ by the Russian government, if not fully 
covered up.  There are myriad examples of these incidents.  For example, on 19 August 2002, 
another event happened that revealed to what lengths the Russian government’s policy of control 
over the media and resulting top down manipulation of Russian public opinion could survive.
On that date, a Mi-26 Russian military helicopter was shot down at Khankala, killing 156
433 ROMIR, ‘Muscovites Polled Following Fire at Ostankino Television Tower,’ 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010303230505/www.romir.ru/eng/research/ostankino-fire.htm.
434 Yakov, Valery, ‘Ubiistvennyi rekord,’ Novye Izvestiia, Issue 126, 24 Jul. 2002, EastView, 
http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=4234618.Russian servicemen.435  This one event killed more Russian soldiers than in some weeks 
previous combined.
In the military, this event reiterated the fact that, while Russia continued to have a substantial 
presence in the region, it could afford to take losses, although it would be folly to continue to 
make mistakes like overfilling helicopters (Mi-26 helicopters have a cargo capacity of 104 
people, cargo lift and crew436) and then allowing them to be shot down by Chechens.  On few 
occasions, if any, were these facts ever fully communicated to the Russian people, and little 
outcry was noticed among those who knew, since much of public opinion accepted many things 
in the Russian armed forces as being irreparably awful while acknowledging that the Russian 
war in Chechnya, as specified by Putin, must inevitably continue.  In most other democratic 
countries, such incompetence would have been caused a great scandal, but not in Russia.
Here is another contradiction worth noting also.  People missed the news most, but people paid 
only lip servic£ in support of media independence and did not actively defend the independence 
of the news.  This area of study shows a basis for determining support for the policies of the 
Putin administration in Chechnya.  The Russian public has seen in effect what it wanted to see, 
and little more.  There was little demand for detailed examination of the second Chechen war. 
Those journalists who tried to report on the war were speaking to an unsympathetic audience.
•  Conclusions
Overall, it must be concluded that the environment of Russia between 1999 and 2002 was 
conducive to the limitation of media by the Russian state.  Internally, the Russian public had
435 Paukov, Victor and Aleksandr Raskin, ‘Katastrofa, Rossiiskaia voennaia aviatsia ponesla samye krupnye poteri v 
sboei istorii, Vremia novostei, Issue 150, 20 Aug. 2002, EastView, 
http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=4283069.
436 Internet FAQ Archives on Mil Heavy-Lift Helicopters, http://www.faqs.org/docs/air/avhvmil.html.
251decided that although they suspected chaotic policies on the Chechen war, the public had also 
understood that the media could not be trusted also.
Russian public support of the war, although continuing to drift downwards, did not change 
drastically.437  This is yet another representation of Russian public opinion being rather more 
than not in support of the Russian leadership’s judgment in conducting the conflict, albeit with 
some hesitation towards support for war in principle.
As shown from previous chapters as well as this one, the Russian public decided that the issue of 
Chechnya must be resolved with this second war, and although the media did manage to report 
on some grievous events in respect to the conflict, the public decided that little could be done 
about it in respect to the Russian leadership.
A Chief Difference between the Two Wars, and Some Comparisons to the West
Primarily, the question of freedom in mass media as the result of a power vacuum is the crucial 
element of this comparison.  For instance, it is obvious that Putin had a media policy.  It is not so 
obvious that Yeltsin had one.  Trying to directly compare government policies between the two 
wars is something akin to comparing apples and oranges; nevertheless some final points should 
be made.  Indeed, some aspects that were the same in both the Yeltsin period and the Putin 
period are seen differently in each context.
Whereas in the Yeltsin era this anarchical nature of Russia was seen as a source of chaos and 
freedom in media, ‘aiding’ Putin in his media policies after his rise to power is the fact that, 
quoting the head of the Russian Journalists’ Union, Igor Yakovenko, in July 2000, ‘In Russia we
437 Relevant VTsIOM polls from informational bulletins show little noticeable change from their usual vacillation.
252have 89 different regions and 89 different press freedom climates.’438  When Putin sought to 
inhibit press freedom across the country, there was no collective extra-regional opposition.  All 
89 individual climates adapted to Putin as president in their own ways, and in turn only 
possessed their individual resources for combating government pressure to adopt the 
governments position.
During the first Chechen war, the situation was novel in concept on the basis of a democratic 
Russia.  Television frequently had free access to the battlefields in Chechnya and the ability to 
scrutinize policy positions and mistakes in Moscow and other Russian cities.  The Russian 
government put out its own line of course, but few actually commented or displayed it because it 
was so obviously wrong in the vast majority of cases.  Journalists could bribe their way through 
Russian and Chechen lines at will, and rarely were they too impeded in their activities.  Many 
Russian commentators, among them researchers like Boris Kagarlitsky at the Russian Academy 
of Sciences Institute of Comparative Politics439, at the beginning of the second war decried the 
new rise in censorship and predicted its inevitable downfall, thinking that Russian public opinion 
would turn much as did in the first war.  The predicted turn revealed itself to be a false hope, at 
least in the course of the three years that are covered in this chapter.
Also, as mentioned before, in some ways Western democracies have become the benchmarks for 
influencing Russian manipulation of the media.  Generals in Western armed forces have become, 
in the decade following the first Gulf War, sometimes TV generals, briefed and trained in giving 
news conferences and answering journalists’ questions in an appropriate setting.  Garth Jowett
438 Quote from: Owens, Brad, ‘The Independent Press in Russia,’ Civil Society and the Search for Justice in Russia, 
(eds.) Christopher Marsh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Lexington Books, Lanham MD, 2002, p.  108.
439 Kagarlitsky, Boris, ‘Grozny’s 1812 Overture,’ Moscow Times, Issue 1843, 23 November 1999, EastView, 
http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=236083 and Kagarlitsky, Boris, ‘Ministry of Truth Losing The War 
Once Again,’ Moscow Times, Issue 1922, 22 March 2000, EastView, 
http.7/dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.isp?id=225676.
253and Victoria O’Donnell present a comical view of this in their book, Propaganda and 
Persuasion.440
To quote directly from the US Army website, one mission goal is to:
‘Sustain an environment that provides resources to support the advancement of military 
art and science by internal and external audiences.’441
Trained officers at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, take classes on public relations, and, although this is not so practised (or even 
approached in the same fashion) in the Russian army442, leading authorities still sought at times 
to replicate the same ideal in presenting and dealing with the second Chechen war because:
‘Ideologically, the fact that the Federal Forces were fighting terrorists made the war 
understandable to most Russians.’443
For further details of the propaganda in Western countries surrounding the first Gulf war, again 
Jowett and O’Donnell make a number of good points.  They found that propaganda in that case 
was essentially aimed at domestic audiences.  While the coalition against Iraq during the first 
Gulf war was multinational, they put emphasis on:
‘U.S. forces... Other countries, such as Britain, for example, had a quite different set of 
socio-historical contexts and circumstance shaping its propaganda strategies.’444
440 Jowett, Garth S. and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion. 3rd edition, Sage Publications, Thousand 
Oaks CA, London and New Delhi, 1999, p. 316.
441 See www-cgsc.armv.mil.
442 See Troshev, Gennadi, Moia Voina. Vagrius, Moskva, 2001.
443 Thomas, Timothy L., ‘Russian and Chechen ‘Information War’ Tactics,’ The Second Chechen War. Occasional 
Paper No. 40, (ed.) Anne Aldis, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, Sept. 2000, p.  115.
254This is important in that propaganda for the second Chechen war has, and rightly so, a Russo- 
centric attitude that many times only secondarily addresses the international arena (however 
important that is also).
Officially, the presentation of the Chechen war took several forms beginning in January 2000. 
One form was a new system of accreditation for supposedly helping more journalists to visit the 
region, but in fact making independent journalists abide by more rules or risk losing permission. 
Two official military press centres were also set up specifically for the war in Chechnya. 
Combined with daily press conferences by the Kremlin’s spokesman on Chechnya, Sergei 
Yastrzhembsky, and organized trips (organized that is by the military) to Chechnya, this 
structure represented the official media face of the war effort.445  Those journalists who did not 
want to play by these structures found the road ahead to be exceedingly difficult.
While it is true that Russian media has made great advances in news casting since the first war in 
Chechnya, many advanced techniques have been put to propaganda uses during the second war 
in Chechnya.  On the positive side, Robert Coalson of the National Press Institute correctly 
points out for instance that in Russia:
‘More and more of the nation’s papers are including maps, diagrams and charts in their 
reports, a phenomenon that most likely will also help gradually make the texts of articles 
more precise and detailed.’446
Coalson also points out that, in a move full of meaning for debate, the newspaper Moskovskii 
komsomolets, using more advanced graphical techniques, analysed and compared Putin’s 2000
444 Jowett, Garth S. and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 312.
445 Lambroschini, Sophie, ‘Russia: New Information Strategy Echoes the Old,’ RFE/RL, 1  Feb. 2001.
^Coalson, Robert, ‘Media Watch: Rising Use of Infographics,’ Moscow Times, 28 Jul. 2000.
255State of the Union address with Yeltsin’s 1995 address when the country was facing similar 
issues in Chechnya.  Putin, in his address, mentioned Chechnya two times, versus Yeltsin 
mentioning Chechnya 18 times.  Likewise, Yeltsin mentioned democracy 11 times, and reforms 
13 times, whereas Putin mentioned reforms 2 times, and democracy not at all.  Moskovskii 
komsomolets put technology to use with great effect in order to point out the differences between 
the two speeches, and this was but one small indication of its possible usefulness.
When used to support propaganda, these techniques can be used to underpin and support even 
the most false of claims.  Such tactics, when used correctly to that end, focus and magnify the 
desired effects of propaganda, and can make falsehood all the more believable.
Not only was Russia ready to copy NATO’s scripted use of the mass media to forward policy 
goals in Chechnya, but also Russia was willing to use the NATO distance-based style of warfare 
as demonstrated in Kosovo, in order to keep down the number of Russian casualties. This was 
also meant to lessen public hostility to the renewed conflict and to blunt the criticisms of the 
Russian Mothers’ Groups and other such organizations that eventually rose again in protest, 
much as they had during the first war.
‘As the Russian military planners prepared for the next campaign, they realized that, 
whenever possible, it was to the Russian Army’s advantage to keep the Chechens at least 
300 meters away from the conscript Russian ground force.’447
Some of these tactics were used to a small degree in Afghanistan, but they had not been fully 
implemented in that war or during the first Chechen war.  The ideal of massive artillery 
firepower with minimal ground contact was influenced not necessarily in Russian army strategy
447  Grau, Lester W, ‘Technology and the Second Chechen Campaign,’ The Second Chechen War.  Occasional Paper 
No. 40, (ed.) Anne Aldis, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, September 2000, p. 101.training school, nor in the hollows of the Kremlin, but in the mountainous terrain outside of 
Pristina, Kosovo.  This of course came at the expense of civilian casualties, when such heavy 
weapons are used to clear territory in front of the moving army.
‘The damage to Grozny was much more severe during the second campaign.’448
In consideration of these points, the central comparison between the two wars on the media issue 
is one of independence, of technology, and the willingness and ability of the government to 
forward and reinforce its own policies.
Progressive Effects of the Media Restraint Issue on Russian Society
Of course, the media does not have a stranglehold on public opinion in Russia.  As stated 
previously, many ordinary Russians are more sensitive to inaccuracies from all sources.  For 
some, only their own experiences and the experiences of other people they know can be 
concrete.  Tradition holds that Russian society has been lied to for far longer than the existence 
of democratic thinking and, to a large extent, the Russian people translate this, as well they 
should, over to media coverage and entertainment.
It is also the case that the Russian people, and particularly the older generations, have become 
extraordinarily good at picking up lies and noticing small ‘signals’ when watching television and 
other media.  Even the smallest clues can become apparent to the learned Russian eye. 
Manipulation of media for much of their lives has made many in Russia adept at picking out 
such signals.449  However, it is also true that:
449 Ibid, p. 105.
449 Mickiewicz, Ellen, Changing Channels. Revised and Expanded Edition, Duke University Press, Durham NC and 
London, 1999, p. 296 - 301.
257‘[...]the influence of sponsors on media coverage can be subtle and difficult to detect.’450
The reasons for choosing to broadcast or print some stories, and not others, can be linked to 
economic and/or political reasoning.
Russian democracy has been degraded by the efforts of the Russian government at repression of 
the media.  Freedom of the media is of course a fundamental part of any democracy.  In the not- 
so-distant future, Putin will either attempt to remain in office for a third term, or there will be an 
election.  How this will be handled in the future, presumably without a high-profile war to 
artificially boost the next President’s public support, will be a central question to examine in 
regard to the media.
Conclusions
The first war in Chechnya brought an outcry when recruits were slaughtered, forcing Russian 
generals to have to consider the outside view of their actions by Russian public opinion and the 
politicians who were ever mindful of such outcries.  Media assisted this democratic conversion, 
but the repression of the media in the second war has brought a return to authoritarianism.
In reference to the issue of ‘portrayal’ of the wars as indicated in the second point of the chapter 
introduction, both wars were portrayed as ‘necessary’ by each of successive Russian presidential 
administrations.  However, only this portrayal of the second war was effective, due to the 
surrounding environment of changing Russian society, ‘chance’ events and repressive 
governmental policy as outlined in this chapter.
450 Belin, Laura, ‘Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media,’ Contemporary Russian Politics: A 
Reader, (ed.) Archie Brown, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, p. 330.In reference to the first point of the chapter introduction, the Russian government’s newly 
enforced paralegal control of Russian media has now supported what seems to be 
authoritarianism of the elite, with President Putin as its head.  While not on the level of Soviet- 
era official control, continuing events show that in some ways the repression of freedom of the 
press, as also stated by many international organizations, is no less complete than 15 years ago. 
This development has been established in large part through the ongoing policy of the Russian 
government towards the Chechen situation.  With few other issues could the Russian government 
have strong-armed independent media to such a degree.  This is not to say that there are 
absolutely no independent media sources in Russia, for there are in large part, but they do not 
have national coverage and/or they are not financially free.
The Russian public has been more willing to accept this state of affairs, by virtue of a new 
perception of an enhanced necessity of the second war in Chechnya.  In this context, media 
repression by the Russian government has been, to what extent possible, ‘allowed’ by Russian 
public.  When the Russian public was willing to listen during the first war, the media responded 
in kind.  With the Russian public largely unwilling to accept fundamental criticism of the second 
war, the media has had to fend for itself in a newly hostile environment.  Thereby, the media has 
been more or less unable to report on the war outside of especially tragic incidents.
Therefore, in reference to the third point of the chapter introduction, seemingly the role of the 
media is to act as a ‘foil’ to the Russian government, but only when the environment is 
conducive to such a position.  In the first Chechen war, the atmosphere was ripe for this; during 
the second war, it has not been.  When the Russian media acts as this ‘foil,’ in a situation 
sympathetic to public outrage, the government found it difficult to ignore.  However, the 
government seems to be able to weather many a political storm such as the downing of the 
Kursk, so it is further questionable as to the long-lasting effect of media-supported outrage.
259In the end, as to be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, Russian democracy is still elite- 
led and the government can and will dominate in almost every conceivable situation.  Therefore, 
in most cases, the rule of law that would underpin Russian democracy does not truly exist as 
supported by a potent media.  Thirdly, and further from this, Russian democracy as defined by 
freedom of the media is not democracy at all.
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Chapter Five
Russian Public Opinion and the Chechen Wars: An Examination of Democracy and 
Authoritarianism in Russia 
Introduction
This chapter is written to discuss the reality of the Russian state in relation to the ideal which 
Russia often has sought to project, that of being a democratic state.  Based on previous findings 
in this thesis and on wider topical research, this chapter will seek to examine particularly this 
issue further.
Along these lines, the following points will be analyzed as accurately as possible:
•  Previous studies of democratization, electoral systems, Russian constitutionality and civil 
liberties, and how each of these principles apply to the case of Russia
•  What can we learn about Russia’s democracy based on research of Russian public 
opinion on the issue of the Chechen war?
First, a debate on the theory of democratisation must be conducted; continued by a discussion of 
the consolidation of democracies in other countries and then as applying to Russia.  Secondly, a 
follow-up section must address electoral systems and the electorate, particularly how these 
concepts are important in the Russian example.  Thirdly, as the threats to constitutionality and 
federalism have purported to be reasons for the Chechen war by two separate Russian 
presidential administrations, a discussion on these issues is necessary.  Fourthly, there will be a
261debate on civil society in Russia, *he role of corruption therein and the importance of these 
concepts in the context of this thesis.  Finally, a conclusion will bring all these studies together to 
reflect on Russian democracy and the status and role of Russian public opinion related to the 
Chechen wars.
Accompanying these arguments will be a short literature review to detail academic writings 
relevant to the arguments in this chapter, but which had less importance in research chapters two, 
three and four.
Theory of Democratisation
The two Chechen wars have been a great test for Russia’s political system and the expressed 
adherence to democracy.  While both the Yeltsin and Putin administrations have outwardly 
professed their dedication to the precepts of democracy, actions of both have sometimes 
suggested otherwise.  This thesis seeks to delve into this relationship between this issue and the 
Chechen wars, its consideration within the public sphere, and the effects of changes in the tone 
and the course of each war in the context of Russia’s political (i.e. ‘democratic’) regime.
With one eye looking to the West (and some direct and indirect ‘help’ of questionable value), in 
theory Russia has sought to become a ‘democracy’ in the post-Soviet era.  Concerning this,
David Held wrote that:
‘Liberal democracy was feted as an agent of progress, and capitalism as the only viable 
economic system.  Some political commentators even proclaimed (to borrow a phrase
262most notable from Hegel) the ‘end of history’ -  the triumph of the West over all political 
and social alternatives.’451
In the wake of Communism, ‘democracy’ as an ideal was desired; Yeltsin sought to make Russia 
a democracy but instead made a chaos, in no small part due to his Chechen policies, as shown in 
other chapters of this thesis.
For one point-of-view, perhaps Samuel Huntington is right in his analysis of this so-called ‘third- 
wave’ of democratisation encompassing Russia in the post-Soviet era.  He alleges in his article 
‘Democracy for the Long Haul’ that there were reverse waves following the first two waves of 
democratisation, and so it probably will be with this third wave.452  If this is so, then the Chechen 
wars in the post-Soviet era have been harbingers of this phenomenon.  Through the reinstitution 
of order represented in part by the brutal nature of Russian operations in the region coinciding 
with an effort in media restraint at ‘home’ (as seen from the previous chapter), it would be an 
active representation of a rollback of any democratic gains achieved by Russia since 1991.
Firstly, however, what is democracy?  Countless articles, books, and publications have debated 
the concepts of democracy.  There have been many disagreements among academics as to what 
is required for a country to be democratic.
Extending from this, how does Russia progress from Soviet authoritarianism, enter into a 
democratic regime of some stature, and then theoretically mature in terms of democratic 
foundation?  Or, as many have debated, does Russia fall into impasse somewhere along the way, 
locked somewhere between authoritarianism and democracy?  What are the prerequisites for 
democracy, and what constitutes the consolidation of democracy?
451 Held, David, Models of Democracy. 2nd edition, Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, 1996, p. 274.
452 Huntington, Samuel, ‘Democracy for the Long Haul,’ Journal of  Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1996, p.5. (pp. 
3-13)Many previous academic writings refer prominently to Robert A. Dahl’s publications, and most 
specifically to his book: Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition.  He expresses eight necessary 
requirements for citizens before democratic elections can be considered polyarchic (more 
commonly called liberal democratic):
1)  Freedom to form and join organizations
2)  Freedom of expression
3)  Right to vote
4)  Eligibility for public office
5)  Right of political leaders to compete for support
6)  Alternative sources of information
7)  Free and fair elections
8)  Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of 
preference.453
Based on these eight suppositions however, Dahl further argues that two dimensions can be 
extrapolated from applying these tests to any regime.  These are: the degree to which these eight 
requirements ‘are openly available, publicly employed, and fully guaranteed to at least some 
members of the political system who wish to contest the conduct of the government.’  Dahl calls 
this the ‘contestation’ or ‘liberalization’ dimension of the equation.  The second of Dahl’s 
dimensions relates to the proportion of the population who have access to participation in the 
government.  Dahl calls this the ‘inclusiveness’ factor in accessing democracy.454
453 Dahl, Robert H, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press, New Haven CT and London, 
1971, p. 3.
454 Ibid, p. 4.
264When put on a 2-D graph, with ‘Contestation’ as the vertical and ‘inclusiveness’ as the 
horizontal, Dahl defines the countries that rate high in both dimensions, and therefore in the high 
right-hand comer, to be ‘polyarchies.’  He finds that as countries rate closest to this ideal area, 
they achieve a higher level of democracy, culminating in a type of ‘perfect’ democracy 
(polyarchy) which he considers to be something usually unreachable.  Any movement up and to 
the right is considered a trend towards consolidation of democracy.
Following Dahl, it seems that authoritarianism would arise when a country lacks some number of 
his characteristics.  Therefore, understanding degrees of democracy for Dahl would consist of a 
practical checklist and little more.  By applying these requirements to Russia, it would seem that 
as a democracy, this country would be found distinctly lacking, thereby measuring in the bottom 
left of Dahl’s graph.  Since all eight concepts are rather fuzzily available to Russian citizens, 
with the possible exceptions of numbers two and three, Russia would not be even close to his 
standard of ‘polyarchy.’  With the aggressive nature of the state’s attitude toward targeting some 
sources of information, politicians, and organizations that do not agree with the government 
(thereby inhibiting at the very least Dahl’s first, fourth, fifth and sixth requirements, ultimately 
bringing into question the seventh of ‘free and fair elections’), these factors must have a role in 
studying public opinion, its relationship to the state, and the wars in Chechnya.
Dahl has further comments that are relevant to this paper.  In his book, Democracy and Its 
Critics. Dahl discusses:
‘[...]the near universal effort by rulers in the late twentieth century, including rulers in 
nondemocratic regimes, to exploit the idea of “rule by the people” in order to provide 
legitimacy to their rule.  Never in recorded history have state leaders appealed so widely
265to democratic ideas to legitimate their rule, even if only to justify an authoritarian 
government as necessary to a future transition to true or purified democracy.’455
Although published in 1989 before the break-up of the Soviet Union, these words have no less 
relevance in contemporary Russia today.456
Some writers disagree with parts of Dahl’s work however.  Guillermo O’Donnell takes a critical 
view of Dahl in his chapter on ‘Human Development, Human Rights, and Democracy.’  His 
view is that the ‘combined effects of the freedoms listed by Dahl [...] cannot fully guarantee that 
elections will be fair, much less institutionalised.’  He considers them instead to be ‘necessary 
conditions’ that, if they are held in a neutral context, then there is a good chance that the election 
will be fair.457
This has increased meaning in the Russian case; democracy in Russia should not be examined so 
strictly in following a list of dogmatic requirements, perhaps the ‘spirit’ of the democracy in 
question should be as important also, making exceptions and inclusions based on the situation.
As Juan Linz points out, ‘deviation from the democratic ideal does not necessarily constitute its 
denial.’458
James Gibson too dismisses an understanding of Russian democracy according to ‘performance 
evaluations,’ arguing that such studies ‘tend to draw more pessimistic conclusions about the
455 Dahl, Robert A., Democracy and Its Critics. Yale University Press, New Haven CT and London, 1989, p. 313.
456 On page 221, Dahl also breaks down his eight requirements for democracy into seven requirements.  These are 1) 
Elected officials, 2) free and fair elections 3) inclusive suffrage 4) right to run for office 5) freedom of expression 6) 
alternative information and 7) associational autonomy.  Dahl refers to the eighth requirement on institutions but as a 
subtext and not as a requirement.  The author chooses to leave in the eighth ranking for the purposes of this paper in 
order to use as a qualifier apart from its exclusion from the updated list.
457 Quotes from: O’Donnell, Guillermo, ‘Human Development, Human Rights, and Democracy, The Quality of 
Democracy: Theory and Applications, (eds.) Guillermo O’ Donnell, Jorge Vargas Culles, Osvaldo M. Iazzetta, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame IN, 2004, pp.  17-18.
458 Linz, Juan J., ‘Introduction,’ The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, (eds.) Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore MD and London, 1978, p. 6.
266consolidation of democracy in Russia.’  Using survey data, in contrast to other more pessimistic 
writers, Gibson prefers an optimistic look at the ‘psychometrics’ of Russian democracy, and in 
his section on Russian support for democratic institution and processes, he finds that support for 
democracy is increasing up to the time of his writing in 2001.459
Furthermore, in the Russian case, Linz predicts some of Russia’s own future through his study of 
other nations:
‘Undoubtedly, the experience of nondemocratic rule and the fear of it lead a large 
proportion of the voters to continue to give their support to the “Center” as a safe 
position, the one that best assures the survival of existing democracy, despite their 
disillusionment with its performance.’460
As published in 1978, few better could characterise how Yeltsin remained in office in 1996, and 
then the phenomenon reoccurred with Putin in 2000.
As expressed further by Guillermo O’Donnell in his chapter on ‘Illusions About Consolidation,’ 
the rule of law is a consistently mentioned addition that is necessary to consider.  Although not 
disagreeing directly with Dahl, O’Donnell finds that Dahl’s definition of polyarchy ‘is mute with 
respect to [again] institutional features such as parliamentarism or presidentialism, centralism or 
federalism, majoritarianism or consensualism, and the presence or absence of a written 
constitution and judicial review.’  As he goes on to explain, although both accountability and the
459 Gibson, James L., ‘The Russian Dance with Democracy,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 17, No.2, Apr.-Jun. 2001, pp. 
101-128.
460 Linz, Juan J., ‘Elements of Breakdown,’ The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, (eds.) Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore MD and London, 1978, p. 26.
267rule of law are absent in Dahl’s definition, O’Donnell does in the end find it appropriate because 
this definition is a ‘crucial cut-off point’ and not an all-encompassing ideal.461
In the case of some academics who study the post-communist states of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, many times they seek a ‘less stringent’ definition of democracy to adhere 
to.  Bruce Parrott emphasizes that, with some caveats related to possible ethnic domination, 
competitive elections with freedom of the press and of assembly could be enough to find a 
country to be democratic.462
Others who examine specifically Russia agree to add other dimensions to strictly applying 
necessary gauges in order to understand democracy in Russia, such as the quotient of Russia’s 
level of modernity.  Richard Rose and Neil Munro’s book, Elections Without Order, presents 
their principal view that follows in that Russia has only an incomplete democracy, in that there 
are elections but no rule of law, and so therefore Russia is not a modem state.
‘The great political challenge facing Putin is to build a modem state without using the 
dictatorship of law to suppress free elections.’463
This book has bearing on the relevance of public opinion in assessing the status, evolution and 
impact of tautology as it stands on the Russian government.  While there will be some further 
discussion on differing depictions of democracy in Russia, their view of Russia as an ‘electoral 
regime’ will be used as the best of many definitions in the sections to follow.
461 O’Donnell, Guillermo, ‘Illusions About Consolidation,’ Consolidating the Third-Wave Democracies: Themes 
and Perspectives, (eds.) Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore MD, 1997, p. 42. (pp.40-57)
462 Parrott, Bruce, ‘Perspectives on Post-Democratic Democratization,’ The Consolidation of Democracy in East- 
Central Europe, (eds.) Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 4-5.
463 Rose, Richard and Neil Munro, Elections Without Order. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 43.
268In the same vein, on the issue of what is, or would be, democracy in Russia, Archie Brown 
defines six points that Russia must fulfil in order to be a ‘democracy,’ all of which are necessary 
to consider.  They are: ‘(1) freedom to form and join organizations, (2) freedom of expression 
and access to alternative sources of information, (3) the right to vote in free and fair elections, (4) 
the right to compete in public office, (5) political accountability, and (6) the rule of law.’464 
These represent what could be considered a more refined list of Dahl’s requirements tailored for 
the Russian case.
All six facets of this test are of great important in analysing public opinion and the wars in 
Chechnya; for example, Brown mentions this point himself in relation to the second test:
‘During the Chechen war of 1994-6, an Organization of Russian women, the Committee 
of Soldiers’ Mothers, succeeded in getting access to the mass media and exercised some 
influence in mobilizing public opinion against the war.’465
Extending these ideas to an examination of what this means for Russian democracy, and 
therefore measuring the extent of this ‘some influence,’ should be examined here.  Chapter four 
in this thesis covering the mass media found that the level of ‘some influence’ possessed by such 
groups only was significant when the people (public opinion) were sympathetic to the inherent 
goals of the ‘influence.’  During the first war, this was acceptable.  During the second war, the 
‘influence’ has been less so.  That is to say that, as the people have supported Putin (and his 
North Caucasus policies), little could be done to change public opinion.
To return to the subject of the consolidation of democracy in Russia, the noted academic on 
democracy Arend Lijphart, in his 1999 book Patterns of Democracy, has a very loose definition
464 Brown, Archie, ‘Evaluating Russia’s Democratization,’ Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader, (ed.) Archie 
Brown, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 546.
465 Ibid, p. 550.
269of what is considered to be a consolidated democracy.  In this book, he compares the status of 
thirty six established democracies.  Indicating that it is slightly arbitrary, Lijphart explains that a 
country is a consolidated democracy, and therefore worthy of his comparisons, when it has been 
a democracy for about twenty years (in the nineteen-year cases of India, Papua New Guinea, and 
Spain he makes exceptions) and it must further have had more than a ‘few’ elections in which to 
measure the durability and kinds of cabinets that the democracy produces.466  Obviously, Russia 
has not at present reached either of these two requirements, at least in relation to truly fair 
Presidential elections.
Namely the meaning of consolidation has always been of issue.  Much time has been spent 
debating what is required for a democracy to consolidate.467  There are generally two approaches 
to consolidation study, one depending on adaptation of both politicians and citizens to 
‘democratic rules, norms and procedures’ and the second concentrates on the development of 
democratic institutions.468
In terms of comparative democracy and exploring the finer points of examining democracy, few 
books exceed the detail of Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson’s 2004 book: Democracy: A 
Comparative Approach.  On the subject of consolidation, Lane and Ersson refer to ‘exogenous 
factors, or big social forces, and endogenous factors, institutions,’ as the hinges on which 
democratic stability, longevity, or consolidation can be assessed.  Further confined to these two 
ideas, Lane and Ersson focus on three key factors with which a country experiences ‘success or 
failure of the endeavour to consolidate democracy.’469 These are:
466 Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy. Yale University Press, New Haven and London,  1999, p. 53.
467 For a detailed examination of the various facets of this idea, see Kelley, Donald R., ‘The Complexity of 
Democratic Consolidation,’ After Communism, (ed.) Donald R. Kelley, University of Arkansas Press, Fayettesville 
NC, 2003, pp.7-29,
468 Boussard, Caroline, ‘Civil Society and Democratisation,’ Development and Democracy, (eds.) Ole Egstrom and 
Goren Hyden, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p. 158.
469 Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson, Democracy: a Comparative Approach. Routledge, London and New York, 
2003, pp. 140-141.
2701)  Structural factors: poverty, illiteracy, religion and ethnic cleavages
2)  Institutional factors: presidentialism, legal system, structure of parliament, constitutional 
volatility
3)  Behavioural factors: the making of pacts, consensus building, like temporary grand 
coalitions, the granting of amnesties.470
These factors have cogency in the Russian case.  By Lane and Ersson’s criteria, it could be 
maintained that Russia has some fewer negative exogenous factors, for instance true poverty or 
illiteracy, but also (as seen from evolving government policy on the Chechen war) excessive 
negative endogenous factors, such as the lack of a progressive legal system and certain elements 
of constitutional volatility.
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, in their article ‘Toward Consolidated Democracies,’ have ‘three 
minimal conditions’ for even considering a consolidation of democracy.  These conditions are 
that the country should be: 1) a state, 2) a completed democratic transition as defined by Dahl’s 
requirements, and 3) its rulers must govern democratically, meaning that officials should follow 
the rules.  They spell out that ‘only democracies can become consolidated democracies.’  Only 
once all three requirements have been attained can a democracy begin to consolidate and mature 
to an extent.  Without one or more of those prerequisites, such a state is outside the bounds of the 
democratic fringe.
Further to this, Linz and Stepan prefer the ‘only game in town’ standard for defining democratic 
consolidation, meaning that basically in every way, democracy in a country is the central basis 
with no available alternative.
™ Ibid, p.  141.
271In practice, Linz and Stepan further give five requirements for consolidation beyond a 
‘functioning state.’471  These are:
1)  civil society
2)  political society
3)  rule of law
4)  state bureaucracy
5)  economic society
In ways agreeing with Lane and Ersson, as Linz and Stepan write in their 1996 book, Problems 
of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
‘Many scholars, in advancing definitions of consolidated democracy, enumerate all the 
regime characteristics that would improve the overall quality of democracy.  We favour, 
instead, a narrower definition of democratic consolidation, but one that nonetheless 
combines behavioural, attitudinal, and constitutional dimension.’472
Furthermore in their book, Linz and Stepan do not preclude the possibility of the breakdown of a 
consolidated democracy or even seek to maintain that there can be only one type of consolidated 
democracy.
However acting as one standard for understanding consolidation of democracy, Linz and 
Stepan’s factors will be examined in relation to the subject of the arguments presented in this 
paper.  They explain in the chapter of their book on Russia a number of elements that necessarily
471 Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan, ‘Toward Consolidated Democracies,’ Journal of  Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 
1996, pp. 14-33.
472 Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe. South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore MD and London, 1996, p. 5.
272need further investigation over the course of this thesis:  what they call the ‘privileging’ of 
‘Independence over Democratization,’ ‘Collective Rights over Individual Rights,’ and 
‘Economic Restructuring over Democratic State Restructuring.’473  All of these decisions over 
what to promote against what to marginalize have a basis in attempting a greater understanding 
of Russian public opinion in the context of the two wars in Chechnya.
Andreas Schedler, in his landmark article ‘What is Democratic Consolidation?’ has a four-level 
classification system for identifying levels of consolidation in democracies.  These are (in order):
1)  Advanced Democracy
2)  Liberal Democracy
3)  Electoral Democracy
4)  Authoritarian Regime
In consideration of this classification system, this thesis questions whether one can call any 
country a democracy without a viable rule of law.  On the basis of the absence of this factor in 
Schedler’s system, subscription will be paid more in this thesis to Rose and Munro’s phrase 
‘electoral regime’ to examine Russia, as opposed to Schedler’s less clearly-defined ‘electoral 
democracy,’ which he describes as ‘any kind of diminished subtype of democracy’474 above an 
acknowledged authoritarian regime.
Within the scope of this thesis, keeping these elements in mind, a continuing debate on the 
consolidation of Russian democracy will be necessary to show to what degree the Russian 
government’s Chechen war policy has damaged or supported this consolidation.
473 Ibid, pp. 366-400.
474 Schedler, Andreas, ‘What is Democratic Consolidation?’ Journal of  Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 2, Apr.  1998, pp. 
91-107.
273Herein, for the sake of the inclusive value of this research, there must also be a comparative 
aspect connected to this thesis.  How does Russian democratic consolidation parallel the 
experiences of other recent post-Communist countries, and how does this reference impact on 
Russian public opinion concerning the situation in Chechnya?
Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram and Harald Waldrauch in their book Democratic Consolidation in 
East-Central Europe have much data for such a discussion.475  Particularly their chapter on 
political participation and integration is very interesting given that in all of the reform countries 
they studied in the early years after Communism:
‘Studies on the initial stages of democratic transformation and current data both show that 
citizens’ participatory orientations and their belief in their own civic competence are still 
underdeveloped in the new democracies.’476
Also acknowledged that:
‘The mass media play an especially important role in the consolidation process because 
the confidence gaps which exist between citizens and political institutions are often wide, 
the structures of political integration are deficient, and the need for orientation is 
acute.’477
When looking at evolving Russian public opinion, the Chechen wars, and how this affects the 
eminence of democratic consolidation within Russia, these factors are acute bases from which to 
understand these subjects within this thesis.  The experiences of the post-Communist eastern
475 Plasser, Fritz, Peter A. Ulram and Harald Waldrauch, Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe. 
Macmillan Press Ltd., Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York, 1998.
416 Ibid, p. 134.
477 Ibid, p. 129.
274European countries that Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch cover do mirror some of the processes 
that affected many aspects of the Russian case.  The mass media, as detailed in chapter four, 
failed in the post-Soviet era to maintain their integrity and bridge any prevailing ‘gap’  in 
‘political integration’ between the public and the government.
To the degree that Russia is becoming a ‘democracy,’ Valerie Bunce finds on the subject of 
comparing Russian democracy to other emerging post-communist states that Russia has its own 
position within the four generalizations that she finds applicable to the region. Given the 
complexity of the past experiences of all the former communist nations of Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, Bunce remarks upon the brilliant ‘diversity’ of those countries emerging from 
communism. Further, she finds where the appeal of democracy is quite durable, or as she calls it 
‘sticky’ then as increased democratic ideals are realized in these states, it is more difficult for 
potential authoritarian elements to over-ride them.  Thirdly, Bunce finds that the viability of the 
state is necessary for democracy.  Listing the Russian Federation among the extreme cases of 
weak states, she comments on the failure of the Russian state to have a monopoly on many basic 
elements of statehood as an example.  Fourthly, Bunce finds that a guiding sense of nationalism 
is essential to continuing democratisation, as she notes in the case of many Eastern European 
states.478
In the case of Russia, particularly Bunce’s fourth generalisation has added prominence, as is 
explained by Raymond Taras in his own chapter on Russian nationalism where he finds that in 
many ways Russia is a state without a nation.  In this argument in relation to the Russian nation’s 
relative indecision in determining its own status, Taras finds that the ‘traditional imperial style of 
rule’ has merely been put into a ‘new institutional framework.’479 Noting the inherent
478 Bunce, Valerie, ‘Comparative Democratization: Lessons from the Post-Socialist Experience,’ After Communism, 
(ed.) Donald R. Kelley, University of Arkansas Press, Fayettesville NC, 2003, pp. 31-60.
479 Taras, Raymond, ‘A Decade of Nonnationalism?,’ After Communism, (ed.) Donald R. Kelley, University of 
Arkansas Press, Fayettesville NC, 2003, p. 222.
275undemocratic nature of imperial rale from the centre has connection to Bunce’s generalization, 
the lack of internal stability on the issue of national self-determination in post-Soviet Russia has 
negatively affected any clear realization of what the Russian state should be.
When all is considered, it is unquestioned that Russia is an incomplete democracy, but to what 
degree?  When tested, elements of almost all gauges applied in order to assess the extensiveness 
of Russian democracy as compared to Western democracies fall short.  In analysing Russian 
public opinion on the two Chechen wars, these facets must be acknowledged.  Particularly, it 
must be examined to what degree the Russian government is responsive to its citizenry.  And in 
return, how low is political accountability?  The freedoms enjoyed by the Russian public are 
highly variable within the context of this degree of Russian democracy.  Previous chapters have 
shown that freedom of the press, of assembly and of expression are in varying stages of 
permissibility, according to access by civil groups, according to the specific issue at hand and in 
respect to the given region in focus.
M. Steven Fish makes a parallel examination of Russian ‘democracy’ along these lines in his 
2005 book titled Democracy Derailed in Russia.  As predictable from the book title, Fish has a 
low view of Russian democracy based in part on his criticism o f‘superpresidentialism,’480 which 
this thesis entirely agrees with in some ways, however, this writing seeks to take another look at 
this topic, as corresponding to research conducted and to what other academics have written.
James L. Gibson paints however a more optimistic view of Russian democracy.  He points out 
that while Russia is far from having a ‘perfectly functioning democratic system,’ Russia is
480 Fish, M. Steven, Democracy Derailed in Russia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2005, 
pp. 224-243.  Fish’s two other ‘variables’ that ‘explain Russia’s failure to democratize,’ which are ‘too much oil’ 
and ‘too little economic liberalization,’ provide little basis for direct argument in the context of this thesis.  See Fish, 
Democracy Derailed in Russia, p. 247.
276‘developing most of the institutions and processes of a viable democratic regime.’481  In some 
ways, such optimism in the case of Russia has been found in this thesis to be premature.  This 
article published in 2001, while not expressing anything false, does not take account of some 
elements of rollback in Russian democracy, as characterised (again in chapter four) by new laws 
of that era which put additional limits on civil society and the press.  Over time, the amplification 
of the global war on terrorism as portrayed by Putin (see chapter two) has solidified this 
deviation from democracy, as has been argued in this thesis.
For the purposes of this paper, Russia will be acknowledged to have many elements of 
democracy as expressed by Dahl, but yet, as to be discussed in more detail, a weak grasp on civil 
society and lacking many elements necessary for a liberal democracy which is accountable to the 
people.  Again, the phrase ‘electoral regime’ as discussed by Rose and Munro will be considered 
to be the most accurate of many choices in this paper’s discussion of what is Russia’s 
democracy.
Ultimately, the final debate in this thesis when dealing with democratisation is to answer the 
same question that Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul asked in their paper ‘Are Russians
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Undemocratic?,’  but taking into account specifically a study of differences in Russia public 
opinion on the two Chechen wars.  Colton and McFaul find that Russia is becoming 
fundamentally more democratic from the bottom up, through their assertion, ‘Represent the will 
of the people within the state, and the institutions will follow.’  However, research in this thesis 
has found that the will of the people has been ignored through Russia’s continuing policies in 
Chechnya; that the presentation of the Chechen problem has been a manipulated paper tiger used
481 Gibson, James L., ‘The Russian Dance With Democracy,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.  17, No. 2, Apr..-Jun. 2001, p.
102. (pp.  101-128)
482 Colton, Timothy J. and Michael McFaul, ‘Are Russians Undemocratic?,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.  18, No. 2, 
Apr.-Jun. 2002, pp. 91 -121.
277for the advantages of a select few to gain greater control over the many at the expense of Russia 
as a developing democracy.
Theoretically, as told by Colton and McFaul, democracy in Russia has tended to continue to 
develop somewhat through the consolidation of the idea of democracy and through institutional 
consolidation.  However, this research finds this to be incorrect, that any democratic evolution 
has been going rather badly.  Previous democratic theory tells us that without rule of law, 
democracy is impossible.  Russia fits this theory.  With a view that the ends justifies the means, 
study in this thesis has found that Russian public opinion, crossing researched cleavages (chapter 
three) on the war, has accepted restrictions on the media (chapters two and four) in order that a 
strong President can take care of the Chechen ‘problem.’  Democracy therefore has been 
sacrificed in favor of order.
Electorates and Electoral Systems
Some study must be conducted on the issue of the electoral system, and the role of this in 
understanding Russian public opinion and the Chechen wars.  Chapter four explored the 
changing efforts of the Russian government to affect Russian public opinion regarding the two 
wars in Chechnya; this section will examine the existence of Russian public opinion as a political 
force, if Russia is indeed any type of ‘democracy’ deriving legitimacy from the people.
Using Rose and Munro’s definition of Russia as an ‘electoral regime,’483 therefore without the 
cohesive civil society of a liberal democracy, then where does this leave public opinion?  In a 
government where there are elections, but few other semblances of a democratic state including 
the rule of law, elected officials can have little to no accountability to the people who elect them.
483 Rose, Richard and Neil Munro, Elections Without Order. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 60.
278There are few rules to the ‘game,’*and as can be shown by Russia’s party system, it can be 
difficult to throw out the political ‘bad guys’ if there is confusion in the electorate in establishing 
to what party the ‘bad guys’ belong, or even what system the ‘bad guys’ are elected in (or even 
further perhaps, with the possible anti-democratic question as to whether the ‘bad guys’ are 
elected).
Timothy Colton’s book on Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New 
Russia is excellent on this subject in that it explores the many aspects in which Russians exist as 
citizens of Russia, and therefore as an electorate.  For example, Colton explores the nature of the 
electoral and political divide in Russian society, including an analysis of what the political left 
and right consists of:
‘In Russia, the words “conservative” and “liberal” are fresh imports into the language that 
seldom infiltrate political debate, except in rarefied intellectual circles.’484
In this vein, it has been found that political debate on the Chechen war will have some bearing 
on any understanding of political left or right.  Putin’s hold on the centre and his prosecution of 
the war seems in this context to be outside of such boundaries.
Caroline Boussard argues that those who adhere to and study democracy in electoral regimes like 
Russia’s are probably more ‘concerned with democratic stability in terms of avoiding democratic 
breakdown, the opposite of democratic consolidation’ than with strengthening the depth of 
democracy.  On the other hand, Boussard alleges that those who ‘work in liberal democracies’ 
worry more about the deepening of democracy.  In simpler terms, she argues about whether
484 Colton, Timothy, Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA and London, 2001, p. 144.
279people working in electoral versus liberal democracies are on the offensive (in the case of liberal 
democracies) or defensive (as in the case of electoral democracies).
While this is a good point concerning perhaps Central America that is Boussard’s field, Russia 
does not fit with this theory.  The fact that there would be democracy in the form of simply 
elections, consisting of regular or semi-regular election cycles has rarely been at issue in Russia; 
this perhaps stemming in part from authoritarian Soviet ‘election’ times.  In the Yeltsin era 
despite the fact that there were those who argued for postponing elections, the question of 
whether or not to have elections generally has been considered always a line that should not be 
crossed.
Deepening democracy and civil society most often has been the primary concern in Russia; 
consolidating the base of an evolving Russian democratic regime always has been the central 
matter, without allowing the government to control external and internal influences on its 
citizens.  To not allow Russia to become locked into a govemmentally dominated ‘democracy’ in 
which elections are predictably pro-incumbent has been the major challenge.
Accountability is a serious problem in Russia’s fledgling democracy.  This is the case when 
looking at the structure of Russia’s electoral system characterized by Rose and Munro as
AOC
‘floating,’  meaning that Russia’s party system has changed between every election and 
especially in great ‘fluidity’ before the Putin era.  Parties have come and gone according to the 
whims of the personalities of political elites.  Future President Putin’s own flagship Unity party 
of 1999, even though he himself was not a member, was created only months earlier.
485 Boussard, Caroline, ‘Civil Society and Democratisation,’ Development and Democracy, (eds.) Ole Egstrom and 
Goren Hyden, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, pp.  156 -  172.
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280Furthermore, Rose and Munro find that there are indeed even four ‘systems’487 of election in 
Russia, each according to ways one can be elected to office.  The electorate in this maelstrom has
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a distinct lack of ways of deciding ‘collective control of decision-making in government.’
Hence, a parliamentary deputy could be put into office in a myriad of different ways, not all of 
which presupposing any responsibility to any cleavage or section of the electorate.  In this 
atmosphere, Russia’s electoral regime has a clear bias towards the incumbent elite, which is, 
while not unbreakable, certainly difficult to overcome.
Therefore, Russian public opinion has little basis in establishing accountability in electing 
officials.  Any critical view of the Putin administration can see clearly how Putin himself was 
picked by Yeltsin and his allies in order to avoid what they projected as possible ‘instability’ in 
the government that might spill over into Russian life.  The Russian public, in their role for this 
order, accepted this bargain and in turn elected Putin.  The political system did not guarantee 
stability, and so the people not surprisingly chose stability.  As seen in previous chapters, the war 
in Chechnya became an archetype of ‘stability’ as long as the President in charge was seen to 
have a firm grip on the affair.
This reinforces the issue that the Russian people had little real choice in the matter.  There was 
no progressive opposition, and especially true in an electoral regime such as Russia’s, democracy 
in some ways is only as good as the relative strength of the opponent.
This is however not the case because of a lack of a developing potential for partisanship and 
party loyalty in Russian society.  Such an argument is applicable to a study of Russian 
democracy in relation to the Chechen wars in that any arising opposition would be greatly aided 
by some degree of party political loyalty in Russian society.Ted Brader and Joshua Tucker, in an article for the American Journal of  Political Science, 
challenge any contention that Russian society might be in some ways ‘anti-party.’  Using a three­
pronged system applied to the voting public for finding the existence of ‘emerging partisanship,’ 
Brader and Tucker attempt to gauge how a democratic electoral system might be growing in 
Russia.  They seek such traits in the electorate:489
1)  ‘a cumulative effect of political experience’
2)  ‘consistency in one’s attitudes’
3)  the people must be able and willing to  make ‘rational’ decisions in regard to party
affiliation
From this point, Brader and Tucker find that:
‘Based on evidence from national surveys conducted during Russia’s first post­
communist elections, we argue that nascent partisanship is visible among a sizable 
plurality of the Russian electorate.’490
In this context, the Russian system is not so alien to the possibility of a party/electoral 
arrangement as sometimes portrayed if other environmental variables, such as ‘real’ stable 
parties, would be established.  Further study herein finds generally, however, that other 
necessary requirements for partisanship in society will not be satisfied.
Michael McFaul and Timothy Colton explore the continuing viability of Russia’s electoral 
system in their 2003 book on the 1999 and 2000 Russian elections.  Particularly interesting is
489 Brader, Ted and Joshua A Tucker, ‘The Emergence of Mass Partisanship in Russia, 1993-1996,’ American 
Journal of  Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan. 2001, pp. 70-71. (pp. 69-83)
490 Ibid, p. 78.
282their finding that the Communists-have become little more than a ‘fixture’491 in Russian political 
life and not an inspiring force of any power.  Other parties that might have opposed Putin’s 
Unity bloc in these elections quickly lost their viability as opponents, thereby demonstrating 
their own fragility of support.  This book has been referred to in arguments made in this thesis 
regarding the status of Russian political life and how this applies to public opinion and the 
evolving situation in Chechnya.
In conclusion, research for this thesis has found that, given the possibility of a stable party 
system, the Russian electorate has always seemed ready to accept a nominal level of 
partisanship.  However, with the dominance of elites in Russian government, such stability 
largely has been elusive.  Data demonstrated in chapter three found that differences in opinion on 
the Chechen war have correlated with party loyalty.  However, as political accountability has 
been absent and with the lack of rule of law, Russia’s developing electoral system has been 
stalemated by Putin’s incumbent control of the centre, inherited from Yeltsin for purposes of 
maintaining order, and not on principles of democracy.
Federalism and Constitutional Maintenance
Questions on the wars in Chechnya and the issue of secession within Russia are critical to this 
paper.  These concepts have been used in successive Russian presidential administrations to gain 
more power and to move Russia back away from some principles of democracy towards 
authoritarianism.  At different junctures, the Yeltsin and Putin administrations promoted 
maintenance of constitutional order as a reason for the war in Chechnya.  Examining this as an 
issue is of importance in any analysis of the Chechen wars in Russian political thought.
491 Colton, Timothy J. and Michael McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections of 
1999 and 2000. The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2003, p.  137.  McFaul examined this topic also in his 
previous book and will be of interest of further examination: see McFaul, Michael, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: 
Political Change From Gorbachev to Putin. Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY and London, 2001.
283The formation of Russia’s democratic government is an imperative matter here.  In scrutinizing 
Russia’s status as a ‘federation,’ Cameron Ross comments on how ‘the Russian Federation has 
one of the highest levels of asymmetry in the world.’  This is not surprising, as he points out; 
Russia is the ‘largest multinational country in the world incorporating 128 officially recognized 
minority groups and nationalities.’  Over the course of his book, Federalism and Democratisation 
in Russia. Ross adeptly explains how Russia has a ‘high level of asymmetry’ in three areas:  1) 
socio-economic, 2) political, and 3) constitutional.492  Parallel to this, Boris Kagarlitsky’s Russia 
Under Yeltsin and Putin (2002)493 also frequently addressed these questions in terms of the 
inherent stability therein.
Another factor to be addressed when discussing relations between the centre and the periphery is 
the difference between ‘russkie’ and ‘rossiiane.’  It is the distinction between, respectively, 
ethnic Russians, and the citizens of the Russian Federation including those who are not 
ethnically Russian.  In his book Russian Messianism. Peter Duncan writes:
‘Part of the Yeltsin’s leadership’s strategy to win the support of the ethnic minorities was 
to create a new civic Russian (rossiiskaia) identity and to refer to the citizens of the new 
state as rossiiane (inhabitants of Russia) rather than russkie (ethnic Russians).’494
Studying regional identity is of great importance in understanding elements of Russian public 
opinion in contemporary Russia.  Especially in chapter three, where the unity and cleavages of 
Russian public opinion have been discussed, differences in regional thought and perceptions 
were analysed.  For instance, in reference to Tatarstan (which was another centre of secessionist
492 Quotes from Ross, Cameron, Federalism and Democratisation in Russia. Manchester University Press,
Manchester and New York, 2002, pp. 7 -8.
493 Kagarlitsky, Boris, Russia Under Yeltsin and Putin. Pluto Press, London and Sterling VA, 2002.
494 Duncan, Peter J. S., Russian Messianism. Routledge, London and New York, 2000, p.  131.
284thought at the formation of the post-Soviet Russian Federation), Leokadia Drobizheva, Director 
of the Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Sciences, finds that greater percentages 
identify with the Republic of Tatarstan than with the Russian Federation.495  Nevertheless, after 
the example of Chechnya, few would believe that Tatarstan would ever seriously consider 
secession itself.  This phenomenon of Chechnya as an ‘example’ is prominent in this thesis.
Russia has had a great deal of struggle in working this asymmetry into a viable government.  The 
fight between regions and the centre and between the branches of government has been fierce at 
times, on occasion requiring a number of ‘band-aids,’ both extensive and slight.  In respect to 
Russia’s problems with the Chechnya situation, the struggle of the regions against the centre has 
been a dominant characteristic since the first enterprising Russian set foot in the North Caucasus.
Looking at Russia’s strong presidency, James Hughes has argued that the high level of political 
asymmetry has been necessary for cementing governmental stability.  Regarding Chechnya as an 
exception rather than as something representative of a more endemic problem, he counters some 
implications suggested by Dahl, Linz and others that argue that strong presidentialism is 
representative of instability.496  In fact, Hughes claims that Russia’s type of government could 
not be maintained without the dominant central executive.  In his opinion:
‘it is doubtful whether any other alternative institutional arrangement [apart from
Russia’s powerful presidency] would work as well for transition to democracy in an
ethnically or territorially divided society.’497
495 Drobizheva, L., ‘Etnicheskaia i respublikanskaia identichnost’ problemie’ sovmestimosti,’ Regional’niie protsesi 
v sovremennoi Rossii: ekonomika. politika, vlasf. Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, Moskva, 2003, p.  15 (pp.  11-29)
496 In reference to Dahl and Linz’s arguments discussed previously, Hughes suggests that some of their 
‘requirements’ for improving democracy could be sacrificed in order to improve others.
497 Hughes, James, ‘Federalism and Transition to Democracy in Russia,’ CEU Working Paper IRES No. 99/1, 
Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, Apr.  1998, p. 35.
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Yeltsin was willing to make compromises, sign treaties with constituent ethnic and non-ethnic 
‘Russian Federation’ members, and was rarely if ever a ready dictator that could have taken 
advantage of nationalism and driven more ethnic divides in society as with Milosevic in 
Yugoslavia.  Apart from this however, such a point is prominent in the context of this paper in 
reference to Putin.
The question of a constitution was an early point of contention in post-Soviet Russia, in its 
design eventually borrowing ideas from once-unimaginable sources; as is well known for the 
1993 Constitution, Russia uses some structural characteristics of the American constitution.498 
In the context of the establishment of the 1993 constitution, however, Cameron Ross writes:
‘In Russia, as we have seen, there is little evidence of consensus and compromise in the 
drafting of its Constitution. Instead, the foundations of Russian constitutionalism were 
forged out of conflict and coercion, and the President’s Constitution was largely imposed 
on a weak and divided society, still reeling from the shock of the violent dissolution of 
the Russian parliament.’499
In respect to public opinion, although it was passed by voters, Ross points out that there was 
another ‘major drawback.’  He accurately points out that a majority rejected the constitution in 
sixteen regions and in eight republics.  Further to this, there was boycott of the vote in 
Chechnya.500  Such outcomes suggest that the Constitution of 1993 lacked a degree of legitimacy 
in sectional areas where this was a result.
498 Among other systemic similarities, one only needs to look at the first line of the 1993 Russian Constitution: ‘We, 
the multinational people of the Russian Federation...’ Translation from: Sakwa, Richard, Russian Politics and 
Society. 2nd edition, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, p. 395.
499 Ross, Cameron, Federalism and Democratisation in Russia. Manchester University Press, Manchester and New 
York, 2002, p. 29.
500 Ibid, p. 31.
286Reform of Russia’s federal structure has been an ongoing issue, and has been part of Putin’s 
supposed re-institution of order.  As Remington states:
*[.. .]the relations between the central government and the governments of regions and 
republics continue to evolve. President Putin made it clear that the reform of federal 
relations was a top priority for him.’501
Putin’s introduction in 2000 of the seven ‘federal districts’ was one of the first steps towards the 
‘re-institution of order’ goal, having the effect of bringing the laws of the regions more into line 
with the centre.  With no other natural policy or tradition of cohesion between them, Putin had 
no doubt found that having to deal with 89 regions on separate terms was a task too complicated 
without another level of control.
Further, the question of separatism is a critical issue at the heart of Russian thought on the 
Chechen wars.  After the fall of the Soviet Union, many Russians were not sure what form their 
country should take.  Russian public support had always been for maintenance of the Union, but 
few advocated force to enact this.  Given that many elites and, generally, public opinion in the 
Soviet republics sought independence, especially given the circumstances surrounding the 1991 
coup, Russians were forced to endure a substantial de-imperialization.  In contrast to other 
historical world empires, as Graham Smith has written:
‘For Russians, the territory that constituted the Soviet Union -  unlike the classical 
empires of Britain, Portugal or even France -  had long been considered an integral and 
largely undifferentiated part of Russia.’
501 Remington, Thomas F., Politics in Russia. 3rd edition, Pearson Longman, New York, 2004, p. 77.
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Algeria was claimed indomitably French by a segment of the French population (leading to war 
against De Gaulle), nevertheless the statement rings true.
From a strictly empirical perspective, also unlike Algeria, no significant segment of the Russian 
public was seriously dedicated to using troops to hold on to the former Soviet republics. This led 
to a peaceful rollback of the Russian empire as this issue was confronted in the context of the 
former Soviet Union.  Although as to be seen by Chechnya itself, even this peaceful de- 
imperialization had its own limits.  For Yeltsin, this de-imperialization meant the boundaries of 
the former Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.  Smith says that, in the main, Russian 
public opinion has agreed with this assessment.
‘While the majority of Russians have adjusted to the loss of the former Soviet 
borderlands, the idea of losing part of Russia is regarded by most as wholly 
unacceptable.’503
Matthew Evangelista in an article for Post-Soviet Affairs entitled, ‘Is Putin the New de Gaulle?’ 
focuses specifically on this comparison between the war in Algeria and the Chechen wars. 
Evangelista, while finding some useful points of interest in regard to this comparison 
‘particularly concerning questions of leadership and missed opportunities,’ found that his study 
yet ‘does not yield any obvious prediction for the future of the conflict.’504
502 Smith, Graham, The Post-Soviet States: Mapping the Politics of Transition. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999, p. 47.
503 Ibid, p. 49.
504 Evangelista, Matthew, ‘Is Putin the New de Gaulle? A Comparison of the Chechen and Algerian Wars,’ Post- 
Soviet Affairs, V. H. Winston and Son, Inc., Vol. 21, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 2005, pp. 360-377.
288Smith additionally points out that-the failure of the first Chechen war to achieve a meaningful 
victory has:
‘[...]severely dented Russian national pride but also failed to guarantee Russia’s future 
control over what most Russians viewed as an integral part of their homeland.’505
Nonetheless, why did the first Chechen war become so unpopular?  This paper disagreed with 
Smith.  As explained in other chapters (and particularly chapter two), Russian public opinion did 
not in some ways oppose independence for Chechnya if the Chechens were willing to fight to the 
death for it.
Indeed, Chechnya was seen by many Russians as part of Russia, but it was not an issue of the 
greatest importance worthy to be fought for and kept at all potential cost, especially if it could be 
stable as a state and politically contained in the region (in direct contrast to other post-communist 
cases, such as the Serbs’ sentimental arguments for keeping Kosovo within Serbia’s borders). 
Only with the advent of groups inside Chechnya seeking to expand the boundaries of Chechnya 
into other sections of the Russian Federation combined with Islamic extremism was Russian 
public opinion willing to support a long period of war there.
In their book, From Submission to Rebellion. Vladimir Shlapentokh, Roman Levita, and Mikhail 
Loiberg discuss many facets of Russian regionalisation versus the centre in the post-Soviet era. 
They make many valid points, but of greatest value is their study of how:
505 Smith, Graham, The Post-Soviet States: Mapping the Politics of Transition. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999, p. 49.‘[...]the ideology of Russian regionalism was somewhat influenced by Russians’ feelings 
of being discriminated against and by the privileged status of non-Russians in the Soviet 
Union and in the Russian Federation.’506
This clashing viewpoint becomes necessary in building an understanding of one reason why 
Russians took different viewpoints on Chechnya between the two wars.  A larger percentage of 
Russian public opinion thought that during the first war, Chechnya was not of great importance 
to the stability of Russia.  After 1999, public opinion took a less isolationist view; for many, the 
war in Chechnya became a serious issue that could, without intervention, become a dangerous 
threat to internal order.
During the second war, for a number of reasons many Russians came to realize that perhaps it 
was a clear necessity that, at whatever the price, Chechnya had to be ‘tamed.’  One reason is 
because the Chechens forced the issue.  This has been discussed in previous chapters, such as in 
chapters two and four.  Parallel to this, Russian public opinion came to accept a seemingly 
higher level of relative authoritarianism to accomplish this and other failures of the state 
structure.  James Hughes’s argument again comes into play.  In theory, perhaps Russians were 
willing to sacrifice some elements of democracy to further others.
Contrasts were shown between Putin’s second war in Chechnya and Boris Yeltsin’s first war.
Did democratisation make Russia more or less likely to go to war?  This topic is discussed 
extensively in a paper by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder entitled, ‘Democratization and the 
Danger of War.’507  Far from the traditional assumption that democracies are less likely to 
embark on military excursions (and argued in 1995 no less, when this principle was held more
506 Shlapentokh, Vladimir, Roman Levita, and Mikhail Loiberg, From Submission to Rebellion. Westview Press, 
Boulder CO, 1997, p. 161.
507 Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder, ‘Democratization and the Danger of War,’ International Security, Vol. 
20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 5-38.
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find that particularly democratising entities may in some circumstances be as prone to war as 
authoritarian states, even though democratised states are safest in the long run.
In terms of this thesis, this assertion is particularly interesting in view of Yeltsin and Putin’s 
policy on the Chechen war.  The rise of Putin has been a significant change between the two 
wars in Chechnya and has merit in study for further understanding the existence, evolution and 
differences of Russian public opinion.  Although strictly speaking, Putin came to power by 
constitutionally prescribed means, there was not a truly fair democratic election in the 
contemporary Western sense.508  The potency of the war issue as a divisive subject of internal 
public opinion judgment in regard to each Russian administration as such is paramount herein.
In regard to constitutionalism and federalism, what parts of these ideas are considered more or 
less important by Russian public opinion?  Again, this thesis has found that elements of these 
principles supporting ‘order’ have triumphed over elements supporting democracy.
Through looking at the issue of the Chechen wars, the Russian people have been found in all 
chapters of this thesis to prefer a ‘strong’ state over perceptions of weakness conveyed by (but 
not the theory of) free partisanship in fair elections where incumbency was not an advantage. 
Therefore, constitutionalism and federalism (in the Russian case, the two concepts together 
combining to form a vague, albeit incompletely-defined, ‘strong’ centralism) has dominated to 
counter the perceived failure of a de-imperialized post-Soviet Russia.  Where the constitution 
and the federal system have been silent or unstable, the modus operandi of encroaching 
presidential government has been busy.
508 For one of many detailed analyses of Putin’s rise, see Rutland, Peter, ‘Putin’s Path to Power,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, 
Vol.  16, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 2000, pp. 313-354.
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The Russian public especially during the first war in Chechnya lived during a period that many 
could describe as being unstable and even anarchic on occasion.  Russian governmental officials, 
police and civil servants many times were corrupt, as has been mentioned over the course of this 
thesis.  During the second war, in which Putin has attempted to enforce some degree of ‘order’ 
apparently to counter the anarchy of the Yeltsin era, this state of affairs arguably has changed 
very little.  What role has Russian public opinion to play in this idea and how do the Chechen 
wars relate to this study?  In the context of this chapter, has this topic affected Russia’s post- 
Soviet democratisation?
As argued before, social practice in post-Soviet Russia has been absent a clearly defined rule of 
law.  In his chapter on ‘Social Relations and Political Practices in post-Communist Russia,’ 
Michael Urban discusses social life in Russia in relation to this.  Urban discusses the ‘grey zone’ 
in reference to ‘arenas in the social world in which practices are neither unconditionally 
permitted nor proscribed.’  This is natural in all countries, but usually quite contained.  However, 
in Russia, Urban finds that the ‘grey zone’ is ‘especially large.’  As representative of this, based 
on the research of Leonid Fituni, Urban uses the figure of 45 percent of GDP in 1997.509
Urban continues on to say that:
‘The size of the grey zone is conditioned by the fact that in actual practice-rather than on 
paper-the state has failed to draw firm lines separating permitted from proscribed 
behaviours.’510
509 Quotes from: Urban, Michael, ‘Social Relations and Political Practices in Post-Communist Russia,’ After 
Communism, (ed.) Donald R. Kelley, University of Arkansas Press, Fayettesville NC, 2003, p.  133.
510 Ibid, p. 133.
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mythologized that it was not that way during Soviet times and that there was greater order (as in 
an absence of corruption).  Of course, during the Marxist era, the corruption of the economy was 
theoretically proscribed.  Reality of the past was quite different, in reference to the Brezhnev era:
‘Central state direction of the economy was, at least in part, belied by growing black- and 
grey-market economies and even in the official state economy control by the centre was 
less than complete as the operational reality of the economy deviated substantially from 
that described in the official plan and planning system.’511
The grey area has always existed in Russia, but it definitely peaked in the Yeltsin era.  The 
estimate of 45 percent of GDP is an amazingly high figure compared to Western countries, and 
this paper will save a debate on this number for the economists amongst us as this figure is even 
perhaps difficult to believe, but nevertheless probably not impossible.
For a more extensive study of the existence of what is often referred to as ‘informal practices’ in 
Russian society, the best source can be found in Alena Ledeneva’s book, How Russia Really 
Works.  As Ledeneva argues, ‘informal practices were an integral part of post-socialist 
transformation.’  Continuing on:
‘These [informal] practices were not simply illegal but integrated the law into political, 
media, and business technologies, often manipulatively.  Similarly, they did not simply 
follow or contradict informal norms but relied on some of them and played one set of
S19
norms against the other.’
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511 Bova, Russell, ‘Democratization and the Crisis of the Russian State,’ State-Building in Russia: The Yeltsin 
Legacy and the Challenge of the Future, (ed.) Gordon B. Smith, M.E. Sharpe Inc. Armonk NY and London,  1999, p. 
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512 Ledeneva, Alena V., How Russia Really Works. Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY and London, 2006, p. 190.
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and the ability to speak out against the war.  Stories abound of how reporters were able to bribe 
their way across the battlefield with a pocket full of roubles and a few bottles of booze.  At the 
same time as initiating the war, the Yeltsin government was seen as being ‘in the pocket’ of 
high-level businessmen who were stealing from the people.  The state was falling apart, and 
widely disseminated reports from Chechnya showed young Russians dying en masse from 
senseless military strategies and rotted military hardware (as to be explored in greater detail later 
in this thesis), cut down by Chechens who bragged about their own sharpened wartime abilities.
Russian public opinion of course, as typical in many such societies, had no desire to tolerate this 
relative anarchy.  In the context of an unpopular war (something not experienced by other 
Eastern European democratising countries, except the parts of the former Yugoslavia), this 
situation was somewhat predictable.  As Huntington writes in reference to problems with 
democratisation:
‘Democratisation involves the removal of state constraints on individual behaviour, a 
loosening of social inhibitions, and uncertainty and confusion about standards of 
morality.  By weakening state authority, as it must, democratisation also brings into 
question authority in general and can promote an amoral, laissez faire, or ‘anything goes’ 
atmosphere.  Hence, although the evidence is sketchy and unsystematic, democratisation 
appears to involve an increase in socially undesirable behavior, including crime and drug 
use, and possibly to encourage disintegration of the family and other bastions of 
collective authority.’513
513 Huntington, Samuel, ‘Democracy for the Long Haul,’ Journal of  Democracy, Vol.7, No.2, Apr.  1996, p.7. (pp. 3- 
13)
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and lack of order to be appalling.  The Soviet era began to look better in comparison.  Many felt 
humiliated: feeling the loss of superpower status, the failure of the state to provide the elaborate 
array of benefits according to the understood social contract put even in the constitution, 
pensioners not receiving their pensions and workers not receiving their salaries.  At the same 
time, society was heavy with corruption, many times without even the semblance of government 
officials hiding their profiteering as in Soviet times (See again Urban’s research and analysis).
Russell Bova writes accurately in his chapter on ‘Democratization and the Crisis of the Russian 
State’ that in the Soviet period ‘the state was everything, and everything was the state.’ 
Continuing into the post-Soviet period (as this book was published in 1999), ‘elements of this 
Russian and Soviet tradition linger to this day.’
Despite this, Bova finds that:
‘And yet, despite this constitutionally powerful Russian presidency and the expanding 
state apparatus through which the president governs, for many Russians the central 
political problem is a very weak state.’514
Fear of anarchy is a distinct element of Russian public opinion on the issue of war in Chechnya, 
and public opinion changes in relation to the level and immediacy of the problem felt in Russia’s 
struggle for putting down the Chechen resistance.  A stable state in Chechnya becomes not the 
issue; Russian public opinion believes that the dominant priority is that a ‘bandit’ Islamic state 
should not be allowed, especially one containing perhaps the next Osama Bin Laden.
514 Bova, Russell, ‘Democratization and the Crisis of the Russian State,’ State-Building in Russia: The Yeltsin 
Legacy and the Challenge of the Future, (ed.) Gordon B. Smith, M.E. Sharpe Inc. Armonk NY and London,  1999, p. 
18.
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consolidating Russian democracy and countering state dominance.  However, as Boussard points 
out using Nicaragua as an example, ‘civil society does not necessarily serve democracy.’515  Her 
valid point is that an inefficient state does not mean the public will automatically turn to civil 
society, as in the case of Nicaragua where inefficient government led to citizens turning away 
from both political institutions and civil institutions.  In the Russian case, where precisely order 
often seems the prominent desire of the public, this is however less of a problem.  Just to have a 
developed civil society in the first place to counter the state on occasion would be of the greatest 
importance.
As Stephen White wrote in his book Russia’s New Politics, some elements of Russian public 
opinion were never adverse to the institution of order as some have suggested, even in 1991 
during the August Coup attempt.  Only in Moscow and St. Petersburg were there substantial 
immediate changes.  In some of the outlying regions, as has been important in other discussions 
in this paper, some totalitarian regimes on the local level reinforced themselves even more.516  In 
the same book, White covers public opinion study in further concise and accurate detail.  He 
points out how Russians were less concerned about constitutional reform (i.e. moving away from 
authoritarianism) or the Chechen situation (outside of the immediate perception of Yeltsin’s 
handling of the war) and more worried about economic issues:
‘What, so far as surveys were concerned, were the main concerns of ordinary Russians as 
the century drew to a close?  For the most part, they had little to do with constitutional 
design, or Russia’s place in a different world, or even the crisis in culture and public 
morality: most people were more concerned about how they were to earn a living in a 
rapidly changing economic environment.  In the late 1990s, it was prices and delays in
515 Boussard, Caroline, ‘Civil Society and Democratisation,’ Development and Democracy, (eds.) Ole Egstrom and 
Goren Hyden, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, pp.  170.
516 White, Stephen, Russia’s New Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 265-266.
296the payment of wages that game first in the list of public concerns (only a third of those 
who were asked in 1999 had received the previous months salary in full and on time).
The next most important public concerns were unemployment, the economic crisis, 
increasing crime, and the widening gap between rich and poor.  The conflict in Chechnya 
had become a less acute concern after a settlement was brokered in 1996... ’
That the conflict in Chechnya would tend to continue to become less of an issue in public 
opinion following 1996 (even upon the reinstitution of hostilities in 1999) have been a facet of 
the analysis in this thesis.  Some of these factors (unemployment, increasing crime, etc. as 
opposed to the Chechen war) were discussed as valuable benchmarks in the third chapter.
In the late 1990s, Boris Yeltsin was unable to carry out progressive policies towards the 
elimination, at least in perception, of an anarchic state.  Thus, the idea of Vladimir Putin and his 
‘dictatorship of the law’ was bom.  As shown from this chapter and in previous chapters,
Russian administration policies on civil society and on corruption have at the very least 
constrained democracy in favour of order.
In the context of the Chechen wars, the second war was going to be a rectification of the first, 
although to what extent has been up for debate.  Islamic extremism became the central enemy in 
the war, as opposed to Chechen nationalism, which in and of itself still harboured some 
disinterest, if not sympathy, in Russian public opinion.  Not surprisingly perhaps, given changing 
world views, Islamic extremism became a watch word for anarchy (which was to be fought 
against at any price), while ‘Chechen nationalism’ still related to a semblance of order (or anti­
anarchy, which was a sympathetic view for many Russians).  Where the concepts of ordered 
nationalism and anarchy became co-mingled, the enemy within and the enemy without was
517 Ibid, pp.  187.
297confused, leading to enhanced povyers of the president while taking advantage of the fears of the 
people in advancing a second war in Chechnya.
Conclusions
A primary point must be made on this subject.
All agreed (and even Putin through his policies) that in order to have democracy in any given 
country, there must be rule of law.  As seen in chapter four and sections of this chapter, 
regarding the existence of rule of law, there is a continuing lack of this basic foundation of 
democracy in the Russian case.
To further this however, democracy can not be made up as it goes along, as Putin has tried to do. 
Laws can not be made to fit the circumstances.  This thesis finds that Russia in this way is an 
authoritarian state, with Putin at the top.  During the Putin administration, with the onset of the 
second war in Chechnya, Russia has backtracked along the road to democracy.
This is not to say that Russia does not have other attributes of a democracy.  There are elections 
and there is voting.  There is a constitution of some validity.  There is a general level of freedom 
of speech (however viable it might be, given the state’s use of terror tactics on journalists 
mentioned in this thesis).
However, there has yet to be an election for a head of state that has been completely free or fair. 
Putin’s takeover from Yeltsin was largely rigged, albeit quite shrewdly in that case.  There are 
parliamentary elections, but they have been dominated by a centrist bloc loyal to Putin, and
298opposed weakly by progressive democratic forces and by a paper tiger Communist party that has 
stood little chance, given the weight of history, at positively opposing Putin.
Considering such reform, there are ways to recognize this in the context of Russian history.  As 
Viacheslav Nikonov writes:
‘Right now, we observe a return not so much to the Soviet, more to the Russian, as 
majorities in this basic thought, conscious matrix.  Liberal reforms stir up the legacy of 
not only the 70-year Communist regime, but the last thousand years of Russian 
history.’518
However, specifically the Chechen wars, both in their own way, have degraded any attempt at 
Russian democracy.  The first war burdened the government with a continuing threat to internal 
peace, much through its own failed policies.  The second war directly drained Russian 
democracy by giving the Russian government a position to balance relative civil freedoms 
against the question of what might be considered ‘necessary’ to combat the ‘threat.’  This was 
the case, thereby presenting the opportunity to hamper media freedom and the development of 
rule of law.
Russia now stands at a crossroads, somewhat independent of policy in Chechnya.  As detailed in 
research in chapters two, three and four, Russian society has accepted a need for conflict in 
Chechnya, there are few divisions in society on the issue, and the media has been muffled, and 
so therefore democratic debate on the issue has been silenced.
518 Nikonov, Viacheslav, ‘Rossiiskoe i sovetskoe v massovom soznanii,’ Sovremennaia Rossiiskaia Politika. 
Nikonov, Viacheslav (ed.), OLMA-PRESS, Moskva, 2003, p.  184.
299The Russian government could attempt to regain the path of developing the rule of law and build 
a basis for a strong democracy, but this is unlikely.  More easily, it could remain as a clientist 
state trapped in reactionary polity.  Also, because of a more or less successful public relations 
policy on the second war, Russia has had more room to manoeuvre in the times that have 
followed, while of course acknowledging that the Chechen situation is a continuing threat to 
stability.  As the ‘lid’ on the ‘pot-boiler’ of such conflicts rarely can be contained, essentially the 
region could blow up in importance at any given time.
As noted in the section on the theory of democratisation, Robert Dahl’s supposition in his book 
Democracy and Its Critics that the idea of ‘rule by the people’ has been exploited ‘almost 
universally’ to justify authoritarianism particularly in the late 20th century in order supposedly to 
further democratic values, has been further established by this thesis.  Putin and his 
parliamentary puppet United Russia party argue that they represent positive and progressive 
Russian thought, to the level of questioning the patriotism of possible media opposition.  Putin’s 
assertion and understanding of rule by the people precludes a position of political opposition 
without trivialization.
Yet, as previously discussed, given the minor weight of democratic tradition in Russia, Putin 
does mirror public opinion in many ways, and in turn the public mirrors him.
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Thesis Conclusions
The primary research question of this thesis was to ask why there was a difference in Russian 
public opinion between the two wars in Chechnya.  First, there was a need to establish that 
there was indeed a difference in Russian public opinion between the two wars within two 
relatively similar time periods (see chapter two).  In addition, there was a need to find out if there 
were particular cleavages in support or against the war within general Russian public opinion 
(see chapter three).  No substantial differences within support or opposition to the wars was 
found in specific cleavages given the data available.  Support for war appears to have cut across 
divisions within Russian public opinion.
In the fourth chapter on comparing governmental public relations on each of the Chechen wars, 
sometimes regarded as information warfare (IW), analysis supports the conclusion that Russian 
public opinion has come around to accept that, alongside the governmentally-projected 
appearance of competent leadership under President Vladimir Putin, the second war must not 
only be ‘necessary’ because of the threat to public order, but in order to stay proper, the war 
must be perceived to be ‘necessary.’  In Russian public opinion, it was deemed necessary that 
restraints be placed on the media.  This is diametrically opposed to the case of the first war 
where separately it was perceived by the Russian public as a war of President Boris Yeltsin’s 
‘choice.’
Further study on the effects of this (chapter five) in relation to the status of Russia’s democracy 
found that along with a public understanding of the ‘necessity’ of the Chechen war came an 
erosion of some democratic freedoms (including freedom of the press, as in chapter four) and an
301increase in presidential power in thp hands of President Putin, thereby tipping Russia back 
towards authoritarianism.
In summary, there was a difference in Russian public opinion in regard to the two Chechen 
wars because Russian public opinion had lost confidence in democracy of the nature of 
Yeltsin’s establishment of that concept (and, further, to call Yeltsin’s ‘democratic’ 
government a democracy is a stain upon the meaning of democracy).  Russian society’s 
desire for stability and ‘law and order’ became synonymous with a strongman who could 
demonstrate these notions through a renewed Chechen campaign.
The Yeltsin years allowed fear of instability to overcome desires for freedom in Russian society. 
Yeltsin failed to establish a stable government, corruption ran rampant, and Russian public 
opinion tired of that environment.  Through his rise to the presidency, his Chechen policies, and 
his administration’s policies on the media, Putin has taken advantage of this fear to establish a 
new perceived order in Russia.  Russia today is as close to being an autocracy as anything else.
Although there is still corruption equal to the Yeltsin years, the ‘perception’ of order portrayed 
by Putin has been enough to satisfy Russian public opinion, up to and including the policies of 
Putin in Chechnya.
At this point, the research chapters of this thesis should now be restated and detailed for a 
summary of other points made, along with some additional comments there have been 
established, in order to reflect a number of supplementary findings.
Chapter Two
302Chapter two examined changing trends in public opinion during the two time periods of war in 
Chechnya of 1994 to 1996 and 1999 to 2002.  Although the second war did not end in 2002, 
these two time periods have been sufficient to show trends in Russian domestic acuity within 
each of the two wars in Chechnya as well as to analyse what these differences in inclination say 
about changes in overall Russian political society as it relates to the Russian government and 
Chechen policy.  Strong variations were found in the public perceptions of each war period that 
corresponded to the coinciding environment and circumstances of the time.
In the case of the first war, the Russian public did not see a clear need to invade Chechnya.  This 
combined with a deepening loss of confidence in Boris Yeltsin himself and his administration’s 
post-Soviet era policies caused extensive dissatisfaction in Russian public opinion for the 
Russian government.  An expansion in terrorism and general anarchy in the North Caucasus 
region was blamed on the Yeltsin administration, and not on the Chechens themselves.
In that case, offensive use of the military was unpopular and perceived to be unnecessary.  From 
the Russian government side, it has been shown in parts of this thesis as well as in research by 
others (as detailed in the literature review/chapter one and in sections of chapter two) that then- 
President Boris Yeltsin was effectively out of ideas for re-invigorating his administration and 
finding the public support that he had lost since the days of his higher popularity in the 
immediate post-Soviet era.  Yeltsin’s mistake was that he believed patriotism, and thereafter 
confidence in his administration, could be engendered by the use of the military in a ‘short’ war. 
This proved to be greatly out of step with public opinion, and the public regarded it as such.
As compared to this, Russian public opinion had changed by 1999.  The Russian public by that 
year had gotten tired of the damage to pride created by the loss of empire.  Bombings on Russian 
soil blamed on Chechens separate from the context of an on-going war brought support for
303Vladimir Putin as a politician of rising prominence conveniently to portray himself as a leader 
espousing law and order.  Nevertheless, the second Chechen war has also been progressively 
unpopular; however the Russian people have accepted the perception of ‘necessity’ in the 
context of the conflict.  Russian public opinion put the blame for the war on what Putin has 
termed the ‘terrorists,’ and not on the Putin administration.
Chapter Three
The third chapter examined cleavages in Russian public opinion and their relationships to the 
Chechen war.  Few clear connections were successfully noted, and so therefore the conclusion 
has been made that, within Russian public opinion, what divisions that did exist in support or 
opposition of the war cut across traditional cleavages.
In studies of the eight cleavages of Russian society, popularity and public support on the 
Chechen war issue has been found to not be sourced by a particularly cogent constituency.  In 
almost all groups and sub-groups where differences could technically be found, such as where 
women seemed slightly more equally divided than not, such divergences were relatively slight. 
Much attention in this context was reflected back on conclusions found in the second chapter 
concerning overall trends in public support of the Chechen war.  Differences in Russian public 
opinion on the war in Chechnya seem to be focused not on any particular section of Russian 
society supporting or failing to support the war, but instead on general society gauging the level 
on which the Chechen war is determined to be a ‘problem,’ and then focusing on the relative 
level of confidence in the successive governments to solve the problem.
As promoted by the Russian government, there is seen here very little choice in the matter as 
presented to Russian public opinion, which is perhaps the point.  Wars in Chechnya within this
304context seem to be a throw-back to .the times of ‘imperial’ wars, and the Russian government, 
while feigning democracy, has become an increasingly ‘imperial’ state, where criticism of the 
‘king’ is indeed frowned upon.  Society, crossing many internal cleavages, either has or has not 
had confidence in the policies of the ‘king.’
One further point must be related as pertaining to chapters two and three.  It has been noticeable 
that the central enemy even in the second war has not been the Chechens as an ethnic group; 
studies found for this thesis find this to be the case.  Russian administration political actors have 
stressed that the Chechen war has not been an ethnic war, as the Chechen war has been portrayed 
frequently by the Chechen resistance.  Russian society, from this study and others, has seemed to 
accept in principle the idea of an independent Chechnya.  Instead, as again it must be stressed, 
the enemy as portrayed by Yeltsin and Putin has been the ‘terrorists’ and not the ‘Chechens.’ 
Consistently, this difference in regard for the war in Russian public opinion has been 
demonstrable.
Chapter Four
Further on the question of Russian political society on the war issue, chapter four looked at the 
question of media manipulation on Russian public opinion and on this relationship to the 
Chechen wars.  From the experience of the first Chechen war, this chapter found that the Russian 
government engendered a view of the necessity of media control and ‘strong’ (indeed heavy- 
handed) policy on public relations.  From the government standpoint, the media became a kind 
of scapegoat for the policies of the Yeltsin administration in initiation and management of the 
first war.  The Putin administration, in directing a second war, apparently decided that the real 
enemy was an uncontrolled press, and therefore to use what means it could to force Russian 
public opinion to accept the war as being necessary.  This has included the use of extra­
305constitutional and extra-legal methods, damaging some of the freedoms promised in the Russian 
post-Soviet era and consequently Russia’s democracy.  Especially since the terrorist attacks of 
11  September 2001  in America, as detailed by John Russell, the Putin administration has been 
able to blur the lines of contextualisation in which the Chechen war has been seen:
‘[Putin has been able] to eradicate memories of Yeltsin’s ‘bad’ war, by presenting the 
entire confrontation with the Chechens as, if not a ‘good’, then certainly a ‘necessary’ 
war.’519
In this way, no longer is the Chechen war seen as good or bad, but as something simply justified.
It is true, and must be pointed out again, that both wars were unpopular.  By the time of Putin, 
however, the perception of the conflict in Chechnya as a policy had changed, even though 
militarily, except for some improvements in strategy concerning front line troop makeup, there 
was little difference in tactics.  Civilians have often been the target intentionally or not in both 
wars, while the Russian military machine has continued to attempt to use overwhelming force 
and air power to eliminate Chechen military elements and strong points.
Assisted by state attempts to dominate the media, and by a public fearful of terrorism thereby 
possibly displaying the consequences of a second failed Chechen war, the relative unpopularity 
of the first war has been overcome in Russian public opinion in the case of the second. 
Collectively, Russian society no longer perceives the war as a personal choice of a President as 
in the days of Yeltsin, but instead as a necessary evil.  However, it should be reiterated that 
necessity, as seen in this thesis, does not equate to popularity.
519 Russell, John, ‘A War by Any Other Name: Chechnya, 11 September and the War Against Terrorism,’ 
Chechnya: From Past to Future, (ed.) Richard Sakwa, Anthem Press, London, 2005, p. 240.
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Chapter Five
The fifth chapter was written to discuss the relationship between Russian public opinion, the 
Chechen wars, and the question of whether Russia is democratic, authoritarian, or something in 
between.  It was found that in the 1990s, there was a period of  potential democracy that in the 
Putin era lapsed back towards a type of autocratic authoritarianism more commonplace perhaps 
in so-called ‘Third World’ countries, as demonstrated by this research on Russian public opinion 
and the two Chechen wars.  This chapter established the basis for answering the research 
question as detailed in the thesis introduction.
Final Thoughts
Having conducted research for this thesis, the author further concludes that (somewhat indirectly 
on the topic of Russian ‘democracy’) there are six elements of importance often referred to in 
different fashions within Russian public opinion that are worth mentioning at this point.  In 
interviews conducted for this thesis, often these subjects were notably prominent and, as a final 
point of debate, should be presented here.  To list them, these are:
1) Stability
2) Economy
3) Mythmaking
4) Ethnicity
5) Democracy
6) Authoritarianism
307Out of all of  these, as shown by this thesis overall, the most important seems to have become 
stability, following a shift in Russian public opinion between the two wars in Chechnya.  During 
the first war, fundamental stability of Russia was not seen to be in danger.  During the second 
war, stability seems to have taken on a pre-eminent dominance over the other five possible 
elements.
For instance, from data graphed in chapter three concerning overall percentages of ‘weak 
hawks,’520 there is a strong desire for stability over economy.  Mythmaking, or those who 
support purely a strong Russia myth, seems to be quite prominent also, although not as powerful 
as the more fundamental element of stability.  As shown frequently, while being a strong element 
of Russian public opinion in its own right, ethnicity seems to be far from a dominant underlying 
point on which to analyze Russian society’s change in support of strong policy in Chechnya.
In Russian societal thought, the question as debated in the fifth chapter of democracy versus 
authoritarianism has also become a largely moot point.  The efforts of the Russian political elite 
to ‘guide’ the political system has dominated to the point where Russian public opinion does not 
consider the terms on which their own democracy is being lost, as seen through the often 
successful attempts by the Russian government to limit open criticism of policies.
Indeed following from these concepts, some observations are perhaps necessary to be reiterated:
As for the author’s viewpoint, generally, ethnic Russians with whom I spoke during research for 
this thesis accepted the war, although they were not supporters of the war, at least in the 
traditional sense.  The vast majority of those who were young enough to serve in the Army were
520 Again, those who end their support of the Chechen war following a degree of resource loss in men or material.
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even they were willing to accept the war, or at least not to vocally oppose the war.  They were 
willing to see the ‘requirements’ of the Russian army pacifying Chechnya, especially as long as 
they did not have to have to contribute to the war effort.
This brings up again the question of economy versus stability.  However, stability wins again, as 
the effects of a bad situation in economy and resources has been softened greatly by the rise in 
oil prices and the general disconnect seen by those who have no personal involvement in relation 
to those who have been sent to fight on the Russian side in this newest conflict.
Again on the idea of the authoritarian/democracy question, there is the continuing theme of 
confidence.  In Ellen Camaghan’s 2001 Slavic Review article where she talks about her many 
interviews with Russian citizens concerning democracy, she finds that:
‘Most of my interviewees do not share many of the particular beliefs supposedly
characteristic of traditional, undemocratic Russian political culture.  Most of them are
ready to vote, to obey the law, and, save exorbitant tax rates on private businesses, to pay
their taxes.  Similarly, most are ready to countenance the disorder of representative
government, even under conditions when they have practically no faith that their so-
called representatives care a whit about the people they are supposed to represent.  Few
were willing to sacrifice newfound freedoms to autocratic leaders who could get things
done.  On the other hand, my respondents had little confidence in the presidency, less in
the State Duma, and none in the police.  Many of my respondents so despaired of ever
having well-functioning political institutions that they were unwilling to take action to
^  1
improve the ones they had.’
521 Camaghan, Ellen, ‘Thinking About Democracy: Interviews with Russian Citizens,’ Slavic Review, Vol. 60, No.
2, Summer 2001, p. 363. (pp. 336-366)
309Insofar as these sentiments relate to my study of the Chechen war, the author has found that 
these points are correct up until the point where the conflict there becomes a clear perceived 
danger to Russian society.  At that point, as Camaghan elaborates, Putin’s policies are accepted 
on the basis that:
‘In many respects, my interviewees’ opinions seemed to be reflections of the institutions 
under which they lived, rather than cultural predispositions that made democracy 
suspect.’522
The idea of Putin as simply a competent leader clearly dominates, as opposed to the perception 
of authoritarianism, even when the perception might be justified to deem his administration to be 
clearly as such.  The research in this thesis supports and adds to the prominence and validation of 
this argument.
To summarize, Russia has little hope in changing the Chechen war as an issue at this junction, 
beyond the attempts at Chechenization seen in recent years.  However, outside of this, the 
government is virtually unable to intensify the campaign there in any imaginative way, and it 
cannot pull support.  As almost by tradition, the future likely sees Russia and Chechnya remain 
locked in an ongoing struggle in the region.
Over the course of this thesis, the Chechen war has been used to evaluate Russian public opinion 
in both of the aspects suggested in the title.
522 Ibid, p. 363.
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lines of decisions made in the environment of the fall of the Soviet Union.  This included the 
adaptation of the theory and practice of democracy to a population that never before had 
experienced such a mode of government as an accepted ideal.  Unsurprisingly based on history, 
part of this adaptation has been to impose a uniquely Russian ‘style’ to democracy.
Over the evolution of Russian public opinion (the second part of the enquiry), this has meant an 
imposition of a heavier authoritarian element to what exists as ‘Russian democracy’ than in most 
other longer-term democracies.  Necessities of the Chechen war (and the ‘war on terrorism’ 
whether or not the two are in concert) have hastened an acceptance of authoritarianism beyond 
what some adherents to democracy, both internally and externally, have found comfortable.  Yet, 
this has not been perceived as a threat by Russian society, and indeed the Russian public accepts 
such policy as necessary.
Will democratic thought, over the long term, rebound in Russia?  Will democracy one day be 
attained?  For now, it is difficult to tell.  As discussed, the establishment of the rule of law and a 
neutral state capability to enforce it are the most important and biggest topics of discussion for 
any further analysis.  The initiation of the Chechen wars has reflected an overtly undemocratic 
polity, and the creation and continuity of policies meant to continue the conflict have eroded 
Russian democracy greatly.
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Jason Vaughn
Thesis: 'Russian Public Opinion and the Two Chechen Wars, 1994-96 and 1999-2002:  Formation and Evolution'
These graphs cover most of the data used in this thesis; other data as cited from other sources unavaliable at the time appendix designed.
Chapter Two, Graph One
Support - President of Russia
1 9 9 4
May July September
Entirely Support His Actions 8 .8 7 .9 6 .5
Aqree With Some of His Actions 3 1 .5 3 2 .2 2 9 .8
Consider That He Should Resign 3 7 .9 3 7 .6 4 0 .5
Difficult to Answer 2 1 .8 2 2 .2 2 2 .9
No Answer 0.1 0.1 0 .3
Chapter Two, Graph Two
"Trust'' in Yeltsin
VCIOM Express
1994
January March July September October
Absolutely Do Not Trust 14 2 2 3 3 3 0 31
To a Great Deqree, I Do Not Trust 15 14 9 1 2 14
More Do Not Trust, Than Trust 17 14 15 15 16
Equally Trust and Distrust 19 17 1 7 2 0 14
More Do Trust, Than Not 13 9 8 6 6
To a Great Deqree, I Trust 8 8 6 3 4
Absolutely Trust 4 6 3 3 3
Difficult to Answer 10 10 9 11 12
Chapter Two, Graph Three
VCIOM Express
"Support" in Yeltsin 1994-4 1994-5 1994-6 1994-7 1994-9 1995-3 1995-7
16.04.1994- 12.05.1994- 06.06.1994- 06.07.1994- 13.09.1994- 10.03.1995- 03.07.1995-
07.05.1994 30.05.1994 26.06.1994 27.07.1994 07.10.1994 03.04.1995 21.07.1995
I support his actions completely. 9 9 7 8 7 2 2
I don't aqree with some of his actions. 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 31 2 6 2 5
I consider that he should resign. 3 8 3 7 3 8 3 6 4 0 5 7 5 6
Difficult to answer 21 2 2 21 2 3 2 2 16 17Chapter Two, Graph Five
"Who Will You Vote For?"
VCIOM Express
January February March April May June
B. Yeltsin 8 11 15 18 2 8 3 6
G. Zyuganov 2 0 2 4 2 5 2 6 2 7 2 4
A. Lebed 10 8 8 10 6 10
G. Yavlinsky 13 9 11 10 9 8
V. Zhirinovsky 10 12 9 8 7 6
S. Fyodorov 8 7 7 8 7 3
A. Tuleyev 2 1
M. Gorbachev 1 1 1 1 1 1
V. Bryntsalov 0 0 0
M. Shakkum 0 0
Yu. Vlasov 0 0 0
Someone else 13 21 8 6 1 0
None of the Above 2 3 4 2 1 2
Hard to say 15 14 12 9 10 9
Chapter Two, Graph Six
VCIOM Express
"Trust" in Yeltsin 1996-5 1996-6 1996-7 1996-9 1996-11
22.03.1996- 04.04.1996- 17.04.1996- 26.04.1996- 31.05.1996-
27.03.1996 10.04.1996 24.04.1996 05.05.1996 05.06.1996
Entirely Trust 5 5 5 7 8
Basically Trust 20 22 2 1 26 27
Basically Don't Trust 24 26 26 23 2 1
Completely Don’t Trust 40 39 38 32 34
Do Not Know 0 0 1 0 0
Difficult  to Answer 1 1 8 9 1 1 10
Chapter Two, Graph Seven
Trends in Support tor War 2000
January February March April May July June August September October November December
Continue the war effort 68 70 69 68 56 55 50 50 50 44 45 47
Begin negotiations 24 22 23 23 35 33 4 1 39 37 47 48 42
2001
January February March April May July June August September October November December
48 38 44 36 34 33 36 30 4 1 40 43 43
4 1 50 46 54 58 55 53 59 45 50 48 48
- 2002
January February March April May July June August September October November
38 34 33 34 3 1 33 29 3 1 34 46 48 36
5 1 57 60 58 62 59 6 1 59 57 45 43 54Chapter Two, Graph Eight
‘To what degree do you approve or 
disapprove ot activities of President Putin?’
2000
October November December
Entirely Approve 25 24 26
More Often Approve, Than Not 46 42 46
More Often Not Approve 13 16 12
Entirely Not Approve 6 7 6
Difficult to Answer/Refuse to Answer 9 10 10
Chapter Two, Graph Nine
VCIOM Express
Putin's Performance (Average) 
(Rating 1  to 10)
2000
January March May July September November
5.92 5.67 5.39 5.17 5.18
2001
January March May July September November
5.73 5.51 5.42 5.58 5.76 5.98
2002
January March May July September November
6.08 5.83 5.93 5.89 6.23 6.36
Chapter Two, Graph Ten
I VCIOM Express
‘How do you rank in the current time 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2000 2000 2000
the material position of your family?' May May May May May May May July September October
Very good 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Good 5 5 5 4 4 3 5 6 4 5
Medium 48 45 43 41 39 38 48 46 45 46
Bad 33 35 38 38 39 39 31 34 37 35
Very bad 11 12 12 15 16 17 13 12 12 11
Difficult to answer 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2
2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2002 2002 2002
January March May July September October November January March May
Very good 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
Good 5 4 5 7 7 6 6 8 7 7
Medium 51 50 54 51 53 52 51 49 53 53
Bad 32 32 31 31 29 32 33 33 31 32
Very bad 10 10 8 9 8 9 7 8 7 6
Difficult to answer 1 4 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 2Chapter Two, Graph Eleven
(abbreviated ques.)
'What do you think should 
take place in a hostage situation?'
VCIOM Express
2001 2002 2002
September September November
Neutralize the criminals even if it result 
Avoid bloodshed at all costs 
Don't know
33 33 53
58 54 37
10 12 10
Chapter Two, Graph Twelve
"What feelings does information about 
operations of Russian troops the 
in Chechnya arouse in you?"
VCIOM Express
1999 2000 2001 2002
November July Juni December
Admiration 3 2 3 1
Satisfaction 21 15 10 6
Anxiety 5 5 6 3 5 5 6 2
Shame 9 7 12 15
No Special Feeling 8 7 14 10
I don't know 4 6 6 6
Chapter Three, Graph One
‘in general what is your attitude towards the 
Chechens?'
09.11.1998-
23.11.1998
01.11.2000-
14.11.2000
02.11.2002-
16.11.2002
With sympathy and interest 2 1 1
Easy, as with any other, without 
special feelings
48 45 34
With irritation and hostility 29 31 36
With mis-trust and fear 21 22 30
Chapter Three, Graphs Two and Three
Anti-War Responses 26-29.11.1999 24-27.12.1999 14-17.1.2000 21-24.1.2000 25-28.2.2000 17-20.3.2000 7-10.4.2000 26-29.5.2000 20-25.7.2000 22-25.9.2000 27-30.10.2000
Overall 'Doves'
Male Doves 
Female Doves 
Overall 'Weak Hawks' 
Male Weak Hawks 
Female Weak Hawks
27 22 23 24 22 23 23 35 41 37 47
37 32 24 29 23 25 28 29 33 35 36
63 68 76 71 77 75 72 71 67 65 64
17 16 21 17 11 12 14 14 21 19 18
42 32 41 37 31 32 38 46 40 36 43
58 68 59 63 69 68 62 54 60 64 57Chapter Three, Graph Four
Who Do You Trust?' President Army
Organs of 
State
Overall - Trust A Lot 
Males - Trust A Lot 
Females -Trust a Lot 
Overall - Do Not Trust 
Males - Do Not Trust 
Females - Do Not Trust
5 2 3 3 2 2
5 0 3 5 2 6
5 4 3 2 2 0
8 18 19
9 19 21
7 17 1 7
Chapter Three, Graph Five
April 2000 - Chechnya - Separation From 
Russia?
1 8 -2 9 3 0 -5 9 6 0 + Total
It has already happened in fact. 9 7 6 7
I would be pleased by such an event. 2 3 19 15 19
It wouldn't make any difference to me. 21 17 17 1 8
I'm aqainst this, but I accept it. 2 5 2 8 31 2 8
We must prevent it by by all means, ini 2 2 2 9 31 2 8
Chapter Three, Graphs Six and Seven
Anti-War Responses 26-29.11.1999 24-27.12.1999 14-17.1.2000 21-24.1.2000 25-28.2.2000 17-20.3.2000 7-10.4.2000 26-29.5.2000 20-25.7.2000 22-25.9.2000 27-30.10.2000
Overall 'Doves'
Overall 'Weak Hawks'
Doves -18-24 
Weak Hawks -18-24 
Doves - 25-39 
Weak Hawks - 25-39 
Doves - 40-54 
Weak Hawks - 40-54 
Doves - 55 and Older 
Weak Hawks - 55 and Older
2 7 2 2 2 3 2 4 22 2 3 2 3 3 5 41 3 7 4 7
1 7 16 21 17 11 12 14 14 21 19 18
14 2 0 12 13 16 2 0 12 13 14 14 12
19 12 14 16 14 9 18 18 15 15 10
3 0 2 4 2 9 2 4 2 6 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 8 2 9 2 7
31 3 2 3 0 31 3 2 3 5 3 5 16 2 7 3 4 31
2 6 2 3 2 4 2 2 2 3 22 2 4 21 2 2 2 3 2 7
2 6 2 6 2 6 2 5 2 6 19 2 3 3 0 31 2 7 2 0
3 0 3 3 3 4 41 34 2 9 3 5 3 7 3 7 3 5 3 4
3 4 3 0 3 0 2 9 2 9 3 6 2 4 3 6 2 7 2 5 3 9
Chapter Three, Graph Eight
Who Do You Trust?' President Army
Organs of 
State
Overall - Trust A Lot 
Under 29 - Trust A Lot 
30-49 -Trust a Lot 
50 and Older - Trust A Lot 
Overall - Do Not Trust 
Under 29 - Do Not Trust 
30-49 - Do Not Trust 
50 and Older - Do Not Trust
5 2 3 3 2 2
5 4 2 9 2 6
4 8 3 2 21
5 5 3 7 21
8 18 19
6 2 5 17
8 19 21
8 13 19Chapter Three, Graphs Nine, and Ten
Anti-War Responses 26-29.11.1999 24-27.12.1999 14-17.1.2000 21-24.1.2000 25-28.2.2000 17-20.3.2000 7-10.4.2000 26-29.5.2000 20-25.7.2000 22-25.9.2000 27-30.10.2000
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Chapter Three,  Graph Fourteen
Those who consider the Chechen war to be a 
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"Problem" according to self-ranked class
Lower class
Lower-
middle
class
Medium-
middle
class
Higher-
middle
class/Upper
class
Difficult to 
answer
Continuing war in Chechnya 16.6 11.9 16.6 18.7 11.9 16.9
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Chapter Four, Graphs One and Two
Surveys of TV watchers Often Sometimes Rarely Never
Difficult to 
Answer
Percentaqe of those who watch state-c 56 24 17 3 <1
Percentage of those who watch NTV 52 23 14 10 <1Bibliography
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